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Social intelligence has a huge impact on the determination of human behaviour in the
society. The use of norms can contribute to advances in this social intelligence by
the provision of appropriate behaviour based upon the understanding of social situa-
tions. Hence, the domain of virtual characters research has given much attention to
take advantage of these characteristics of norms particularly in engineering human-like
behaviour. However, a lack of capability in reasoning about norms as well as a lack of
norm autonomy in virtual characters have significantly diminished the naturalism in vir-
tual characters behaviour. Within this context, a hybrid approach incorporating social
and individual reasoning inspired by socio-cognitive theory is taken into account in this
thesis. To this end, we propose DNA3, Distributed Norm Aware Agent Architecture,
established through the integration of (i) the institution, a normative framework per-
forming the social reasoning, (ii) N-Jason, a (BDI-type) cognitive agent carrying out
run-time norm-aware deliberation and (iii) a virtual character in charge of perception
and realisation of actions.
The institution takes responsibility of (i) analysis of state of external worlds by
recording a sequence of event occurrences observed by multiple virtual agents, (ii) rea-
soning about situationally appropriate behaviour with an assistance from Answer Set
Programming (ASP) solver depending upon the social context virtual characters en-
counter and (iii) in turn detachment of a new set of norms, more precisely normative
consequences of specific actions, to virtual characters. This contributes to the enhance-
ment in the flexibility in specifying and reasoning about social norms subject to changes
of social situations. Those detached norms are involved in the reasoning process of in-
dividual virtual characters. In here, a norm-aware BDI-type agent, N-Jason, performs
a practical reasoning to select a plan to execute between norms and goals. Basically,
N-Jason offers a generic norm execution mechanism on top of norm aware deliberation
to contribute to the exploitation of run-time norm compliance. The selection of agent
ii
behaviour is achieved in the norm-aware deliberation process by intention scheduling
with deadlines and priorities. This improves the rationality in the choice of behaviour
with taking into account the preference on norms and goals in agent mind by evaluation
of the importance and imminence between feasible plans triggered by both norms and
goals.
The design and simulation of politeness is presented as an evaluation of DNA3 with
respect to the effectiveness and adequacy in modelling virtual characters behaviour.
The emphasis in here lies on the capability that is able to exhibit different types of
appropriate polite behaviour in response to frequent changes in social situations. This
is mainly driven by two main activities: prediction of other participants’ intention is
carried out by norm-aware virtual characters whilst the understanding of context and
reasoning about relevant social behaviour is performed in normative frameworks. For
this purpose, three case studies are provided in this thesis: (i) politeness in navigation
of individuals, (ii) politeness in the formation and navigation of groups during a guided
tour, and(iii) evacuation model as a politeness in the emergency situation. The evalu-
ation is conducted by measuring: (i) the appropriateness of in response to scenarios
(e.g. a number of avoiding collisions) and (ii) the reliability of agent decision making
(e.g. a response time in relation to norms with the highest priority and the most urgent).
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Social intelligence is an essential ingredient in human intelligence [Bandura, 2005,
Dautenhahn, 2007]. It plays a substantial role in decision making which influences
thought and action in the various social situations people encounter. Norms have a
potential to contribute to advances in social intelligence of agents since not only do
norms offer guidance about correct behaviour in social situations, they also provide
better understanding about a current social interaction. Hence, it might be seen that the
addition of normative reasoning to virtual characters can be regarded as a way in which
to improve characters’ decision making and thus to perform enhanced responses which
appear more socially acceptable.
This thesis aims to design and simulate human-like behaviour in virtual characters
taking into account the benefits arising from the use of norms. We basically pursue
a socio-cognitive approach incorporating a social and a cognitive dimension into the
reasoning process of virtual characters behaviour to this end [Stein, 1993, Bandura,
2001, Akgu¨n et al., 2003]. Therefore, we describe a computational model, Distributed
Norm-Aware Agent Architecture (DNA3), established by norm-aware (BDI-type) cog-
nitive agents under the governance of normative frameworks for the purpose of engi-
neering norm-aware Intelligent Virtual Agents (IVAs). Given DNA3, we intend IVA
behaviour to mimic better – in the way socio-cognitive theory addresses it – how hu-
mans behave under various social settings, through the combination of each IVA’s own
contextual information, constructed by its cognition (which represents the cognitive
dimension) and socially constructed beliefs (e.g. norms or expectation) from other par-
ticipants (which represents the social dimension).
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In this chapter, we firstly present the motivation for the research in Section 1.1,
then the problems we would like to solve are described in Section 1.2. It is followed
by the contribution of the approaches in this thesis in Section 1.3. After the approach
in Section 1.4, the whole structure of this thesis is given in Section 1.5. At the end
of the chapter, related publications which are the basis of this thesis are discussed in
Section 1.6.
1.1 Motivation
Virtual environments (VEs) have seen significant developments in recent years, moving
from virtual worlds designed for specific purposes (e.g. on-line games) to more general-
purpose environments which are not for entertainment but for serious games, resulting
in changes in form, scope and purpose [Messinger et al., 2009]. With these changes in
application domain has come a demand for more human-like virtual characters in the
context of more sophisticated and dynamic VEs.
The human-likeness stands for a conception that virtual worlds and its participants
should bear a close resemblance to human behaviours in the real world. Consequently,
two approaches are widely accepted as a prerequisite: (i) to pursue realism in appear-
ance through computer graphics research, on the one hand, and (ii) to build naturalism
in behaviours as an outcome of AI on the other. Since the former, realism in appearance,
has been more or less satisfied due to the dramatic development of graphics technology,
the latter, naturalism in virtual characters behaviour, is lately being paid more attention
for the enhancement of human-likeness.
In AI domains, the embodiment of human-like behaviour has been a long term chal-
lenge. One main theme to this end is to simulate and/or replicate the social aspect of
human intelligence [Payr and Trappl, 2004], which has been given more attention in
order to make robots/agents appear smarter (i.e. looks more human-like or believable
in behaviour). In so doing, the robots/agents can exhibit improved responses (i.e. so-
cially more acceptable behaviour) to the other participants (e.g. humans, robots, agents,
intelligent softwares) in that circumstance [Walters et al., 2008].
The use of norms has an impact on improving the social intelligence of robots and
(software) agents. In principle, norms are socially constructed beliefs which represent
patterns of appropriate actions in various social settings. Norms can influence human
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thought and action by means of the deontic forces they impose, which indicate ‘the way
things are or the way things should be’ [Stein, 1997]. In addition, norms could be de-
scribed as human “expectations” during social interactions. In other words, norms are
able to act as a window to interpret the associated (tangible) contents (e.g. the informa-
tion and transactions participants communicate each other) of an interaction [Mitchell,
1973]. Therefore, to consider those characteristics of norms ensures the appropriateness
in behaviour with respect to the mutual expectation which manifest a proper choice on
either a desire individuals want to pursue or an action they can actually do in the social
context. [Stein, 1993].
One interesting finding in virtual environment domains is that norms can influence
virtual character behaviour as humans do in the real human society. As Yee et al. [Yee
et al., 2007] show, social behaviours of human controlled characters with regards to
Inter-Personal Distance (IPD) are governed by the same social norms as those in the
real human society. Depending on gender, intimacy or cultural background, player
characters (PCs) exhibit different levels of IPD, such as whether or not to keep a certain
distance, to avoid eye contacts between avatars or to change the avatar’s focus of at-
tention in response to the inter-personal context, which shows a very similar behaviour
pattern as those that humans perform in the real world. Friedman et al. [Friedman
et al., 2007] also ensure this aspect in virtual characters behaviour with the investiga-
tion of the spatial distance between human controlled avatars during the conversation
with others.
Whilst those observations are rather focused on inter-relational norms, there is an-
other example that norms also have an affect on conventional (social) behaviour. Sam-
peri et al. [Samperi et al., 2012] discover the particular patterns in navigation of PCs.
Interestingly, PCs perform exactly the same behaviour as we can see in the real world
when people explore the parks or gardens. They are likely to keep to the path or road
rather than wandering on the grass (or green) area while they are navigating to a des-
tination, despite the shortest path obviously running across the grassed area. Although
there might not be sanctions or punishment in the case of the violation of norms, play-
ers seem likely to control their avatar to do the “right thing” as players would normally
in a park.
This implies that if we wish the behaviour of virtual characters (e.g. non-player
characters (NPCs)) to resemble human behaviour more closely, then it is desirable
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somehow to convey those real world human social norms into the agent mind. Hence,
we believe that to take into account an impact (or deontic forces) of norm on human
behaviour promises better human-likeness in the design and simulation of NPCs be-
haviour.
1.2 Problem Statement
In the domain of virtual environments, the use of norms for NPCs behaviour is com-
monly achieved by two approaches:
Approach (1) The one is to make use of individual agent reasoning independently. In
this case, NPCs have in their mind pre-defined, situation specific norms
and their associated plans, in order to be able to exhibit norm compliant
behaviour. When NPCs perceive actions and events occuring in the vir-
tual world, NPCs carry out reactive decision making whether to comply
norms or not subject to the current percept [Pedica and Ho¨gni Vilhje´lmsson,
2010, Si et al., 2006].
Approach (2) The other is to make use of social (norm) reasoning via normative frame-
works (also called institutions) [Bogdanovych et al., 2008b, Almajano
et al., 2013], or in conjunction with individual agent reasoning [Ranathunga,
2013, Baines and Padget, 2014]. The normative frameworks are able
to perform automated norm reasoning in response to observations from
the external environment (virtual worlds in this case), determine which
norms are the most appropriate in the current situation and detach those
norms into NPCs’ mind. Whenever new norms are detached, the receiv-
ing NPC perform its individual reasoning.
In general, individual reasoning which actually refers to decision making in NPCs
mind brings about an associated behaviour in an open environment. According to
Russel and Norvig [Russell and Norvig, 2002], the decision making is usually per-
formed by three types of agents: (i) Reactive agents, (ii) Utility based agents and
(iii) Goal oriented agents. In the domain of NPCs research, NPC behaviour is also
typically determined by those agent models. For example, the literature contains ap-
proaches to design reactive plans associated with norms via reactive agents [Pedica and
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Ho¨gni Vilhje´lmsson, 2010], to program goals and plans leading to norm-compliant be-
haviour [Ranathunga, 2013, Baines and Padget, 2014] with goal oriented agents, or to
provide probatility and utility distribution of actions for planning to norm compliant
behaviour [Si et al., 2006] based on utility oriented agents. Although such approaches
have become a standard means to design AI with norms in NPC behaviour, it gives rise
to a couple of issues in decision making with norms.
On the one hand, in both cases (approach 1 and 2), NPCs are likely to be regimented
by design. In other words, the most significant point, in our view, is that agents do
not have the possibility to reason about norm compliance: they are required simply to
follow pre-defined behaviours to comply with norms without deliberation on norms,
goals and potential sanctions. This may cause deprivation of agent (norm) autonomy
since pre-defined behaviours in effect are treated as hard constraints, whose violation
is not possible.
On the other hand, particularly in approach 1, norms in this type of agents are too
domain specific to be adaptive subject to the changes of situations. In other words,
norms are usually a pre-defined set of desirable behaviour dedicated to the specific
situations in the virtual environments. When the situation is changed, the norms in the
agent mind might be no longer valid in the new situation subsequently. To be able to
behave correctly ‘in real time’, ‘at right places’ and ‘being associated with interactions
amongst other participants’ in response to the changes of situation, reasoning about
norms themselves should be considered.
Within this context, we have four questions in mind with regards to the above two
issues:
(Q1) How to reason about norms subject to dynamic changes of situations in which
virtual characters are involved,
(Q2) How to share the new set of norms (constructed by collectives) with virtual char-
acters at run-time,
(Q3) How to ensure norm-aware decision making in virtual characters behaviour, and
(Q4) How to share virtual characters’ percepts with both individual agents reasoning
and social norm reasoning at run-time.
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1.3 Contributions
The central mission of the thesis is to design and simulate norm-aware behaviour of vir-
tual characters. We believe that the consideration of norms and the values they impose
ensures more socially acceptable responses from virtual character, so that it enhances
the behaviour of virtual characters to make it more human-like with respect to social
itelligence.
As mentioned earlier in Section 1.2, the involvement of norms in virtual charac-
ters’ decision making, according to published work, can be accomplished by either
social (norms) reasoning or individual agents reasoning. We pursue a hybrid approach
inspired by socio-cognitive theory [Stein, 1993] (or social cognitive theory [Bandura,
2001]), a combination of the two, in this thesis. We begin to set out the motivation and
justification in section 1.4, below.
As a result, the primary contributions of the thesis is:
“The provision of a Distributed Norm-Aware Agent Architecture (DNA3)
via the combination of cognitive and social reasoning in order to engineer
norm-aware behaviour in virtual characters.”
DNA3 facilitates a socio-cognitive perspective on agent decision-making by means
of the combination of social norms reasoning and individual cognitive reasoning. In
practice, this is a programming framework for norm-aware virtual characters behaviour
which consists of:
1. institutions, which are normative frameworks that perform social reasoning,
2. N-Jason, which is a BDI-type cognitive agent carrying out the norm-aware indi-
vidual reasoning and
3. virtual characters that are in charge of perception and realisation of actions in
virtual environments.
Institutions (also called normative frameworks) can be viewed as a kind of exter-
nal repository of (normative) knowledge from which guidance may be delivered to
agents. It is composed of a set of rules whose purpose is the governance of individual
agents in the society. These rules are not just hard-coded recipes presenting reactive
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behaviours (such as those in the static expert systems), but which rather describe con-
sequences in response to knowledge or observations for reasoning about the current
context, resulting in situation-specific norms. The framework not only identifies cor-
rect and incorrect actions but also normative facts such as obligations, permissions and
prohibitions through the institutional trace, that records the institutions evolving inter-
nal state, subject to observed external events captured from the external world. The
main contribution of institutions given those characteristics is as follows:
C1-1 To design and specify norms and external events triggerings these norms as per-
ceived by NPCs in the virtual environment,
C1-2 To perform automated norm reasoning, i.e. which norms are the most appropriate
in the situation NPCs and humans are encountering and
C1-3 To share social information by means of detachment of (social) norms to NPCs.
The virtual character’s behaviour is planned and executed through decision mak-
ing in (BDI-type) cognitive agents, when institutions bring about new norms (more
precisely normative consequences of specific actions) via a social reasoning technique
with the assistance of an Answer Set Programming solver. Consequently, such detached
norms are involved in the practical reasoning process of individual agents.
In this system, a norm-aware BDI-type agent, N-Jason, performs practical reason-
ing to select a plan to execute incorporating norms and goals. Basically, N-Jason offers
a run-time norm execution mechanism on top of norm aware deliberation to contribute
to the exploitation of run-time norm compliance. Thus, it is capable of the operational-
ization of new and unknown (event-based) norms not stated in the agent program at
run-time by judging the executability of those norms. At the same time, the selec-
tion of agent behaviour is achieved in the norm-aware deliberation process by inten-
tion scheduling with deadlines, priorities and prohibitions. It enables the evaluation of
the importance and imminence between feasible intentions triggered by both detached
norms and goals, which confirms the decision about which behaviour an agent would
prefer between goals, norms and sanctions. In conclusion, the main contribution of
N-Jason is as follows:
C2-1 To provide run-time norm execution on top of the BDI practical reasoning and
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C2-2 To carry out norm-aware deliberation (on norms, goals and sanctions).
Lastly, one another (practical) contribution of this thesis is the proposal of a mid-
dleware, the Bath-Sensor-Framework (BSF). This BSF facilitates the integration of het-
erogeneous software systems. Heterogeneity stands for the differences in programming
languages to develop the software and platforms (or operating systems) to run software
in this context. Given both pub/sub and message based communication on top of stan-
dard network protocol (XMPP), BSF enables the integration of cognitive agents, vir-
tual agents and normative frameworks by supporting multiple programming lanuguages
(e.g. Java, C# and JavaScript) as well as distributed physical locations. In summary,
the contribution of BSF is:
C3-1 Middleware and engineering methodology to integrate normative frameworks,
norm-aware agents, NPCs and virtual environments.
C3-2 To establish the communication channels enabling run-time sharing mechanism
for both observations and social information.
1.4 Approach
As introduced in the previous section (1.3), we propose a hybrid approach to the engi-
neering of norm-aware virtual characters. This hybrid approach is inspired by socio-
cognitive theory [Stein, 1993, Bandura, 2001], which basically emphasises the incor-
poration of a social and a cognitive dimensions to human choices in society.
Without doubt, “People do not live their life only in individual autonomy” [Bandura,
2001]. People tend to give up their autonomy (i.e. intention to achieve individual
goals) when they reckon that a certain action which should be done is more socially
appropriate (or fits better with moral purposes) than those triggered by their individual
desire (i.e. actions that they really want to do). It reminds us that human choice and
subsequent behaviour are definitely affected by social influences by an individual’s
interpretation of social reality [Stein, 1993] during the individual reasoning processes.
The socio-cognitive theory addresses this aspect that the human choice in practice is
an outcome of the interplay between individual knowledge and social structures [Cook
and Yanow, 1993, Easterby-Smith, 1997]. In other words, it is essential in the deter-
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mination of human behaviour to consider not only individual collectives (e.g. cogni-
tive structure) constructed by cognitive process performed in human brain [Anderson,
2005] but also socially constructed belief (e.g. social norms) established by social pro-
cess taking place in institutions [Stein, 1997] or organisations [Akgu¨n et al., 2003] as
social phenomena (See Chapter 4 for more details).
In principle, psychology tends to focus on the understanding of human decision
making process from a micro-analysis perspective. As a result, a cognitive approach
pursuing the investigation of human mind internals without consideration of external
influences [Neisser, 1976, Anderson, 2005] has become popular. In contrast, sociology
attempts to comprehend human behaviour in a way of macro-analysis which takes into
account additional factors such as social context or environmental settings in conjuc-
tion with the individual mind [Anderson, 2005, Bandura, 2001, Akgu¨n et al., 2003].
Hence, this attitude in sociology leads to the view that the cognitive reasoning process
ought not be seen as sufficient to illustrate the mechanism of human choices, in par-
ticular under social settings. Instead, the socio-cognitive perspective has been given
more attention for the better identification of underlying mechanism of human social
behaviour [Granovetter, 1985, Stein, 1993].
In accordance with this perspective, this research centres on the provision of a com-
putaional model facilitating agent reasoning behaviour with norms on the basis of a
socio-cognitive perspective of human choice. To this end, we propose DNA3 based
on the hybrid approach, which is a combination of the institutional model (also called
normative frameworks) [Cliffe et al., 2009] as a means to achieve social cognition and
the (BDI type) cognitive agent architecture as a means to achieve individual cognition.
We start this work from the design of an integration middleware, BSF. Then we con-
nect both BDI-type cognitive agents, N-Jason, and institutions with virtual characters
(SecondLife avatars in this case) into one system by BSF. It is followed by three ex-
perimental evaluations which design and simulate polite behaviours subject to norms
between individuals and groups, with consideration of emergency situations. The de-
tails are as follows:
• Coupling Cognitive Agents and Virtual Environments We firstly do coupling
BDI-type cognitive agents and virtual environments. This enables the control
of virtual character behaviour by intelligent agents, specifically by goal-oriented
agents in this thesis. Also, this promises the cognitive reasoning capability in
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individual behaviour planning subject to the observation from virtual environ-
ments. We propose a middleware approach (via BSF) to integrate both softwares
for this purpose.
• Facilitating Automated Social Reasoning to Govern IVAs Behaviour with
Norms Given the above AI programming environment for IVAs, we integrate
institutions being capable of social reasoning on top of the framework via BSF.
This completes the DNA3 environment and enables the performance of social
and individual reasoning simultaneously as soon as virtual characters broadcast
percepts can be observed in the virtual environment. The final choice of plans
to execute is carried out during the individual reasoning step in N-Jason. When
action plans are determined by the N-Jason agent, those plans are received and
acted upon immediately by the virtual characters.
• Norm Aware Decision Making in N-Jason Although DNA3 allows the formu-
lation and communication of norms with virtual characters so each IVA has ex-
plicit information in its mind, the actual deliberation inside agents still requires
the internal mechanism to choose norms and agents’ own goals. To this end, we
apply the deadline and priority based scheduling algorithm [Alechina et al., 2012]
adapted for Jason BDI agents in order to evaluate the importance and urgency of
each intention that is the means-ends to achieve goals.
• Evaluation Given DNA3, we aim to show how the appropriate behaviour of vir-
tual characters can be exhibited by the combination of social and norm-ware
cognitive reasoning. In here, three case studies on modelling politeness in virtual
characters behaviour are presented as a means to verify the adequacy of DNA3 in
the design and simulation of norm-awareness for virtual characters. We specifi-
cally would like to show the characteristics of DNA3 with respect to the flexibil-
ity in reasoning about norms subjec to changes of situaions and the rationality in
norm-ware decision making in these scenarios.
1.5 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organised as follows:
10
Chapter 1 – Introduction This chapter introduces the main objective of the thesis and
identifies the challenges we aim to address. Further, the contribution of the work is
emphasised and an outline of the thesis as a whole is presented.
Chapter 2 – Related Works This chapter presents the background of the research
we conducted to establish the computational model, N-Jason, and reviews the litera-
tures which illustrates several approaches to the use of norms in the virtual character
behaviour.
Chapter 3 – A Middleware Approach to Connect Cognitive Agents to Virtual En-
vironments This chapter presents an illustration of coupling BDI-type cognitive agents
and virtual characters via the middleware approach, as a starting point of building norm-
aware virtual characters. After the introduction to the integration middleware, BSF, we
describe in depth an illustration of the integration through an example.
Chapter 4 – Governing Intelligent Virtual Agent Behaviour with Norms In this
chapter, we present a computational model of the socio-cognitive theory on human
choices, DNA3, which is established by the integration of normative framework (or in-
stitutions), BDI-type cognitive agents and virtual characters. After a short introduction
to socio-cognitive theory, the institutional model and its associated automated norm
reasoning mechanism is presented. Afterwards, we provide an informal explanation
of DNA3which illustrates: (i) How reasoning about situationally appropriate norms is
carried out and, (ii) How norms can be adopted in the agent’s mind.
Chapter 5 – Norm Aware Decision Making in BDI Agents This chapter introduces
the norm-aware cognitive decision making process in N-Jason (i.e. how norms can
be associated with the agent decision making process) for reasoning plans to execute,
particularly through the deliberation on norms and agents’ individual goals. Firstly, we
describe the extended features over the conventional BDI architecture and program-
ming language in order to support normative concepts, then we propose norm-aware
deliberation as well as run-time norm execution.
Chapter 6 – Case Studies This chapter presents the illustrative examples of applica-
tions of DNA3. We particularly focus on the modelling of scenarios already achieved
using both Decision Theoretic Models and Dynamic Planning models, in order better to
contrast them with our approach. Firstly, we describe the polite behaviour between in-
dividual NPCs and PCs, then we extend this politeness model to inter-group behaviour.
In addition, we simulate NPC behaviour when an emergency situation occurs. We in-
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vestigate the performance with regards to the speed of taking actions and success rate
of the tasks the NPCs have to achieve.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion This chapter wraps up the thesis, addressing the discussions
including advantages and drawbacks of our approach, conclusion and future works in
relation to those limitations.
1.6 List of Publications
The followings are papers all published by the author which are basis of this thesis.
In each case the contribution of authors to the paper are stated in accordance with
regulation 16.1 subsection 3.v of University of Bath regulations.
1. Run-Time Norm Compliance in BDI Agents - JeeHang Lee, Julian Padget, Brian
Logan, Daniela Dybalova and Natasha Alechina. Published in the Proceedings
of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent sys-
tems (AAMAS ’14). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Mul-
tiagent Systems, Richland, SC, pages 1581-1582.
2. N-Jason: Run-Time Norm Compliance in AgentSpeak(L) - JeeHang Lee, Ju-
lian Padget, Brian Logan, Daniela Dybalova and Natasha Alechina. In Dalpiaz,
F., Dix, J., and van Riemsdijk, M., editors, Engineering Multi-Agent Systems,
volume 8758 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 367-387. Springer
International Publishing. This is the full version of the AAMAS 2014 paper.
Publications 1 and 2 introduce the norm-aware decision making throughN-Jason.
Parts of these publications appear in Chapter 5.
3. A Semantic Approach to Situational Awareness for Intelligent Virtual Agents -
Surangika Ranathuga, Stephen Cranefield, Julian Padget, JeeHang Lee. Submit-
ted to the Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.
The main objective of publication 3 is the provision of situational awareness for
virtual character behaviour by means of Complex Event Recognition (CER) on
top of the combination of IVAs and normative frameworks. Prerequisites for
this approach are the integration of multiple software components (e.g. cognitive
agents, virtual characters, normative frameworks and event recognition systems)
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on the one hand, and frequent exchanges of events with their semantics inter-
preted by CERs amongst them on the other hand. We contribute to this publica-
tion through the use of the Bath-Sensor-Framework as an integration middleware,
which is also capable of the semantic representation of data to this end. Part of
this publication appears in Chapter 3.
4. Towards Polite Virtual Agents using Social Reasoning Techniques - JeeHang
Lee, Tingting Li and Julian Padget. Published in the International Journal of
Computer Animation and Virtual Worlds. 24(3-4):335-343, 2013
Publication 4 describes the polite behaviour of IVAs during individual navigation,
which is expressed and realized using DNA3. This publication forms the major
part of Section 6.2 in Chapter 6.
5. Governing Intelligent Virtual Agent Behaviour with Norms - JeeHang Lee, Tingt-
ing Li, Marina De Vos and Julian Padget. Published in Proceedings of the 2013
international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems (AA-
MAS ’13). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems, Richland, SC, pages 1205-1206.
6. Using Social Institution to Guide Virtual Agent Beahviour - JeeHang Lee, Tingt-
ing Li, Marina De Vos and Julian Padget. Presented at the 2nd International
Workshop on Cognitive Agents for Virtual Environments (CAVE2013) at AA-
MAS2013 - Saint Paul, MN, USA, 2013. This is the full version of AAMAS
2013 paper.
Publication 5 and its full version, item 6 introduce DNA3, a computational model
of a socio-cognitive theory of human choices, comprising the integration of N-
Jason agents, virtual characters and normative frameworks. Parts of these publi-
cations appear in Chapter 4.
7. Decoupling Cognitive Agents and Virtual Environments - JeeHang Lee, Vicent
Baines and Julian Padget. Published in Cognitive Agents and Virtual Environ-
ments, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 7764, pages 17-36, 2013.
Presented in CAVE 2012 in Valencia, Spain
Publication 7 introduces an integration middleware, Bath-Sensor-Framework (BSF),
and then presents a middleware approach to connect N-Jason agents and virtual




In this chapter, we discuss literature describing state–of–the–art in the domain of intel-
ligent virtual characters that consider social norms as part of their behaviour. As men-
tioned in Chapter 1, the decision making is usually achieved by three types of agent
models – Reflex, Goal-based and Utility-based agents [Russell and Norvig, 2002].
Here, we review research implementing norm-aware behaviour in virtual characters
through these types of agents.
2.1 Introduction
Advances in psychology theories contributing to understanding the mechanisms of how
human brain works, lead to the advent of various computational models in the domain
of AI. These computational models in turn have encouraged AI researchers to pay much
attention to agent behaviour in response to sensing the environment in which it is situ-
ated as a means to replicate/simulate human intelligence and behaviour.
Usually, intelligent agents (e.g. reactive, decision theoretic or cognitive) [Group,
b, Fikes et al., 1972, Brooks, 1991, Brooks, 2001, Bryson, 2003, Brom and Bryson,
2006, Rao and Georgeff, 1995, Mascardi et al., 2005] analyse this information, make
decisions, and do planning for the next behaviour to execute. All of these approaches
effectively take the position that the entirety of the perceivable knowledge, possibly
even its (partial) history and the whole of the decision-making process are internal to
the agent, in order to make the system self-contained and perhaps also better to reflect
the notion of an independent intelligent entity.
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Awareness of social norms can be added to any agent model, although it is an open
issue whether norms should be an external source of knowledge that delivers obliga-
tions (also called norms in some literature) to agents [Alechina et al., 2012, Meneguzzi
and Luck, 2009], or be internalized in some way and then whether they are absorbed
into the agent reasoning process [Andrighetto et al., 2010] or kept separate so they can
be ‘switched off’ when no longer applicable [Criado et al., 2010]. These issues aside, it
is clear that the addition of social norms into intelligent agents is viewed as one way in
which to enhance agent reasoning and response capabilities and in particular to enhance
response in social settings. As we discussed earlier in Chapter 1.1 with observational
studies [Yee et al., 2007, Samperi et al., 2012, Friedman et al., 2007], almost all social
behaviours occurring in virtual worlds by human users are governed by the same social
norms as those in the real human society. This implies that if we wish the behaviour of
IVAs to resemble that of humans more closely, then it is desirable somehow to convey
those real world human social norms to the agents.
What we firstly describe is a single agent perspective that social norms are inter-
nalised in agents’ mental states (Section 2.2) on the one hand. Norm-awareness in
virtual characters behaviour achieved by reflex agents (Section 2.2.1) and utility based
agents (Section 2.2.2) is presented in here. Afterwards, we introduce the Multi-Agent
Systems (MAS) approach that social norms are external knowledge and delivered to the
agent’s mind to guide virtual character behaviour (Section 2.3) on the other hand. The
summary is presented at the end with an evaluation of pros and cons of each approach
compared to our proposal, DNA3, a socio-cognitive computational model.
2.2 Norms in a Single Agent
2.2.1 Reactive Approach
The underlying principle of reflex agents in decision making is action selection in a
reactive manner. Only the percepts that agents currently observe affect the process
of action selection. When agents perceive events from an external environments, re-
flex agents immediately search for a corresponding plan dedicated to the symbolic
representation of those external events, and execute a single selected plan reactively
in consequence [Russell and Norvig, 2002]. The most famous reactive architecture is
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sub-sumption [Brooks, 2001]. In this architecture, agent behaviour is represented as re-
active plans in the form of an ‘if-then’ structure. Those reactive plans are hierarchically
organized by relative priority between the plans. Finite State Machines (FSMs) are also
popular in the design of reactive plans, where the effect of current conditions brings
about a new state. Beyond the architectural approach, this type of agent can be devel-
oped as simple conditional branches in ordinary high-level programming languages. In
accordance with such principle, the social norms that virtual agents implicitly possess
are in the form of reactive plans.
Figure 2-1: Conversations and Human Territories. (c) Pedica et al., 2010. [Pedica and
Ho¨gni Vilhje´lmsson, 2010]
Figure 2-2: The paradigm of territorial organisation. (c) Pedica et al., 2010. [Pedica and
Ho¨gni Vilhje´lmsson, 2010]
Pedica et al. [Pedica and Ho¨gni Vilhje´lmsson, 2010] take this approach; social
norms are represented as reactive plans in reflex agents, in order to generate socially
believable behaviour of virtual characters. They in particular concentrate on the ex-
hibition of avatar behaviour with regards to dynamics in social interactions. Inspired
by theories on human territoriality [Scheflen and Ashcraft, 1976, Kendon, 1990], this
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research models and simulates the territorial dynamics of social interactions (e.g. con-
versational situations, see Figure 2-1) by means of a set of social norms. These norms
indicate reactive motions defined in the territorial organisation (see Figure 2-2) sub-
ject to proximity and social intimacy between virtual characters. In other words, social
norms address the territorial rights and responsibilities of participants (who are cur-
rently engaged in a specific group) and others (such as new-comers or outsiders from
the group who are willing to join). Depending upon a personal or organisational re-
lationship, avatars can take part in the interactions within a spatial boundry the group
allows, or just exhibit conventional social behaviour apart from the group.
Figure 2-3: Models of social norms. (c) Pedica et al., 2010. [Pedica and Ho¨gni Vilhje´lmsson,
2010]
The models of social norms by which social awareness of virtual characters is
achieved is shown in Figure 2-3. In this system, avatars behaviour is realised by the
activated set of reactive plans which actually embody a norm determined by a social
situation (i.e. social place) in which avatars are situated. This activation of reactive
plans gives rise to the group dynamics a group of people are now expecting.
All of this process is determined by a Reaction Generation Framework described in
Figure 2-4. In essence, this framework pursues “reactive response” rather than a delib-
erative reasoning process, such as that which cognitive agents usually perform for the
purpose of a quick response to dynamic changes in virtual environments. Thus, the in-
ternal process is intuitive but simple: when an agent perceives a low-level information,
this is analysed by a set of reactive plans. Afterwards, the outcome of analysis triggers
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Figure 2-4: Reaction Generation. (c) Pedica et al., 2010. [Pedica and Ho¨gni Vilhje´lmsson,
2010]
an immediate motion (i.e. low level implementation such as to produce an animation
in response to low-level perceptions).
In conclusion, the use of reflex agents which enables social norms through reactive
plan, promises: (i) a good performance with regards to response time and (ii) a simplic-
ity in design of social norms and its associated behaviour as Pedica et al. emphasise.
Despite these advantages, there is a downside of this approach. First, it seems hard to
say that social norms described in the form of reactive plans are formal representations
of norms although the designer of norm-aware reflex agents claims that it makes sense
ontologically. Those social norms are likely to be a form of ordinary reactive plans at a
syntactic level rather than a formal model containing the essential properties of norms
such as normative position, deadline, priority or sanctions. Thus it is hard to show more
delicate model of norm compliance since those properties can not be considered. In ad-
dition, agents cannot violate those social norms, thus norm-autonomy is bounded since
compliance with all social norms is already preordained inside an agent’s mental states.
Lastly, agents may not be able to show social norm aware behaviour when the envi-
ronment or a situation (in terms of place and time) is changed. Since those norms are
pre-built knowledge and agents are not able to reason about norms subject to changes
in situations, this type of agent cannot always show a proper level of social believability
as Pedica et al. aim to.
2.2.2 Utility Based Approach
In principle, a central concept of utility based agents is to pursue the highest satisfaction
or optimality in decision making. Once an utility based agent adopts a goal, its reason-
ing process tries to find a specific combination of actions to achieve the goal, which
ensures the maximisation of utility. Each action (or step) has a real number which is
mapped to a degree of satisfaction or optimality (or sometimes called weight), when
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an agent takes such action on the way to achieving a goal. The representative example
is a decision theoretic agent framework which combinies probability and utility theory
(e.g. probability distribution of candidate actions agents execute to achieve a goal in
environments). The agent updates its current state based on beliefs (updated by percep-
tions) and a way of choosing an action with highest expected value under the current
context [Russell and Norvig, 2002].
Thespian [Si et al., 2006] is a decision theoretic framework that facilitates modelling
of social norms and its associated behaviour for virtual characters controlled by utility-
based agents. In this work, Si et al. aim to develop a human-like virtual character which
is capable of holding a conversation with human characters as social norms governing
conversational situations in the real world. On top of Partially Observable Markov
Decision Processes (POMDP) [Smallwood and Sondik, 1973] enabling an alternative
to the explicit representation of norms, the Thespian system also allows virtual agents
not only to have explicit goals to comply with social norms and personal goals, but also
to reason about those normative and personal goals to avoid conflicts between them.
The reasoning about conflicts is in turn driven by evaluating the effect of achieving or
dropping personal goals in response to complying or violating social norms.
In essence, a Thespian agent has: (i) goals which trigger the correct behaviour in a
social context, (ii) state features1 that the agent pursues to maximise or minimise (e.g.
the status of conversation, affinity between characters and obligations each character
possesses) and (iii) dynamic functions which update state features by defining how
actions/beliefs can affect agent’s states. Virtual characters mainly seek to achieve goals
with intention of maximising all those state features using dynamic functions. The final
decision is determined by measuring the weight of each goal in the virtual character.
Table 2.1 shows a model of conversational norms used in this system. In addition,
the algorithm of dynamic function in relation to Table 2.1 is illustrated in Algorithm 1
as an example. This algorithm shows the process that enforces those adjacency pairs
in a virtual character’s behaviour by triggering a goal of each agent with a request
to maximise the state feature, complete adjacency pair norm. Depending upon the
state feature in the agent’s mind, the best choice can be either violation of or compliance
with the norms
1State is a set of state features which are agent properties such as name, age and affinity between two
characters.
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Speaker 1 Speaker 2 Obligation
Greet Greet back Greet back to speaker 1
Bye Bye Say “Bye” to speaker 1
Thanks You are welcome Say “You are welcome” to speaker 1
Offer X Accept/Reject X Either accept or reject X to speaker 1
Request X Accept/Reject X Either accept or reject X to speaker 1
Enquiry about X Inform about X Inform to speaker 1 about X
Inform information Acknowledgement Acknowledgement to speaker 1
Table 2.1: Adjacency Pairs and Corresponding Obligations. (c) Si et al., 2006. [Si et al.,
2006]
Algorithm 1 Dynamics for complete adjacency pair norm. (c) Si et al., 2006. [Si
et al., 2006]
1: if self == dialogueact.speaker then
2: if dialogueact intends to satisfy an obligation then
3: if the agent has such obligation then
4: return original value + 0.1
5: else




10: return original value
The use of utility-based agents could be a good choice to engineeer norm-aware
virtual characters with regards to the norm autonomy of virtual characters. This type of
agent is able to provide an opportunity to violate norms subject to the utility the viola-
tion brings about, while reflex agents must comply with norms as reactive plans enforce
them without further consideration. By promising a means to evalute the importance (or
weight) of each behaviour triggered either social norms or individual goals, a rational
deliberation on norms and goals can be determined in utility-based agents.
However, the use of utility-based agents shows a couple of shortcomings. On the
one hand, reasoning about norms depending on dynamic changes in a current situation
is not possible in this setting. As described earlier, social norms are already pre-defined
in an agent mind with a relative imporance (represented in a real number). The ob-
servation of changes in the environment by an agent can only trigger situation-specific
norms, in turn leading to the calculation of an utility in order to carry out decision mak-
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ing for the next behaviour. During this process, the primitive role of observations is
not to bring about norms subject to a new situation the agent encounter, but to change
the agent mental states so as to adopt associated social norms specified by preordained
rules.
On the other hand, decision theoretic frameworks (e.g. probability or utility distri-
butions of norms, actions and behaviour) show a low level of robustness with regards
to environmental settings. In other words, those distributions and reasoning dynamics
are closed dedicated to the specific environment and thus utility-based agents cannot
exhibit correct behaviour when the agents are situated in a totally different environ-
ments, where desirable behaviour may differ from the place where the distributions are
designed.
2.3 Norms as an External Knowledge in MAS
What we introduce in this section is an approach to using Normative Multi-Agent Sys-
tems (NorMAS) with an external source of situationally adequate norms in order to
guide virtual character behaviour. We firstly give an overview of NorMAS which is a
combination of normative frameworks and MAS. This includes some background on
norms, normative systems in MAS, and a brief description of governance mechanisms
for individual agent behaviour in NorMAS. Afterwards, we present an in-depth survey
of norm-aware behaviour of virtual characters residing in NorMAS. For this, we show
some examples following (i) regimenation approach that normative frameworks di-
rectly governs virtual characters behaviour and (ii) regulative approach that normative
frameworks privides a set of norms as a guidance, and the final decision is determined
by the agents.
2.3.1 Normative Multi-Agent Systems
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are a societal structure where autonomous agents are re-
siding and taking actions and interactions. While the aim of individual agents is to
achieve a task by both reactive and proactive behaviour in an agent society, the ultimate
objective of MAS is to coordinate and regulate individual agents so as to achieve desir-
able goals or states in the agent society incorporated with social interactions between
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agents. This nature of MAS reminds us the similarity to the human society which is
defined as “Society merely is the name for a number of individuals, connected by in-
teraction” [Simmel and Wolff, 1950]. As mentioned in Chapter 1, norms lead people
to have enhanced social awareness, which in turn play a crucial role in human choices
during human interactions. Likewise, it is feasible that computationally well formalised
norms for MAS can also shape and regulate individual agents’ behaviour, specifically
with respect to socially acceptable actions and interactions in an agent society.
As a result, MAS has given much attention to the incorporation of norms in agent
behaviour. This trend in consequence results in a facilitation of Normative Multi-Agent
Systems (NorMAS). In essence, the central concept of NorMAS is to organise the nor-
mative behaviour of individual agents in conjunction with an external source of norms
and/or organisational rules in MAS. Typically, NorMAS is composed of (i) a normative
framework and (ii) a MAS.
The normative framework is the main entity for the governance of individual agents’
behaviour in MAS. Their central role is to specify and reason about norms in response
to both external events both that agents bring about and changes of state in the environ-
ment. Once situationally correct/required norms are determined by this framework and
in turn broadcast to MAS, then individual agents adopt those norms and start the prac-
tical reasoning process in response to determine whether to comply or not with those
norms. In some cases, those norms enforce or regiment individual agents’ behaviour
via monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms for the social purpose. Given these char-
acteristics, NorMAS provides a good means for coordination and cooperation, group
decision making, regulation of agent societies and so forth in the domain of MAS re-
searches [Boella et al., 2006].
Norms in NorMAS
In NorMAS, the primary entity for regulating an agent society is normative frame-
works (e.g. institutions, organisations). The normative framework is a set of rules
which indicate situation specific norms and organisational rules. Actually, computa-
tionally formalised norms in these systems are classified as Constitutive and Regulative
norms [Therborn, 2002].
Constitutive norms, on the one hand, are the categorical property of normative sys-
tems, which stand for the definition of functions of the normative system and the mem-
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bership of an agent participating in that normative system [Therborn, 2002]. The con-
stitutive norms regulate not only the creation of institutional facts but also revision of
the normative system itself. Based upon this concept, the consitutive norms act as a
belief prescribing a category of the normative system as well as specifying behaviour
of the normative system [Boella and van der Torre, 2004]. On the other hand, regulative
norms typically address an action or event the system requires the participants to carry
out in response to the current state of the system. In other words, the regulative norms
directly indicate a normative position of a particular action/event such as obligations,
prohibitions and permissions which should be achieved by agents that the normative
system governs. Thus, the regulative norms are able to act as desirable goals (or states)
the normative system is currently pursuing [Boella and van der Torre, 2004].
Depending on the formalism of the normative system, the regulative norms can
be categorised as state-based norms or event-based norms. State-based norms usually
express higher level norms that impose desirable or required states on the system (or
an environment), often as a logical combination of institutional facts, which should be
brought about by the actions of agents (e.g. agent i is obliged to bring about a state
φ) [Dignum, 2004]. In contrast, event-based norms generally represent relatively lower
level activities addressing possibly executable events (or actions) at the individual agent
level (e.g. agent i is obliged to perform an action α) [De Vos et al., 2013].
The Life Cycle of Norms in NorMAS
In NorMAS, norms are generally created by a set of normative multi-agents in conjuc-
tion with normative frameworks. These newly created (potential) norms will become
(actual) norms not only in agents’ mind but also in MAS, through a chain of processes
known as ‘norm emergence’. Transmission, enforcement and internalisation of norms
are major sub-processes of norm emergence [Hollander and Wu, 2011].
Once new (potential) norms are created by reasoning about norms (which usually
takes place in normative agents and/or normative framework), in response to events
they observe from the environment, the (potential) norms can spread from agents to
agents, or from normative frameworks to agents, by various transmission mechanisms
such as broadcasting, publish/subscribe or other protocols. If some agents are exposed
to those transmitted (potential) norms, the enforcement process ensures the acquisition
of those norms in the agents’ mind. Then, the agents begin to shift its preference from
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the original set of (actual) norms to newly incoming (potential) norms depending upon
personality, desire or contextual knowledge of the agents. At some point a sufficiently
large number of agents change their preference to the newly created (potential) norms,
these new (potential) norms are internalised, thus becoming (actual) norms, which are
able to trigger normative goals or desirable normative states to achieve [Hollander and
Wu, 2011].
In the end, the context of the environment in which multi-agents are situated has
changed, thus it would be undesirable to comply with the specific (actual) norms in
agents’ mind. In other words, a particular set of (actual) norms can be no longer valid
under the changes of circumstances. Then, these (actual) norms become candidates
which should be forgotten, and new (potential) norms may be created via the continua-
tion of the new cycle of normative emgergence process [Hollander and Wu, 2011].
NorMAS and Agent Behaviour
As we have seen in the earlier section (Section 2.3.1), NorMAS is a combination of
normative framework and MAS. As indicated in the norm emergence process, the nor-
mative framework (e.g. institution or organisation) is in charge of governing the be-
haviour of individual agents by means of social norms. These norms are specified in
the frameworks, and in turn determined by taking into account external events subject
to the context of individual agents (e.g. situations or roles). This results in a detachment
of a new set of (social) norms which influence individual agents’ behaviour. Normally,
the new set of norms is delivered to an agent’s mind via communication (e.g. by broad-
casting or a specific protocols). Once agents adopt those norms in their mind, agents
start a practical reasoning process about whether to comply with those norms or not
depending on the mechanism that determines agent behaviour in response to a norm.
The implementation of this governace has broadly taken one of two approaches:
regimentation or regulation. The former requires total compliance of the agent with
the norms – so they are no longer norm autonomous and violation in turn is not possi-
ble – whereas the latter provides compliance information to the agent, but the decision
whether to comply or not remains with the agent – norm autonomy might be retained,
but violation is possible.
The regimentation approach is developed in many works [Boman, 1999, Verhagen
and Boman, 1999, Esteva, 2003, Bogdanovych et al., 2008b]. The underlying mecha-
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nism of the regimentation is the direct control of agent behaviour by means of norms
detached by normative frameworks. In this approach, the choice of required/desirable
behaviour in the current situation is done by normative framework. In accordance with
this, individual agents just simply follow the specified normative behaviour without
further deliberation on norms and individual goals when norms are detached. Thus,
the main role of agents is effectively limited to perceiving external events and realising
actions in the environment.
Electronic Institution (EI) is a representative example of an institution based upon
regimentation, in which heterogeneous agents including humans and software entities
can participate by playing different roles and can interact via speech acts [Esteva, 2003].
The EI defines a set of constraints, such as what participants are permitted or forbidden
to do depending upon roles the participants have already taken. Each role identifies
activities that agents should do in the current situation (which is referred to as a Scene
in the EI). Reasoning about norms is carried out by given transition rules in the Scene,
which identify consequence between contextual knowledge (e.g. external events agents
observations) and norms (e.g. activities in roles). As soon as norms are detached,
agents just simply obey these norms without further deliberation on norms and agent’s
individual goals. All that is allowed to agents is a total compliance of norms from EI
thus no violations occurs under this context.
In contrast, the regulation (or governance) approach, explored in [Dignum, 1999,
Boella et al., 1999, Hogg and Jennings, 2000, Falcone and Castelfranchi, 2001, Broersen
et al., 2002, Cliffe et al., 2007], allows agents to have autonomy with respect to norms.
In other words, norms can be both accepted and violated by agents depending upon
their own situation. This approach usually takes a combination of normative frame-
works and goal-oriented agents (e.g. cognitive agents) to produce a norm compliant
behaviour in agents. When agents perceive external events or changes of state in envi-
ronments, the observations trigger reasoning about norms in the normative framework.
As soon as this finishes, the agent adopts (a set of) norms into its mind and performs
individual reasoning. Depending upon the preordained rules in the agent programs of a
goal-oriented agents, norms can either be a goal itself that the agent wants to pursue or
be a part of a mental state which can trigger a goal or plan to achieve a state/action in
the current situation.
The goal-generative approach [Dignum, 1999, Falcone and Castelfranchi, 2001,
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Broersen et al., 2002] is a good example. In this approach, norms defined explicitly
are coped with as one of the influential elements in the reasoning process of cognitive
agents. Norms are not hard-wired into agents but can be acquired by agents through
interactions with other agents which have different norms [Savarimuthu et al., 2008].
These norms are likely to be used in the process of decision making, either for the plan
selection by preference ordering of norms [Dignum, 1999, Falcone and Castelfranchi,
2001], or for the goal generation with belief, intention, obligation and desire [Broersen
et al., 2002]. This is very important aspect for norm-aware intelligent agents, because
not only can agents choose the fact whether norms might be violated or not, but also
norms might not always be necessary for agent decision making. This means norms
can be either totally neglected, partly considered or fully affective for the final decision,
depending upon the situational information of the agent.
2.3.2 Virtual Characters Behaviour in NorMAS
As mentioned earlier, taking norms into account in determining agent behaviour can
be categorised as either regimentation and regulation. The domain of virtual charac-
ters also take these disciplines in the design and simulation of norm-aware behaviour.
We firstly introduce a regimentation approach in this domain, which is usually imple-
mented by the combination of normative framework and virtual character with no rea-
soning capability. Afterwards, a regulation approach is presented, which is composed
of normative framework, virtual characters and reasoning agents (usually goal-oriented
agents).
Regimentation of Virtual Characters Behaviour
Virtual Institution (VI) [Bogdanovych, 2007] is pioneering research on facilitating Nor-
MAS in Virtual Worlds (VWs) on the basis of regimentation approach. The VI aims
to construct 3D EI (which is a combination of EI and VWs) to be able to control par-
ticipants’ actions and interactions based upon norms and associated behaviour. This
approach aims to embed EIs into Virtual Worlds (VWs), in particular in the physical
3D spaces such as building, rooms or halls where interactions may be able to take place
between Player Characters (PCs) and Non-Player Characters (NPCs). During the in-
teractions in a specific 3D space, EIs embedded in that place recommend and control
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characters behaviour in a same way as that described in the earlier section (Section
2.3.1).
Figure 2-5: Basic Concept of Virtual Institution. (c) Bogdanovych, 2007. [Bogdanovych, 2007]
Figure 2-5 shows the basic conception of VI. The EIs are represented as a 3D build-
ing and its internal spaces (e.g. rooms, halls) in the VW. In other words, each institution
is mapped to each 3-dimensionally visualised physical space. This pair of EI and 3D
virtual space is called a 3D EI. As we see the Figure 2-5, they divide the 3D virtual
world into a set of 3D physical places such as 3D object, rooms and buildings in Visual
Interaction Layer (VIL). The individual physical place is regarded as an ‘EI’ described
in the earlier section (Section 2.3.1). Inside a 3D EI (e.g. building), PCs and NPCs can
take roles and carry out activities allowed by the EI. Of course, EI specifications and its
reasoning about normative actions and interactions are managed in Normative Control
Layer (NCL).
From the engineering perspective, the system is deployed by the integration of
three-layers described in Figure 2-6. The Visualization Layer is used for the graphical
visualisation of 3D VWs. Not only actions and interactions of avatars but also graphical
representation of 3D environments can be displayed by this layer. In addition, a detec-
tion of activities which is essential to normative reasoning is also taking place in this
area. The Communication Layer is in charge of communication as well as integration
between VWs and EIs. When virtual character activity and its influence on VWs are
detected, this information is transferred by this layer. In the opposite direction, when
changes of institutional states (e.g. norms) result from those information observed in
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Figure 2-6: Runtime Model. (c) Bogdanovych, 2007. [Bogdanovych, 2007]
Visualization Layer, these changes of states are also transferred via the causal connec-
tions server in Communication Layer. Reasoning about and inspection of normative
behaviour in response to environmental changes that the virtual characters bring about
is carried out by Electronic Institution Layer, which is established by AMELI [Arcos
et al., 2005]. This layer holds the institutional states and uses these states in conjunction
with the institutional specification to make sure that NPCs cannot violate norms.
Figure 2-7: Performative Structure. (c) Bogdanovych, 2008. [Bogdanovych et al., 2008a]
The choice is actually determined through the performative structure in the Elec-
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tronic Institution Layer. According to Figure 2-7, the performative structure consists of
scenes where interactions between PCs and NPCs are articulated. Each scene defines
a dialogical protocol in which virtual characters may be involved. With the definition
of relationships in the performative structure, virtual characters are able to move from
one scene to other scene depending upon both their role and observed external events.
When NPCs are situated in a specific scene (e.g. rooms), this role and associated events
in the full set of observations are engaged for the detachment of norms. As we discussed
earlier, normative rules in the scene specify the consequence between characters con-
textual information and required norms. Thus, once NPCs perceive external events, the
combination of these observations and its role trigger the reasoning about norms, and
then the consequences of actions open to NPCs is determined by the normative rules.
As soon as NPCs adopt the consequence of actions, these actions would be a com-
mitments that participating NPCs acquire and have to fulfill later. With regards to
reasoning about NPCs behaviour, the deliberation is not taken place at an agent level
in principle. As we can see, the determination of the behaviour is completely done by
the EI in the 3D interaction space. Virtual characters are just requested to comply with
norms through carrying out a course of actions either to fulfill norms or to achieve a
normative state. In this sense, virtual characters behaviour is completely regimented by
the request of EI. Without doubt, it is very hard to violate norms, therefore the norm
autonomy of virtual characters is circumscribed.
This concept of VI has been popular as a engineering methodology to model and
implement NPCs behaviour [Bogdanovych et al., 2008a]. In particular, this methodol-
ogy is in the pursuit of interaction design between NPCs. The goal of this methodology
is the provision of more “believable” actions/interactions of NPCs as PCs perform the
same activities in VWs. Bogdanovych et al. take advantage of this methodology to
produce e-Learning purposed serious games such as Virtual Heritage Application. In
The City of Uruk project [Bogdanovych et al., 2009, Bogdanovych et al., 2012], much
attention has been given to the design and simulation of the accurate illustration of
everyday activities of ancient inhabitants (e.g. eating, sleeping, working or communi-
cations) with one another, whereas ordinary cultural heritage researches tend to focus
on the realistic reconstruction of environments (e.g. buildings or artifacts). Not only are
the daily activities of ancient characters displayed by roles defined in the EI, but also
interactions between characters are automatically presented by reasoning about norms
in accordance with the performative structure.
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Figure 2-8: VIXEE Architecture in v-mWater, (c) Trescak, 2011. [Trescak et al., 2011]
Similar to this line of research, Almajano et al. [Almajano et al., 2013] propose
an e-Government application which enables govenrmental administrative services for
real humans by utilising the concept of VI. The representative example is v-mWater,
which is a (virtual) governmental auction market for water services where the interac-
tions between human users and autonomous virtual characters take place live. It is well
known that auctions require specific interaction protocols to make an agreement for a
certain transaction between participants. To this end, the VI methodology is employed
to design formal specification of interactions which are essential for all procedures dur-
ing the auction market. Interaction specifications are used in the normative behaviour
reasoning for both NPCs and human users whereas Bogdanovych’s e-Learning appli-
cations [Bogdanovych et al., 2009, Bogdanovych et al., 2012] are designed only for
NPCs. In v-mWater, the outcome of determination of normative behaviour is detached
to manipulated NPCs behaviour directly for NPCs. In contrast, this outcome is a guid-
ance that clarifies required interaction procedures human users should take at the cur-
rent situation for human users. Thus, human users are able to participate in the auctions
and other services by looking at and complying with the guidance recommended by VI
with higher adequacy in those interactions, even though the human users may have less
(or no) idea about how to act in that place. This extended feature is facilitated by the
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VIXEE architecture [Trescak et al., 2011] (Figure 2-8) which supports the integration
of multiple virtual environments on top of VI.
The VI methodology is also employed to establish imitation learning environments
for autonomous virtual characteres thanks to the nature of performative structure rep-
resenting standard behaviour in social interactions [Bogdanovych et al., 2008c, Bog-
danovych et al., 2008b]. In this case, the specifications in VI describing roles and its
associated normative behaviour (e.g. scenes, rules and performative structures) can
be regarded as a formal model of actions/interactions of virtual character behaviour.
This formal model is mainly used as a means to interpret other characters actions. Let
consider a trainee, who is the primary subject for learning by imitation, and training
characters controlled either by human player or by agents capable of reasoning. Once
the trainee observes a series of external events a trainer character brings about during
interactions, the trainee starts a simulation of reasoning about normative behaviour with
the observation (i.e. a series of external events) using the formal specification of VI. If
this simulation is successful to bring about a set of norms, this set of norms in response
to the observation (e.g. a sequence of external events used in the simulation) is taken
by the trainee as a standard interaction pattern.
All in all, the VI and its applications, despite regimentation characterstics, is a
positive demonstration of the benefits of integrating normative frameworks with VWs,
showing how norms can affect participants’ behaviour. However, there are some draw-
backs to their approach. The most significant, in our view, is that agents do not have the
possibility to reason about norm compliance: they are required to follow pre-defined be-
haviours without consideration of the current situation. Furthermore, these behaviours
are tied to specific roles, so that an agent must choose to take on a role that was de-
fined when the EI was specified. An agent can reason about its situation, but actions
are restricted to those defined as norm-compliant at the design-time of the institution.
Thus, the agents are subservient to the goals of the institutions and should only choose
to surrender their autonomy for the period of institutional interaction, if the outcome
aligns with their own goals. Furthermore, there appears to be no scope for adaptation
to account for a changing environment.
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Regulation of Virtual Characters Behaviour
One of the most important characteristics of intelligent agents is autonomy: agents
should be able to take an initiative whether to pursue its own goals or not. Actually,
this may imply that the autonomy is a capability of decision making on whether or not
to achieve the goals triggered by either internal motivations or external influences. In
other words, both goal autonomy (which is autonomy with respect to individual goals)
and social autonomy (which is autonomy with respect to other actors) are essential to
becoming an agent [Castelfranchi, 1995].
What the regulation approach ultimately seeks for virtual character behaviour with
norms is to ensure this autonomy for the deliberation over both goals and norms as
discussed earlier (Section 2.3.1). In other words, the regulation approach intends intel-
ligent agents to be able to have more opportunities to make a decision about whether to
comply with norms or not. For this reason, the regulation approach prefers the use of a
reasoning agent (e.g. goal-oriented agents) to control its dedicated NPC, in conjunction
with normative frameworks, as opposed to the direct control of NPCs behaviour by way
of regimentation.
In general, the reasoning agent is coupled to a specific NPC. This pair of reasoning
agent and NPC is likely to be seen as a set of mind and body of the virtual character:
the mind thinks about what to do next based upon the current context, and the body
not only observes external worlds but also performs actual movements in relation to
the mind. With this paradigm, the reasoning agent becomes an essential means to
determining plans to execute in response to percepts the NPC observes. These plans
are executed by actuators the NPC realises. In NorMAS settings, the choice between
goals and norms also takes place in the reasoning agent in the same manner. When
a new set of norms is detached in response to NPC percepts, these new norms are
likely to be an explicit goal itself with which an agent should comply or a certain
condition (or state) to trigger an individual goal that an agent would like to achieve. As
a result, the reasoning agent tries to make a decision between norm-generated goals and
individual goals that ordinary percepts generate. The final decision might be made by
several properties, or combinations of them, such as personality [Broersen et al., 2002],
preferences [Alechina et al., 2012, Padgham and Singh, 2013] or emotion [Ferreira
et al., 2012].
Ranathunga [Ranathunga, 2013] demonstrates virtual football players inspired by
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Figure 2-9: Framework for Improving Physical and Social Awareness of an IVA. (c) Surangika,
2013. [Ranathunga, 2013]
the regulation approach. In this work, a framework for improving physical and social
awareness of IVAs is proposed in order to engineer virtual players. As it can be seen
in Figure 2-9, the framework is broadly composed of: (i) Data Processing Module
(DPM), (ii) Monitoring Service (MS), (iii) Jason Platform and (iv) Avatar in the virtual
world.
In principle, the perception of surroundings in virtual world is the main responsibil-
ity of avatars (e.g. NPCs). In addition to this, a Data Processing Module is attached to
the whole system in order to improve physical awareness through the complex events
detection mechanism which is able to interpret low level sensor data received from vir-
tual worlds by a set of data inference mechanisms. These collectives constructed by
simple observation as well as inference are able to deliver higher accuracy in repre-
senting the current state of the VW abstractly, and in turn provide richer percepts for
the Jason, BDI-type cognitive agents taking a role of reasoning agent, on the Jason
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Platform.
The regulation approach is implemented by the combination of this Jason agent and
Monitoring Service where the improved social environment awareness takes place. Ac-
tually, the central role of Monitoring Service is to inspect whether social expectations2
are fulfilled or violatied in the behaviour of a football player. The Monitoring Ser-
vice is composed of: (i) states representing the type of social situations that provides
what kind of behaviours could be correct and (ii) a set of relationship rules identifying
the consequences of events resulting from the Data Processing Module and expected
behaviour in the social interactions wherein multiple players are engaged. Once the
events detected or those inferred by the Data Processing Module have triggered either a
goal or a series of actions in the Jason agent program, the Monitoring Service starts the
inspection of fulfillment and violations, consistent with the underlying mechanisms of
normative frameworks. After the detection of events an agent brings about, the Mon-
itoring Service performs reasoning over whether events by an agent satisfy the social
expectations described in the service or not.
Depending on the monitoring result, the Jason agent coupled with the virtual foot-
ball player produces the socially adequate response under the current situation. In here,
the result that whether or not an agent comply situationally specific social expectations
becomes a new percept in the Jason agent. This percept is a source to trigger a goal
or a series of actions as a belief addition event in the Jason platform. The decision on
which plan to execute next is determined by taking into account the result that whether
to comply with the expectation or not, subject to the set of beliefs an agent currently
possesses, which influences on the selection condition of a plan.
Listing 2.1 : Social Expectation Example [Ranathunga, 2013]
1 @Plan1




6 <- .term2string(OtherAgent, OtherAgentStr);
7 .concat("(’U’,",
8 "’advanceToGoalB(", OtherAgentStr, ")’,",
9 "’penaltyB(", OtherAgentStr, ")’)",
10 Expectation);





13 "#once", Expectation, [N]);
14 monitor.start_monitoring("viol", "move_to_target",
15 "expectation_monitor",
16 "#once", Expectation, [N]).
Listing 2.1 shows some sample code in Jason that shows how social expectations
influence the virtual football players’ behaviour. Let us assume the Me agent is success-
fully passed the ball from OtherAgent and all conditions in Plan1 are satisfied to
trigger Plan1. According to the plan body, the Me agent is expected to fulfill the ac-
tion move to target (line 11 – 14). Thus, monitor starts to monitoring whether
the Me agent complies with the move to target action (line 11) or not (14). As
we can see, an event fulf will be generated when move to target is fulfilled,
and an event viol otherwise.
Listing 2.2 and 2.3 show plans which can be chosen depending on the result
of Monitoring Service (Line 1 and 1). When the result of monitoring is detached,
monitor stops monitoring and the agent Me carries out the relevant action aci -
in vw (Line 10) or choose and enact new tactic (Line 9) in response to
+fulf or +viol, respectively.









9 //turn towards other agent and pass the ball to him
10 act_in_vw(‘‘pass","up-kick").











One important aspect in these two examples (Listing 2.2 and 2.3) is that the vi-
olation is allowed for virtual football player, in contrast to the previous approaches
(e.g. reflex agents with norms, utility based agents and regimentation approach). This
reminds us that the monitoring and its result which represent a normative framework
are not able to enforce the direct control of football player behaviour. In other words,
the virtual football player in VW is free from the obligation that norms (or social ex-
pectation) should be complied with any time, any place. Instead, the football player
can choose the actions with respect to its own mental states in Jason agent, which is
constructed by both the result of expectation monitoring service and individual percep-
tion mechanism incorporating with Data Processing Module, an inference based event
detector.
In line with this research, Baines et al. [Baines and Padget, 2014] propose a simula-
tion framework inspired by the regulation approach. The main objective of the frame-
work is to design and simulate virtual vehicles behaviour controlled by Jason, a (BDI-
type) cognitive agent, under the governance of the normative framework. The work
is motivated by the fact that the driving behaviour is able to be heavily influenced not
only by individual preference (e.g. fuel consumption, CO2 emmissions) but also by en-
vironmental collectives in traffic (e.g. interactions between vehicles, traffic flows, road
conditions). Thus, this framework and its simulation pursue the demonstration of the
impact (whether positive or not) of situational awareness accomplished by normative
frameworks on the determination of individual virtual vehicles’ driving patterns.
The system overview is shown in Figure 2-10. The simulation framework is com-
posed of (i) normative framework, (ii) Jason agent and (iii) virtual vehicles. The main
role of each component is almost same as those in the previous work. Virtual vehicles
take a reponsitility to perceive external events, to distribute its percepts to both nor-
mative framework and Jason reasoning agent, and to embody a series of actions when
Jason agent choose a specific plan to execute. With respect to virtual vehicles, the nor-
mative framework performs the social reasoning about context by means of the Institu-
tional Model [Cliffe, 2007], detaches a new set of norms agent, and in turn broadcasts
this to the Jason agents. In the mean time, the Jason agent carries out the individual
reasoning with ordinary percepts as well as the set of norms to find the most appropriate
plan in the current situation.
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Figure 2-10: Simulation Framework for Norm-Governed Virtual Vehicles. (c) Baines,
2014. [Baines and Padget, 2014]
The set of norms could be events to trigger a certain goal in the agent program
or percepts to update beliefs in the agent mind. In doing so, the Jason agent may
be able to have more chances in the selection of plans, between norm-triggered and
individual contextual information triggered goals. This selection is achieved by the
practical reasoning process in the Jason agents. In this sense, the use of norms and
its associated normative framework in agent behaviour can be regarded as a means to
provide complemenatry information identifying the appropriate patterns of behaviour
with regards to the current situations. Since these norms initially originated from the
collectives of multiple vehicles (which can be seen as multi-agents), norms might be
able to present improved understanding of the social situation for individual agents.
In conclusion, the works inspired by regulation approach presented here have con-
tributed to not only the advances of virtual characters autonomy on norms and goals,
but also support norm compliance at the level of individual agents. In general, norms
can be a kind of recommendation/guidance for virtual characters, but cannot control the
agent behaviour in strict obedience to norms by using reasoning agents in conjunction
with characters.
However, as we saw in two examples, in conventional BDI agents, norm compliance
is typically achieved by design. That is by specifying plans that are triggered by de-
tached norms, because the agent programmer knows which norms the agent will adopt,
and then prioritising those rules so that those supporting norms are chosen over those
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preferred by the agent’s mental attitudes, in order to suppress conflicts between the nor-
mative and the agent’s existing goals. In addition, when an agent encounters new and
unknown norms, which were not taken into account at design time, there is typically no
plan to deal with those norms in the plan library at run-time. Hence, norm compliant
behaviour cannot normally be exhibited because the norms are unavoidably ignored.
Yet worse, agents may suffer a punishment from the enforcement of the normative sys-
tem as a result of a violation caused by their incapacity to process the normative event.
However, a solution that applies a hierarchical prioritisation of normative over ordinary
plans would still deprive an agent of its autonomy, since the norms in effect are treated
as hard constraints, whose violation is not possible.
2.4 Discussion
We summarise the system features and capabilities in engineering norm-aware virtual
characters in Table 2.2. As noted in Section 2.1, the systems are categorised by: (i) the
use of the infrastuctures (i.e. normative frameworks) where reasoning about norms
takes place, and (ii) the type of agents which carry out norm-aware individual reasoning
(i.e. a deliberation on norms, personal goals and sanctions).
In case without infrastuctures, where norms are internal knowledge in a single
agent, the straightforwardness in modelling and building normative behaviour in vir-
tual characters is a strong advantage. However, it is obvious that this approach reveals
a lack of flexibility in social norms subject to changing of situations. Since social norms
in an agent mind are likely to be pre-defined (or pre-designed) already in relation to the
specific situations at the design time, these norms are too domain-specific to be adap-
tive to the frequent changes in virtual environments. When the situation is changed,
those social norms might no longer be valid, thus less adequate or even worse totally
wrong in that situation. The other drawback is that the system always requires explicit
action to evoke normative behaviour both in the reactive plans (in Human Territoriality
Model [Pedica and Ho¨gni Vilhje´lmsson, 2010]) and in the process of goal selection (in
Thespian [Si et al., 2006]). However, external events which actually occurred in some
place but are not observed by the virtual character might bring about new situations
requiring normative behaviour in the virtual environment. In this instance, a single








































































































































































































































































































































comprehension of the current situation, which is a consequence of not perceiving an
explicit event that triggers a reactive plan or a goal selection.
In contrast, the approach using infrastructures promises better comprehension of the
situation due to the capability in reasoning about norms depending on changes in virtual
environments. The infrastructures observe the occurrence of a series of external events
produced by multiple virtual agents, so as to bring about situationally adaptive norms
in response to changes of situation in the environments. Therefore, virtual characters
are able to exhibit desirable behaviour in the new situation with the consideration of a
guidance that the infrastuctures offer.
However, the level of norm-autonomy of agents is limited in this approach. In-
deed, the Virtual Institution [Bogdanovych, 2007] does not use the intelligent agent
to determine whether to comply with norms or not. Instead, virtual characters sim-
ply comply with a set of norms the normative framework (Electronic Institution in
this case) detaches without further reasoning on that. The other two, Expectation
Model [Ranathunga, 2013] and Virtual Vehicles [Baines and Padget, 2014], are in the
better situation where goal-oriented agents perform norm-aware reasoning. But the rea-
soning on norms and goals is relatively simple, not unlike that of both reflex and utility
based agents. In effect, norms have its own properties such as ‘when’ (e.g. deadline),
‘what’ (e.g. required behaviour), deontic forces on the behaviour (e.g. permission,
obligation, prohibition) and sanctions when the required behaviour is violated. The
conventional goal-oriented agents (e.g. BDI type agents) are not capable of dealing
with those properties such as assessing the essential properties between norms, goals,
prohibitions and sanctions. We believe that norm-aware reasoning can promise the
choice of the most appropriate behaviour, based upon a preference of individual agents
or a level of autonomy, as allowed by the infrastructure.
Against this background, we propose DNA3 which pursues a hybrid approach to
take advantage of both approaches to engineer norm-aware virtual character. As seen
in Table 2.1, DNA3 facilitates the ‘infrastructure’, which is capable of specifying, rea-
soning about norms, for the purpose of a better comprehension of situations, which
in turn provides situationally appropriate norms subject to frequent changes in the en-
vironments. In the meantime, ‘norm-aware reasoning agent’ is able to deliberate on
norms, goals and sanctions is coupled in the system so that virtual characters can or-
ganise the choice of behaviour, taking into account norms and individual context.
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we present a state-of-the-art survey of the domain of virtual character
behaviour incorporating norms and normative frameworks. In brief, we investigate
two main approaches: (i) norms as internal, pre-defined knowledge in a single virtual
agent mind, and (ii) norms as external knowledge in the virtual environment which can
specify and reason about norms and thus broadcast new sets of norms to individual
virtual agents.
In more detail, we introduce the use of both reflex agents (Human Territorial-
ity Model [Pedica and Ho¨gni Vilhje´lmsson, 2010]) and utility based agents (Thes-
pian [Si et al., 2006]) for reasoning about the normative behaviour of virtual characters
in the first approach. Afterwards, the use of normative systems to guide individual
agents behaviour is presented, which can be decomposed into (i) the deployment of an
Electronic Institution into the virtual environments (Virtual Institition [Bogdanovych,
2007], v-mWater [Almajano et al., 2013]), (ii) the combination of expectation moni-
toring service and goal-oriented agents (e.g. BDI type cognitive agents) (Expectation
Model [Ranathunga, 2013]) and (iii) the utilisation of the institutional model and goal-
oriented agents (Virtual Vehicle [Baines and Padget, 2014]). A comparison of systems
with regards to features and capabilities in building norm-aware virtual characters is
shown in Table 2.2 with a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of each system.
At the end of the discussion in Section 2.4, a hybrid approach which combines norma-
tive frameworks and norm-aware individual agents is proposed as a way of improving
the norm-awareness in virtual characters behaviour.
In practice, infrastructure for NorMAS has been developed but a few integrations
into the virtual environment has been proposed. This is mainly caused by heterogeneity
such as differences in programming languages to develop the softwares and platforms
(or OS) to run softwares, which hinders the integration of software components (e.g.
intelligent agents, virtual characters and normative frameworks) as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1. As a result, virtual environments that allow AI programming for virtual char-
acters take such a tightly-coupled approach that addition or removal of components is
not straightforward [Adobbati et al., 2001, Bogdanovych et al., 2008c, Gemrot et al.,
2009, Ranathunga et al., 2011, van Oijen et al., 2012, Veksler, 2009]. In the next chapter
(Chapter 3), we introduce an integration middleware, Bath-Sensor-Framework, its en-
gineering methodology and illustrative examples which show how intelligents agents,
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A Middleware Approach to Connect
Cognitive Agents and Virtual
Environments
As discussed in Chapter 1, norm-aware virtual characters are the primary subject of in-
vestigation in this thesis, in order to design and simulate human-like (social) behaviour
of virtual characters. For this purpose, the research centres on characters reasoning
about their behaviour with (social) norms through the socio-cognitive approach [Stein,
1993, Bandura, 2001, Akgu¨n et al., 2003] as proposed in Chapter 1, which empha-
sises the incorporation of individual cognitive reasoning and social reasoning on human
choices, in particular when individuals are engaged in social settings.
As a starting point to this end, we introduce a middleware approach to support the
coupling of (BDI-type) cognitive agents and virtual environments and their participants
as noted in the Chapter 1. It enables the control of virtual characters’ behaviour through
cognitive reasoning, as humans do in decision making for their individual autonomy.
We firstly propose an integration middleware, Bath-Sensor-Framework (BSF) with
an investigation including the architecture, main functionalities (e.g. sensors, pub/sub
mechanism) and programming model. Given BSF, we subsequently show an illustrative
example of the integration between N-Jason (a BDI-type norm-aware cognitive agents
as an intelligent agent. See Chapter 5 for more details) and SecondLife [Linden Labs,
2014] (a virtual environments where virtual characters reside). In this case study, inter-




Programming the environment in which a multiagent system is situated has been and
continues to be an active research issue [Ricci et al., 2011]. From this perspective,
many rich open systems, formed from networked 3D Virtual Environments (VEs) such
as online games, non-gaming applications or some entertainment context are all poten-
tial (programmable) environments, since they offer sufficient variety to simulate real
and semi-real world situations. SecondLife [Linden Labs, 2014] is an obvious repre-
sentative example of a 3D virtual environment: it provides a sophisticated, dynamic
and realistic virtual world as if duplicating the modern human society with avatars and
3D objects [Kumar et al., 2008]. Such a virtual world may encourage advances in agent
intelligence, through the demands of sensing and interaction, as agents are situated in
increasingly complex, dynamic or realistic environments.
However, the integration of agent software and rich environments creates a range
of challenges, arising not least from the variety of each and that neither is typically
designed to interact with the other. For example, the original purpose of SecondLife
is to provide an avatar in a networked 3D virtual environment, that it is expected a
human will control, so it does not explicitly take into account either the use of AI or
integration with other applications. The N-Jason agent platform proposed in Chapter 5
is similarly placed: its objective is to provide a BDI-based a deliberative reasoning
engine for agent research, so it does not consider standard programming interfaces for
other environments.
As a result, research on agent-environment programming has mostly relied on tightly
coupled approaches, characterised by using a specific ontology, protocol and interface
that are particular to one system [Adobbati et al., 2001, Trescak et al., 2011, Gemrot
et al., 2009, Ranathunga et al., 2011, van Oijen et al., 2012, Veksler, 2009]. Such a
lack of interoperability is possibly not beneficial overall for the development of agent
intelligence because there is little scope for the agent that is built for one VE to be ex-
ercised in another and so the agent is unavoidably mono-cultural. Besides, such tight
connections between agents and particular environments must somehow inhibit further
potential applications arising from alternative agent-environment combinations. We
44
believe that a way forward from this situation may be possible through an appropriate
form of middleware.
Thus, our objective is to describe and to demonstrate a kind of integration mid-
dleware that serves not only to loosen the coupling between agents and environments,
but also to make it possible to consider the connection of any kind of agent and any
kind of environment. In software engineering pattern terms, we outline a fac¸ade for
each agent platform and each environment, where each communicates with the other
by means of events (in effect, asynchronous message passing), facilitated by the use of
a publish-subscribe server. This constitutes the essence of the Bath Sensor Framework
(BSF), which provides the means to link software components independently of pro-
gramming language, platforms or operating systems, so in principle offering good ac-
cessibility, distribution and scalability as an agent-environment integration framework.
Performance is a more delicate issue that will take time and experience to establish,
depending on the communications overhead (the pub/sub server) and – more likely to
dominate – on the decision-making cycle of the agent, although this will clearly depend
on the sophistication of the agent architecture.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The overall system design
is be described in section 3.2 including the introduction to the integration middleware,
BSF. Section 3.3 presents the illustrative example and and in depth description of in-
ternal operations in the coupling on BSF. This section also includes the evaluation of
the system. We finish with a brief survey of related work in section 3.4 followed by
summary in section 3.5.
3.2 System Design
In this section, we describe the system design and how it can integrate an agent platform
with a virtual environment. In particular, we will demonstrate the interaction between
the software components and describe the programming model.
For our experimental set-up, the collection, distribution and exchange of data is
performed by using publish/subscribe between event producers and consumers via the
Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), an open standard communica-
tions protocol [XMPP Standards Foundation, 0129a]. Although XMPP is often cited
as a component in real-time (web) systems [XEP-301: In-Band Real Time Text, 2012],
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there is little quantitative evidence to back this up. In consequence, we have carried out
some preliminary evaluation (see 3.3.2) and we return to this issue in related work. For
an agent platform, we use N-Jason, a BDI type cognitive architecture and as VE, we
use SecondLife.
Any of these components (N-Jason, SL, XMPP) may be substituted in pursuit of
a better fit with the requirements set out earlier, but the primary focus of this work is
our evaluation of the adequacy of the BSF, instantiated as outlined, as a solution to
the issues identified above pertaining to agent-environment programming. In doing so,
we present an illustrative example that connect N-Jason agents and SecondLife, and
discuss how to accommodate differences in platform and programming language.
3.2.1 Overall System Architecture
The essence of the system architecture is that the agent platform is decoupled from the
virtual environment by means of a publish-subscribe messaging server – in this case,
XMPP – as shown in Figure 3-1.
In the case of SecondLife, the virtual character is created using the OpenMetaverse
library (LIBOMV [OpenMetaverse Organization, 2012]), which also provides the con-
nection to the SecondLife server. The role of the virtual agent is to interpret the actions
received from the BDI agent, and then carry out the resulting “physical” actions. In the
other direction, the virtual character perceives the environment and the percepts are de-
livered to the BDI agent via BSF, where they become a belief that influences the agent’s
reasoning process.
Clearly the BSF plays a key role in facilitating the interaction between the two
components. In particular, through the imposition of a simple communication API,
a java-based agent platform and a virtual character, in this case written in a different
language and running on a different platform, can interact with one another. We now
explain in more detail about the sensor framework.
3.2.2 Bath Sensor Framework
The Bath Sensor Framework (BSF) is an abstraction layer for data collection, distri-
bution and exchange built upon XMPP technology. The primary task for which the
framework was conceived is the effective collection of data from numerous physical or
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Figure 3-1: System Architecture of an Example
logical sensors, and its subsequent distribution to the relevant devices or software con-
nected to the XMPP server. The data itself is represented in RDF or JSON, although
this is not mandatory: the XMPP message structure is just a HTTP body and can be
any representation that is suitable.
XMPP is an open standard communication protocol built upon a set of open XML
technologies [XMPP Standards Foundation, 0129a]. It is intended to provide not only
presence and real-time communication services, but also interoperability by exchang-
ing any type of data in cross domain environments by means of nodes in the XMPP
server. To this end, it supports 1-to-1, 1-to-many, and many-to-many data transport
mechanisms, so that any data may be be transferred from anywhere to anywhere [Bern-
stein and Vij, 2010b]. Its flexibility, performance and lightweight nature have lead to
XMPP being chosen to support research in a diverse range of fields, including Many
Task Computing [Stout et al., 2009], bio-informatics [Wagener et al., 2009] and Cloud
Computing [Bernstein and Vij, 2010a], as a data distribution service in preference to
HTTP or SOAP services.
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Figure 3-2: The System Architecture of Bath Sensor Framework (BSF)
The above features suggest a number of advantages over pure TCP/IP connections.
The latter typically require quite careful set-up and can be fragile where the connection
graph is not simple. Moreover, TCP/IP is primarily for 1-to-1 connections, so every
additional connection needs an independent additional socket whenever multiple soft-
ware components are integrated into the main system. In contrast, XMPP provides a
star- or bus-like connection model to resolve the m-to-n problem, but through the node
abstraction within the server, allows the set-up of multiple virtual circuits. Further-
more, the data producer does not need to know the consumer’s identity to set up the
connection and through the server’s mediation of the connection, the system acquires
a degree of fault-tolerance, and permits the observation of system behaviour by third
parties, rather than having to replicate such mechanisms in each component. Thus, we
conclude that XMPP offers several attractive features, which is why we have chosen to
base BSF upon it.
For our purposes, the most notable feature of XMPP and hence the BSF is its pro-
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vision of a publish/subscribe mechanism. BSF supports these operations by means of
Sensor and SensorClient classes. When the Sensor is created in the application which
has a role as a data source, a corresponding node is also created in the XMPP server1.
Once created, the application can publish the data sensed from the real or virtual world
via the node. If the SensorClient, which is created in another application, and has a
role as a data consumer, sets up a subscription request on that node and registers a
corresponding handler in its application, then the data will be transferred from one ap-
plication to the other. As noted earlier, the data is represented in RDF or JSON and
published data can be stored in a triple-store (in our case OpenRDF) so that historical
data can be retrieved on request from the SensorClient using the SPARQL query lan-
guage2. In this way, BSF supports a form of messaging passing with unstructured data
between multiple software components.
A particularly valuable aspect of XMPP/BSF is its relative independence from both
operating systems and programming languages so that more general programming en-
vironments can be provided for users attempting to combine heterogeneous software
components. Thus, regardless of language, its interfaces reveal the same classes, meth-
ods and data structures, so that all kinds of applications or libraries can be integrated
relatively easily just by adding the classes inside applications.
As can be seen, the features of this framework present a simple and flexible pro-
gramming environment for heterogeneous software components, with a good level of a
accessibility in terms of a simplicity of protocol and ease of connection, performance,
and distribution. Consequently, we show how the BSF can facilitate the integration
of a BDI type cognitive architecture for virtual agents. The next section discusses the
programming model of the BSF.
1A node (also called topic) is a focal point for the publication and subcription, to which the pub-
lisher (e.g. Sensor) sends data, and from which subscriber (e.g. SensorClient) receives the notification.
The node is a topic-based: when xmpp entities (e.g.Sensor) are created to share information about spe-
cific subject (e.g. percepts), the corresponding nodes are also created. The pub/sub service at nodes is
grounded upon “Observer” design pattern: when a Sensor publishes information at the node, an event
notification is broadcasted to all Sensorclients which subscribe to that node [XMPP Standards Founda-
tion, 0129b].
2Other (structured, relational) databases may equally be connected to the Openfire [Ignite Realtime,
0129b] XMPP server and accessed by SQL queries.
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Listing 3.1 : Example of Sensor object
1 public class SampleVirtualAgent extends Sensor {
2 public SampleVirtualAgent(String server,
3 String user, String pwd, String node) {
4 super(server, user, pwd, node);
5 }
6
7 public void run() {
8 while (true) {
9 if (usePub) {
10 DataReading data = new DataReading();
11 publish(data); // populate






3.2.3 Programming model of Bath Sensor Framework
The Bath Sensor Framework can equally be applied to data exchange between dis-
tributed software components as to sensor based applications. The perspective of this
section is limited to the former. The analogy we draw, in making the connection be-
tween BDI agent, virtual agent and virtual environments, is that the virtual agent can
be viewed as a sensor for the percepts from the environment, in line with the tradi-
tional view of the “situated” (intelligent) agent [Wooldridge, 2009]. In this context, the
sensor object is instantiated in a virtual agent in order to collect percepts for the BDI
agent. Conversely, the BDI agent needs a subscriber object to receive the percepts and
subsequently reason over acquired beliefs.
To publish data from the data source to the target, subclassing via extending Sensor
class is necessary inside the virtual agent (see Listing 3.1). In a data consumer such as
in the BDI agent, the SensorClient object has to be instantiated inside the BDI agent
(see Listing 3.2). The C# version of this example is identical modulo the grammar of
the programming language.
The objective of the design is that it should suffice just to put the Sensor and Sen-
sorClient object in a wrapper around whichever software component it is desired to
integrate into the event processing framework.
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Listing 3.2 : Example of SensorClient object
1 public class SampleAgent {
2 public static void main(String[] args) throw Exception {
3 SensorClient sc = new SensorClient(server, user, pwd);
4 sc.addHandler(nodename, new ReadingHandler() {
5 public void handleIncoming(String node, String rdf) {
6 DataReading dr = DataReading.fromRDF(rdf);






The aim of this section is to demonstrate how the integration of agents and VEs is en-
abled by BSF. In particular, this example focuses on the impact of the use of BSF on the
integration of agent platform and virtual environment, in respect of some desiderata for
computational models such as generality, modularity and dynamic extensibility [Ricci
et al., 2011]. A complementary aspect is the increased capacity for distribution of the
components of the software architecture, so that it is not so tightly coupled and that the
addition or removal of components is straightforward.
In the preceding section, we outlined how Sensor and SensorClient objects are in-
corporated into a BDI agent and a virtual agent. For the following discussions, the
components are (i) N-Jason, providing a BDI type cognitive agent, (ii) the Open-
Metaverse library, providing a virtual agent, and (iii) SecondLife, providing a virtual
environment all linked by the BSF.
3.3.1 N-Jason agent and SecondLife
The goals of this work are two-fold: (i) to demonstrate the integration of N-Jason
agents with avatars in SecondLifevia BSF and (ii) to identify appropriate mechanism
for the control of avatars via BSF, through exploratory scenarios.
The brief scenario for this section is as follows: one avatar controlled by a human in
SecondLife server says ‘hello’ to a SecondLife avatar governed by a N-Jason agent. In
what follows, we refer to the N-Jason controlled avatar as the SecondLife Bot (SLB).
When the SLB receives the greeting message, the SLB sends it to the Jason agent over
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XMPP via the Sensor, where it is received via the SensorClient. The N-Jason agent
then updates the percepts, and performs one cycle of reasoning. As a result, the belief
‘hello’ triggers the plan ‘bow’, and appropriate actions are sent to the SLB. Finally the
bot does a ‘bow’ animation by means of the OpenMetaverse library after interpreting
the action plan ‘bow’. Interpretation of the action plans means the conversion of actions
from N-Jason to SecondLife animation action(s). For example, if ‘bow’ is received
from N-Jason, then SLB looks to see whether ‘bow’ is defined in the action map: if so
it perform that animation. More commonly, an action plan is likely to be composed of
several atomic actions (or animations) in SLB.
A notable aspect of this example is that two heterogeneous software components
are able to interact by means of the BSF: because the OpenMetaverse library is in C#,
so too is the SLB, but N-Jason is Java. Previous work has been able to integrate them
by means of the .NET framework [Ranathunga et al., 2011], but this requires all the
components to be in the same location, on a specific platform and also couples them
quite tightly. The C# interface to BSF is achieved by an extension of the jabber.net
library [Jabber-Net, ], whilst the Java interface is built on the Smack library [Ignite
Realtime, 0129a], although this is just one of several available Java libraries for XMPP.
We are currently using the OpenFire [Ignite Realtime, 0129b] XMPP server, although
again there are several other candidates.
N-Jason agent and Bath Sensor Framework
Figure 3-3 sketches the basic operations between a N-Jason agent and the BSF. The N-
Jason agent is extended, using the AgArch class, with the Sensor and SensorClient
objects. Percepts from the SLB are received by the SensorClient object, which results
in updates to the beliefs. The next reasoning cycle utilises these beliefs to retrieve an
action plan and the Sensor object publishes the plan to the SLB.
SecondLife Bot and Bath Sensor Framework
The OpenMetaverse library3 [OpenMetaverse Organization, 2012] provides a set of
APIs to program a Second Life avatar in terms of creation, appearance, movement,
communication – verbal and non-verbal – and interaction with each other, in the same
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Figure 3-3: Basic Operation between N-Jason agent and Bath Sensor Framework
way as the Second Life official viewer application. Thus, with OpenMetaverse, it is
possible to program complex compound actions in the avatar.
Figure 3-4 shows the basic operations between SecondLife bot and the BSF. Once
logged in, the SLB appears as an avatar in SecondLifeA˙s such, it has an identity and can
move and interact with other participants, as well as perceive events taking place nearby
the SLB itself. Consequently, all events occurring in SecondLife are detectable in the
OpenMetaverse library and delivered via a callback mechanism to the Sensor object in
the SLB, which collects them and publishes them for the N-Jason agent to receive. On
the other side, the SensorClient object receives (subscribes to) the action plans from the
N-Jason agent. These are then translated into sequences of atomic actions, which are a
combination of defined actions in OpenMetaverse or user-defined actions. As a result,
the SLB carries out these actions in respect of other participants or its environment.
3.3.2 Evaluation
We have prototyped a demonstrator using the BSF: N-Jason agents controlling Sec-
ondLife avatars in a SecondLife virtual environment. At the outset, our informal re-
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Figure 3-4: Basic Operation between SecondLife Bot and Bath Sensor Framework
(ii) performance: decoupling without significant degradation (iii) distribution: connec-
tion of components where-ever they might be, and (iv) scalability: in terms of size of
environment and number of participants.
Clearly, at this stage, progress on scalability is not feasible, but we can comment on
each of the other aspects, although we devote the most space to performance because
seems to be the one that raises the most questions.
Accessibility
Whilst each case study started out with the decoupling of the decision-making compo-
nents (BDI agent) from the virtual environment, each has added other components that
demonstrate the practice of our accessibility requirement.
In the context of the case study, connection with the VE presented a challenge,
because the OpenMetaverse library is written in C# and runs in .NET, hence required
the construction of a C# client for the BSF, as well as cross-platform communications.
Subsequently, we have incorporated a connection with an institutional model (involv-
ing Java and Answer Set Programming), following the initial implementation of Balke
et al. [Balke et al., 2011], but decoupled by means of the BSF interface (which is pre-
54
sented in Chapter 4). This has been used to demonstrate norm-mediated behaviour of
agents in SecondLife (the ‘hello’ example described earlier, and a more complicated
one involving making space in a queue for an individual who is given priority)4.
Performance
We have carried out preliminary performance evaluation of BSF by measuring the
elapsed time during the publication and subscription, which may reflect the physical
layer latency on the network. In particular, we focus on the investigation of the time
just before the publication of data that is already packed as a single item, and taking
the time when the subscription handler detects the arrival of the item. Two cases are
explored between (i) Java entities, e.g. BDI agent–virtual worlds (developed in Java)
and (ii) Java and C# entities, e.g. the virtual agent–BDI agent or vice versa. The hard-
ware platform used for this evaluation is a Windows 7 Professional edition, comprising
intel Core i7 Quad 64 2.93 GHz each with 4MB cache, with 6GB RAM. The hardware
platform for running the XMPP server is a Windows 7 Starter edition, comprising intel
Atom CPU N455 32 1.66GHz with 1GB RAM. Both hardware systems are connected
to a (VLAN) network implemented on (copper) Gigabit ethernet.5
Elapsed Time
Published every 25ms Published every 100ms
µ σ µ σ
Java to Java 1.875 ms 0.625 - -
C# to Java 1.119 ms 0.630 - -
Java to C# 2.826 ms 7.557 1.156 ms 2.268
C# to C# 2.664 ms 7.829 1.150 ms 2.466
Table 3.1: Delivery Time of BSF
During each evaluation, 152139 items (2 elements, metrics and commands each)
are published every 25msec. During the whole evaluaions, no data losses are observed
on the subscriber side. The overall statistics are shown in Table 3.1, where µ and σ
are the mean and standard deviation, respectively. These results suggest that transport
latency seems acceptably low. Based upon the largest average elapsed time (2.826ms),
4For more details, see Chapter 4
5The full test set is available via https://code.google.com/p/bsf/downloads/list,
retrieved 20150130
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this implies a frame update rate of at least 350 fps (which stands for 350 messages are
delivered per second) in theory, not accounting for time spent on either plan processing
or scene rendering. In practice, we observe that subscription in Java applications seems
both faster and more reliable, in the sense that the standard deviation is much lower than
for C#. C# also appears to be more sensitive to the publication rate, since if the interval
is increased (from 25ms to 100ms), the average time falls slightly and the standard
deviation improves significantly. We emphasize that performance per se is not the
objective here, but poor performance or irregularities may trigger problems at higher
levels and so it is important to establish a baseline figure for message transmission on
a given platform.
Although we have provided statistics on the elapsed time as a preliminary, a qual-
itative measure of performance might be that the system is performing properly only
as long as no events are dropped. That would require even extreme situations to be
withing the performance envelope. Quantitative evaluations may not be particularly
helpful except perhaps to provide reasssurance that throughput of particular compo-
nents is probably sufficient not to be the cause of a bottleneck. Even then, it may be
hard to say, even if many such components are performing “well”, whether their collec-
tive performance is adequate. We have, for example, measured elapsed message times
between Second Life and the agent controlling an avatar shown in Table 3.1, but this
may well say more about the networking infrastructure than about the architecture as
whole. As a consequence, it is common to eschew distribution for tight coupling in
order to be able to deliver performance guarantees. Thus, performance is less about
raw processing power, however that might be measured, but whether the architecture
as a whole performs believably. Even then, exhaustive testing all possible states of all
possible components is likely to be infeasible, so we are limited, as a poor substitute,
to stress-testing individual components as a way of seeking confidence in the overall
architecture. In practice, performance is a pervasive issue and tight coupling of com-
ponents is one way that some control can be exerted over the collective factors that
influence it, but in the long term such coupling impacts scalability.
Among the primary (new) sources of delay are the network, which is relatively hard
to control, and the XMPP server (or servers, since they may be federated). There are
several XMPP server implementations, but it is nor surprising, given the application
domain, that all aim for high performance within themselves. We have chosen to use
Openfire, because of its stated aims of supporting real time communications projects.
56
We have not done a comparative evaluation against other XMPP servers. Openfire
claims to be able to support significant numbers of (human) users with relatively few
resources (e.g up 500 concurrent users with a minimum of 384Mb RAM on a 1.5GHz
processor and up to 100,000 with a minimum of 2.0Gb RAM, 2×3GHz processors and
1–4 connection managers). Further details at [Jive Software, ] measure factors such as
the number of concurrent sessions and packet counts.
Since the fundamental mode of communication is publish/subscribe, one approach
to evaluating the processing capacity of a component is to quantify the rate at which
it can process incoming items, that is the data in the streams to which it is subscribed.
Different components will have different subscription capacities, and depending on
their role and where they are connected into the subscription network, one of several
approaches may be appropriate if this capacity is insufficient, such as: (i) increasing
component input capacity (ii) component replication (iii) throttling input volume, and
(iv) inserting an aggregator component whose subscription and publication rates match
upstream and downstream components.
There are two forms of mitigation that are possible in the architecture we have out-
lined: (i) short-circuiting, and (ii) aggregation (as mentioned earlier). Short circuiting
is, in effect, taking events from the virtual environment, intercepting them before they
are forwarded to the controlling agent, and making a decision that is returned to the
VE. We do this, for example, in the Mindstorms scenario, where an android handset is
physically located on the robot, which may make some (reactive) control decisions and
relay them back over the local bluetooth connection to the (lower level) Mindstorms
controller. Several such (nested) feedback loops [Roy, 2007] can be inserted into the
control chain depending on need. Such a design pattern reflects a hierarchical control
framework, where proximity to source implies lower level events and tighter control, as
seen in historical multi-layer agent architectures such as InteRRaP [Mu¨ller, 1996] and
Touring Machines [Ferguson, 1992]. The technical difference here is that those layers
are distributed, reflecting the network-determined (or estimated) capacity for a timely
response.
Aggregation is a complementary perspective on the same issue. Our experience and
that of others [Ranathunga et al., 2012] is that the Jason [Bordini et al., 2007] agents
cannot handle high percept update frequencies (actual figures are not very useful be-
cause they are inevitably application and platform specific useful), which is typically
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manifested by unstable and hard to re-produce behaviour. One approach might be to
re-engineer Jason for higher performance, which although possibly desirable, does not
consider whether all those events actually need to be processed at the BDI, that is the
deliberative, level. In both theory and practice, cognitive architectures use layers to
aggregate small observations into bigger ones. This can be characterised as inference
or situational awareness, depending on perspective, but the overall effect is that minor
observations are somehow collected, correlated and classified into less minor observa-
tions, subject to some degree of probability that reflects the accuracy of the process.
In doing so, the volume of data, which possibly at some level may be labelled “in-
formation”, is reduced so that frequency of communication is also reduced and the
receiving reasoning process is presented with synthesized knowledge reflecting some
kind of summary of the situation, rather than having to carry out that process itself. It
is a fundamental design challenge, perhaps reflecting the principle of so-called sliding
autonomy, to decide which levels should make which decisions, whether those strata
are fixed and if not, how those divisions may be determined, or negotiated, in live situ-
ations.
We believe that performance is a many-faceted issue in this context and XMPP
server throughput, and to a lesser extend network latency, whilst significant, are not
the only factors, and it is as much the other components, but especially the deliberative
architectures that we choose to use, the rate at which they can absorb percepts and the
rate at which they can make effective decisions. This in turn is significantly affected by
the level at which it is demanded they reason. Thus, the second mitigation is the relative
ease with which new event processors can be added to this architecture, by subscribing
them to existing feeds and publishing their results to existing consumers, through which
it becomes possible to balance the factors of event rate, information level and network
latency to achieve performance targets.
Distribution
Observations regarding distribution are relatively brief because, like accessibility, it
could be viewed as having been demonstrated in principle, but like scalability, more is
needed for it to be demonstrated with confidence. Since the XMPP message transport
layer is directly built on HTTP, and since XMPP has been used for some years to
support Internet Messaging in various guises (Microsoft Messenger, Google Talk, etc.),
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the mechanism has been demonstrated both to distribute and to scale. We have used the
BSF in the context of a distributed sensing project, but the case studies reported here
have only been run in the same local area network.
3.4 Related Work
AI research has paid substantial attention to how agent behaviour should reflect a re-
sponse to something sensed from the environment in which it is situated. Cognitive
architectures analyse this information, make decisions, and carry out planning to de-
termine the next behaviour to execute. In a dynamic environments, SOAR [Group, b]
is a well known example of a classical symbolic reasoning architecture. However, it
is also known as rather heavy-weight and can hardly be expected to respond in real
time. There is also a range of well-known reactive architectures, including subsump-
tion [Brooks, 2001], Finite State Machines (FSMs) [Brooks, 1991, Bryson, 2003], Ba-
sic Reactive Plans (BRP) [Fikes et al., 1972, Bryson, 2003], and POSH plans [Brom
and Bryson, 2006], amongst others. Any of the above, perhaps bar SOAR, are suitable
decision-makers for avatars in virtual environments, but our choice from among goal-
driven approaches, is the popular the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) architecture [Rao
and Georgeff, 1995]. Beliefs here refer to knowledge about the world in agent’s mind,
desires are objectives to be achieved, and intentions identify the actions chosen by the
agent as part of some plan to help it achieve a particular desire [Mascardi et al., 2005].
A distinct line of research has highlighted the notion of the environment program-
ming in multiagent systems [Ricci et al., 2011]. According to [Ricci et al., 2011], agent
programming should have a balance between the agent itself and its environments in
order to achieve a high level of intelligence. This perspective reflects the idea that the
environment becomes a meaningful place to support the agent’s abilities with many
functionalities, rather than the traditional view in which it is simply a place that the
agent senses and acts upon.
In this context, there is a fair body of research into the deployment of an embodied
artificial intelligence using the above cognitive architectures in rich environments. For
example, Bogdanovych et al [Bogdanovych et al., 2008a] introduce the 3D Electronic
Institution, or Virtual Institution (VI), which is a virtual world with normative regu-
lations governing interactions between participants and environment. They also also
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propose the introduction of virtual characters capable of learning [Bogdanovych et al.,
2008b] and the use of VI as environments for imitation learning, providing for the en-
hancement of virtual agent behaviour by learning from human users or other software
agents. Later work from this group puts forward a teaching mechanism, so that the vir-
tual character may become more believable [Bogdanovych et al., 2008c]. Although this
work is amongst the most developed in the use of Second Life, it offers rather less on
the matter of agent-environment programming and the role of cognitive architectures,
because of its focus on the regimented normative environment and virtual characters
that learn.
Veksler [Veksler, 2009] demonstrates integration between ACT-R [Anderson et al.,
1997, Group, a] and Second Life via a HTTP web server. In this work, all information is
gathered by a 3D object, which is attached to the avatar. It scans the environment around
the avatar within a certain radius, and sends what the scanner senses to a dedicated web
server. The ACT-R module is separate from the Second Life environment, but capable
of communicating to the web server. By means of HTTP request to the web server,
the decision-making module collects sensing data and executes a ‘perceive–think–act’
loop. In the end, the decision including motor actions goes back to the intermediate
web server, and are then applied to the avatar. Another notable work is [Ranathunga
et al., 2011], in which a Jason agent supplies the reasoning for a virtual agent in an en-
vironment provided by Second Life, supported by an external data processing module
that handles environment sensing. In the same manner as above, through an attached
3D object, which serves as a virtual sensory system, sets of perceptions generated by
the data processing module are delivered to Jason agent, which then deliberates. The
results of the reasoning are communicated back to the Second Life avatar, and the ac-
tion is realised, changing the state of the environment. The scenario in this case is the
playing of a football game. This work demonstrates the utilization of an event recogni-
tion platform [Ranathunga et al., 2012] not only to enhance the perception capability,
which becomes a source of better reasoning, but also to retrieve more accurate domain-
specific information from low-level data.
In comparison with the above systems, which are quite tightly coupled, other ap-
proaches also exist, that aim for a more general integration between cognitive agents
and virtual environments. There are (at least) three representative systems, with similar
objectives to ours, against which we contrast what has been presented here: Game-
Bots [Adobbati et al., 2001], Pogamut [Gemrot et al., 2009], and CIGA [van Oijen
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et al., 2012].
Gamebots [Adobbati et al., 2001] has much in common with the virtual agent com-
ponent in our system, being a kind of programmable agent controller, integrated with
the 3D video game Unreal Tournament (UT), in order to create autonomous bots that
interact with human players as well as other bot players. The bots are able to sense
and act directly from the environment, via TCP/IP socket communication. Gamebot
‘agents’ appear to be limited to reactive behaviours, whilst the system as a whole only
functions with one game engine, namely Unreal Tournament.
Pogamut [Gemrot et al., 2009] incorporates an interface layer between Unreal Tour-
nament and the decision-making agent, by means of TCP/IP sockets. The role of this
component is rather like that of the N-Jason agent in our system, in that it has the task
of perceiving the environment, interaction with the environment, and decision making,
for which it uses the POSH reactive planner [Brom and Bryson, 2006]. As with Game-
bots, Pogamut has seen substantial up-take, from student projects to complex research
projects, thanks to their approach that allows greater flexibility in the development of
the high level of autonomy in virtual agents. Nevertheless, it still has a high depen-
dency on the particular environment of UT, and on a particular programming language,
namely Java.
CIGA [van Oijen et al., 2012] also has numerous similarities with our framework
in that it aims to resolve the coupling problem between agent and virtual environment.
This it does by means of two interface layers and an ontology model: (i) physical
interface layer to connect to a environment (game engine), and (ii) cognitive interface
layer to connect to a multiagent system, corresponding to the Virtual Agent and the Ja-
son Agent, respectively. The use of ontology model, containing pre-defined ontologies
to make a contract between agent and game engine even though they are situated in a
specific domain, eases the interpretation of perception and behaviour execution. This
architecture offers fair accessibility, and could in principle support distributed execu-
tion, thanks to the use of socket-based communications, but this would require careful
manual configuration. In this respect, CIGA is the closest to our proposal, but the de-
pendence on a relatively low-level and inflexible network layer seems likely to inhibit
distribution and scalability.
To summarise, the short-comings we observe in the above lie in their tight in-
tegration of the components, leading to an effectively closed, single platform sys-
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tem. Thus, they do not have the flexibility necessary for distributed software systems.
They are tightly coupled by the communication protocol as well as ontology, so that
adding/removing a software component is challenging, and deploying such platforms
more widely is in general difficult. This is only exacerbated – or probably even ren-
dered impossible – if it is desired to incorporate components in different programming
languages or that only run on another operating system.
Earlier, we noted the lack of any comprehensive performance evaluation of XMPP,
as far as we can find, in the academic literature. Linden Labs have apparently carried
out an evaluation of various message passing protocols6, noting that the Advanced Mes-
sage Queueing Protocol [Committee, 2012] implementations demonstrate good single-
host performance, but lack figures on maximum capacity when clustered, or the value
of clustering. XMPP appears in the list, but was not evaluated for lack of time. Several
other protocols are eliminated for not meeting their requirements, but unfortunately
there is no definitive conclusion.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, the Bath Sensor Framework has been introduced as a middleware for
decoupling cognitive agents and virtual environments. Also, a case study is presented
using the framework for linking heterogeneous software, N-Jason BDI type cognitive
architecture and SecondLife which is representative rich 3D virtual environment. From
the study, it seems clear that BSF has some useful advantages as an integration mid-
dleware. Firstly, it offers good accessibility, because of the simplicity in protocol, and
ease of both connection and use. Secondly, in respect of speed and reliability, it inher-
its from XMPP, so that it is able not only to communicate in (soft) real time but also
transfer whatever data in the form of open XML, which may become the basis of inter-
operability in cross domain applications. Finally, it enables distribution of components,
so that it contributes to effective data transport mechanism such as 1-to-1, 1-to-many,
or many-to-many, from anywhere to anywhere. As a result, through the use of the BSF,
the system as a whole has the potential for flexibility and extensibility.
In the following chapter, we have extended the framework to operate in conjunction
6http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/Message_Queue_Evaluation_Notes,
retrieved 20120416, last updated 2010.
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with an institutional framework, so that the behaviour of an agent in a virtual envi-
ronments can be governed by norms.The notion of institution, as a set of rules for a
particular agent society, is appropriate for the regulation of behaviour of virtual agents
in a particular situations, by saving the need to incorporate behaviour for all circum-





In the previous chapter (Chapter 3), we present how (BDI type) cognitive reasoning
agents can control virtual characters behaviour through the services of a middleware.
In this chapter, we present Distributed Norm-Aware Agent Architecture (DNA3) as a
model of a socio-cognitive reasoning framework for virtual characters by the use of
insitutions [Cliffe et al., 2007] on top of the above integration, thus enabling cognitive
reasoning for virtual characters.
4.1 Introduction
Recalling the main objective, the thesis centres on reasoning for virtual character be-
haviour with (social) norms from a socio-cognitive perspective [Stein, 1993, Bandura,
2001, Akgu¨n et al., 2003] which emphasises the social influences on individual cogni-
tive processes in human choices. This characteristic of the theory in turn gives rise to
the necessity of incorporating social as well as cognitive processes in the selection of
behaviour when individuals are engaged in social settings.
One approach to the realisation is to utilise institutional models [Cliffe et al., 2007]
as a social reasoning process in conjunction with cognitive reasoning virtual charaters.
The institutional models – also called normative frameworks – are seen as an effective
way to capture the salient elements of human social structures [Boella et al., 2006] and
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can equally be applied in (participatory) VEs to provide IVAs with adequate knowledge
of human social mores, or indeed the rules of whichever context in which we wish
them to be able to behave properly. Thus, the use of institutions is a way to achieve the
appropriate recognition of complex situations and provide guidance on the consequent
choice of action(s) depending on the context the virtual characters encounter.
In response, this chapter introduces a computational model, Distributed Norm-
Aware Agent Architecture (DNA3), in order to facilitate the socio-cognitive approach
in reasoning virtual character behaviour with (social) norms. We attempt to establish
DNA3 by the additional integration of institutions [Cliffe et al., 2007] on top of coupling
BDI-type cognitive agents and virtual characters shown in Chapter 3. Given (DNA3),
we intend to answer the following questions as noted in Chapter 1 through DNA3and
its examples: (i) how institutions carry out reasoning about situationally appropri-
ate norms under the combination of BDI-type agents and virtual characters, (ii) how
these norms can be adopted in a virtual agent’s mind and (iii) how these norms can be
associated with agent decision making process.
We start the chapter by explaining socio-cognitive theory [Stein, 1993, Bandura,
2001, Akgu¨n et al., 2003] through the survey on psychology and social science liter-
atures in Section 4.2 as a theoretical foundation. Then, in Section 4.3, we present the
introduction to computational model of institutions Cliffe et al. introduce [Cliffe et al.,
2007], where social cognition in virtual environments takes place. Afterwards, we pro-
pose DNA3 as a socio-cognitive reasoning framework for virtual character behaviour
in Section 4.4. This includes an informal explanation of the socio-cognitive reasoning
process in DNA3 (Section 4.4). Two illustrative examples are given in Section 4.5.
4.2 Socio-Cognitive Perspective on Human Choices
This section identifies a theoretical background, the socio-cognitive perspective on
human choices, as it appears in psychology and social sciences. To begin with, a
background that what motivates an advent of the socio-cognitive perspective in hu-
man choices is described in Section 4.2.1. Afterwards, a brief overview about socio-
cognitive decision making process is introduced in Section 4.2.2. We particularly em-
phasise the role of institutions as a means to mimic the social reasoning process in the
human society.
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Note that the material presented in this Chapter is mostly grounded upon the litera-
ture of Anderson [Anderson, 2005], Bandura [Bandura, 2001, Bandura, 2005], Akgu¨n, [Akgu¨n
et al., 2003] and Stein [Stein, 1993, Stein, 1997].
4.2.1 Cognitive Psychology: Background
A decision making process organising human thought and action has been given much
attention in psychology. Traditionally, it has been seen as a simple input-out model
inspired by behaviouristic principles. Accordingly, human choices are shaped and con-
trolled by stimuli from external environments in both a mechanical and automatic way
in this linear model [Bandura, 2001]. This perspective has been rapidly supplanted by
more dynamic and complicated models in modern psychology. A reasoning process
can be regarded as a result of simultaneous and interactive computations carried out by
several subpersonal components which orchestate a series of actions [Harre´, 1983, Ban-
dura, 2001].
Cognitive psychology contributes to understanding the underlying mechanism of
human decision making in accordance with the development of modern psychology [Neisser,
1976, Anderson, 2005]. It successfully illustrates such simultaneous and active in-
volvements of diverse operations in human mind with a concept of ‘human cognition’.
According to Hilgard [Hilgard, 1980], the term ‘human cognition’ means ‘the process
of knowing’ about newly incoming information people are receiving from the external
environment. This process involves several simultaneous and/or consecutive brain ac-
tivities such as processing, codifying, representing, interpreting, storing and retrieving
the information subject to the occurrences in external environments [Stein, 1993, An-
derson, 2005] in order to ‘make sense’ of the observations. More details are decribed
in the succeeding section.
Cognitive Structure
The cognitive structure is a form of complex pattern in the human brain, which is con-
structed by recognising, arranging, systematising and storing stimuli perceived by in-
dividuals. This cognitive structure mainly plays an important role in making sense of
newly incoming information when people are receiving a series of stimuli from exter-
nal environments. If this new information is too much to process within an individual’s
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cognitive capacity, then the cognitive structure contributes to economise their cognitive
capacity [Anderson, 2005].
The cognitive structures starts the task (i.e. to process newly income information)
just after the stimuli are received and stored in the sensory memory via the heuristic
search mechanism governed by “gestalt principles” [Anderson, 2005]. This registered
information subsequently enters into the short-term memory, then those incoming infor-
mation is identified by a pattern recognition techniques e.g. “recognition”, “heuristic
search”, “pattern recognition” and “serial recognition” [Simon, 1990]. These tech-
niques are essentially carried out based on: (i) the search for combinations of features,
(ii) the situational context and (iii) the attention given [Stein, 1993].
If the information is not identified successfully by the use of cognitive structures,
and which is in turn proved as unfamiliar from the existing set of cognitive structure,
then it gives rise to more attention leading to the request for more cognitive capacity to
process. Depending on the amount of attention given, the cognitive structure processes
those unfamiliar information either ”automatically” (or ”habitually”) in case that low
attention given or ”actively” otherwise [Anderson, 2005].
Interpretations of stimuli are the final step of the process, which in principle aims
to give a meaning in the end. At this stage, those interpretations are stored in the long-
term memory by the principle that the schema theories of memory proposed. Actually,
the stimuli (or experiences) are interpreted to a large extent and guided by the existing
structures in the long-term memory. In other words, schema (also called a frame) selects
and modifies experiences so that a coherent and consistent representation subject to
schema (reflecting existing memory) is formulated.
Thus, the outcome stored in the memory is always under some degree of influence
from the existing knowledge individuals possess [Bourne et al., 1987]. These stored
interpretations are in turn distinguished between: (i) “episodic” memory identifying
the spatial and temporal aspect of an experience, (ii) “semantic” memory referring to
an individual’s knowledge focusing on what it is and thus (iii) “procedural” memory
storing the knowledge relevant to what one can do [Bourne et al., 1987]. The informa-
tion those memories hold can be utilised if required during another cycle of processes
later on.
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Criticism of Cognitive Psychology
Despite the subtantial impact on understanding human behaviour, some criticisms have
been raised about cognitive psychology. On the one hand, it is an issue that the ratio-
nality of human cognition is bounded. ‘Horizon’, a TV program on the BBC in the
UK, introduced an interesting perspective on individual cognitive reasoning process.
The program argues that whether or not human choices are clearly rational during de-
cision making (via individual cognitive process) as ordinary people believe that their
decision making is rational. Kahneman [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] confirms that
the assumption, human choices are rational, is not true. In effect, almost all human
decisions are likely to rely on intuition which is ‘biased’ by not only inherited traits
from human evolution but also previous individual experiences, rather than by ‘logical
process’ in their cognition. Kahneman claims this tendency in human choices, called
choice bias, is mainly caused by the limited cognitive capacity [Simon, 1990] of the
human brain. Since on the one hand, the logical reasoning process requires a signifi-
cant work load under bounded resources, but on the other, it is easy to recall or imagine
from experiences, a response, the human brain tends to economise its mental activities
by doing heuristic search and re-using preconceived knowledge instead of carrying out
additional reasoning [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979].
The limited choice domain where heuristic search or recalled experience take place
is another factor in bounding the rationality of human cognition. As shown in the pre-
vious section (Section 4.2.1), the representation of the world is actively constructed
by (cognitive) processes where the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated,
recovered and used [Neisser, 1976]. Human attention is limited in capacity, thus peo-
ple are inevitably likely to be selective in their perception of the world, in order to
prevent of information processing overload. Even worse, only a small part what peo-
ple observe can be internalised in the cognitive structure due to its limited capacity.
In the meantime, those selective and partial observations are transformed sometimes
through reduction and elaboration in the human brain [Bourne et al., 1987, Anderson,
2005, Reed, 2012]. As a result, people may not be able to possess the entire representa-
tion of the world and experiences. Instead, it is obvious that only a limited knowledge
of choice domain is in their mind. Simon argues that limits on computing resources
(e.g. power, speed, data set) of intelligent systems (e.g. human brain, computers) lead
the systems to have limited rationality due to the approximation methods necessary to
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handle the tasks [Simon, 1990]. In accordance, the limited choice domain as well as
limited cognitive capacity in human brain consequently constrain the rationality of a
human decision when the human choice is adopted on the basis of the cognitive struc-
ture individuals have.
The limited comprehension of human behaviour in social situations is seen as the
other shortcoming of cognitive psychology, as discussed earlier in Chapter 1. Like to
behavioural theory, cognitive psychology relies heavily on studies (e.g. empirical as
well as experimental studies) constrained by elaborat artificial settings [Neisser, 1976,
Anderson, 2005]. In other words, the cognitive approach only pursues the investigation
of the human mind and its inner working mechanisms without consideration of external
influences. This results in the social influences on the human mind not being given due
recognition, which gives rise to less comprehension of human behaviour, especially
when an explicit causal relation between ‘thought about what to do next’ and ‘actions
that individuals can actually pursue’ is not seen.
This non-causality in human choices reminds of what Bandura raises in his litera-
ture [Bandura, 2001] that “People do not live their life only in individual autonomy”.
People are sometimes likely to give up their individual autonomy during their decision
making process when they are situated in the society where a number of individuals are
connected by interactions [Simmel and Wolff, 1950]. Although an explicit causality is
not seen between individuals’ thoughts (e.g. what people really want to do) and obli-
gations (e.g. what should be done), human behaviour can be affected by social forces
when the decision that gives up the autonomy is more socially worthy (or fit to moral
purpose) in their interactions.
This nature teaches us that people have an ability to make a judgement of the
rightness and wrongness by conducting an evaluation of personal standards and social-
situational circumstances [Bandura, 2001]. As described above, cognitive structure is
a complex knowledge set ordinarily constructed by the (cognitive) processes of ‘per-
sonal’ collections and experiences. Suppose that a sensory input is personal experi-
ences in the social context. Then individuals internalise the input information as a set
of recipes about ‘the way things are and the ‘the way things should be done’ [Stein,
1993, Stein, 1997, Anderson, 2005] – which are called preconceptions – in the cogni-
tive strucuture. When they are situated in a similar social context subsequently, they
tend simply to recall those preconceptions in order to interpret either situations or asso-
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ciated responses from others (or both) so as to behave adequately [Weick, 1979, Weick,
1988]. However, such preconceptions are a personal prior knowledge which can be
seen as a ‘private sense’ [Stein, 1993] thus the choices based upon preconceptions may
not be accepted as appropriate in relation to the situations. In order to judge the ade-
quacy of the behaviour determined by cognitive reasoning process(es), it is desirable
to take into account a standard of behaviour in a ‘common sense’ with a personal stan-
dard, which is a shared common knowledge by members of a society, such as norms
addressing what conduct ought to be in that circumstance [Gibbs, 1981].
In conclusion, cognitive psychology has led a contribution to the understanding of
the internal mechanism that how human brain functions during the decision making
process. However, it shows a shortcoming with respect to (i) the bounded rationality
of human cognition and (ii) the limited comprehension of human choices under social
forces. Subsequently, such a recognition of the limitaions enables to take a different
route in theorising underlying mechanisms in human mind, towards a socio-cognitive
approach in order to comprehend human behaviour better.
4.2.2 Socio-Cognitive Theory
As discussed in the previous section, cognitive psychology has limitations, that makes it
insufficient to illustrate the internal mechainsm of human mind, specifically under soci-
etal structures and its sub-systems [Stein, 1997, Anderson, 2005]. As a result, sociology
in response attempts to comprehend human behaviour in a macro-analytic way, so that
the determination of human choices and its associated behaviour are socially interde-
pendent and such that it is an outcome of the interplay between individual knowledge
and social structures [Cook and Yanow, 1993, Easterby-Smith, 1997, Bandura, 2001].
A socio-cognitive theory is in principle grounded on the above hypothesis, the pur-
suit of the incorporation of a social as well as a cognitive dimension in human choices.
The cognitive dimension stands for an individual knowledge structure that personal
collectives have constructed in their mind as seen in Section 4.2.1. Similarly, social
dimension refers to an intersubjectively-shared knowledge structure about “the way
things are and the way things should be” [Stein, 1997]. Human behaviour is closely
related to this knowledge in social situations, which takes responsibility for the inter-
pretations of that deontic forces at play in that situation, as cognitive structure does
during the cognitive process. In this sense, the social dimension is seen as a result of
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social structure and processes driven by collectives of people, called ‘social cognition’
that can be compared to human cognition on the individual level.
In general, the notion of ‘cognition’ refers to the process of ‘knowing’ about newly
perceived information as noted in Section 4.2.1. Given this concept, cognitive psychol-
ogy defines human cognition as a mechanism activated for the processing and storing
information in the human brain [Anderson, 2005]. Likewise, social cognition is seen as
processes to construct socially-shared knowledge structure through functions similar to
those in human cognition, such as acquisition, storage, transmission and manipulation
of social information [Larson and Christensen, 1993].
Social cognition mainly investigates the (conscious/unconscious) human informa-
tion processing in complex social interactions [Gioia and Sims, 1986] taken by individ-
uals with one another. This is closely related to the identification of the way how people
interpret and construct their social reality and all aspects of reasoning processes [Weiner
et al., 1983]. With this aim, social cognition develops the socially constructed knowl-
edge structure through social activities amongst people and a collective of people in
the society. Such information processing of social stimuli produces a knowledge struc-
ture representing a ‘common sense’ in the form of norms, rules or culture [Klimecki
and Lassleben, 1998]. Similar to cognitive process, these knowledge structures oper-
ate as a central means to interpret social interactions in which individuals are currently
engaged [Wyer Jr and Srull, 1984].
Recalling the standpoint of the socio-cognitive approach, it is not unusual that a
causal relation might not be seen between ‘thoughts about doing something’ and ‘ac-
tions actually allowed’ in the human mind, due to the social context in which people
are embedded [Stein, 1997]. Individual perceptions are interpreted on the basis of the
cognitive dimension so that thoughts about what to do next in relation to those percep-
tions are independent from the external influences. In other words, the interpretation
relies entirely on an individual knowledge structure in the human brain representing a
‘private sense’. But actions actually taken may not be in the category of those thoughts
(i.e. desires) people initially have in their mind, when the situation they now encounter
sometimes requires a special consideration. Due to the external deontic forces the spe-
cial consideration imposes, the actions people can actually pursue can be restricted
and/or organised by the consideration, rather than desires (i.e. thoughts driven by in-
dividual cognitive processes). In consequence, there might not be an explicit causality
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between individual thoughts and embodied actions, which cannot be explained or un-
derstood by cognitive psychology at all. In this case, social cognition could be a clue
for the identification of the reciprocity between individual desires and situationally ap-
propriate actions being taken.
In review, we believe it is important to consider both cognitive and social dimen-
sion during the decision making. This approach provides a complementarity for the
interpretation of the reciprocity between desires and actual choices in the social con-
text, by the formation of social phenomena through interaction processes [Stein, 1997].
Within this sense, the fertilisation of social cognition is essential for socio-cognitive
decision making. We now introduce the institution where social cognition takes place
in conjuction with individual cognition in the following sections.
Institutions for Social Cognition
Social cognition is achieved by a collection of people in a social context through the
processes of interaction amongst them. This results in the knowledge structure rep-
resenting the norms, rules or cultures which affect behaviour during interactions by
acting as a frame to interpret a meaning of reality from those interactions [Duncan,
1979, Kim, 1998, Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, Akgu¨n et al., 2003]. An institution is a
socially constructed belief system functioning as described above [Stein, 1993, Stein,
1997]. As in the way of human cognition (e.g. cognitive process and structure), the
institution takes responsibility for both process and structuring of social information,
following the operations that how the social information is stored, organised, retrieved
and selected [Douglas, 1986].
The institution is a structural discipline in the processing of information [Stein,
1993]. It governs the creation of meanings so as to pattern human actions/interactions
at various social levels – which can be seen as a social process. Note that the action-
s/interactions are not actually taken by the instition themselves during the process of
interactions. Instead, the institution acts through the mediator (which is the individual
and their cognitive process) by the exertion of influence on them. The institution is then
influenced by the knowledge those individuals have induced [Douglas, 1986, Akgu¨n
et al., 2003]. Subsequently, the institution governs the gathering and processing of the
information [Stein, 1997].
As a result, this social process produces the social structures whose contents are
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normative patterns defining expected modes of action or expected modes of social re-
lationship [Parsons, 1940]. In other words, the institution has a set of norms describing
socially-shared expected behaviour in particular situations (or circumstances) agreed
by all members of society [Gibbs, 1981, Schotter, 2008]. Given such a set of norms,
the institution interprets and organises human interactions by means of normative pat-
terns representing “the way things are” and “the way things should be” [Stein, 1997],
which can be seens as a social structure.
In principle, norms in the institution work as expectations in social relations. Ac-
cording to Wallace [Wallace, 1983], the norms brings the ‘common sense’ to the in-
terpretation and choice of behaviour for participants in four ways that: (i) from the
roles the individuals address (“actor expectations”), (ii) from the context, in particu-
lar the time (‘when’) and the space (‘where’) (“situation expectations”), (iii) from the
experiences of causal effects (“response expectations”) and (iv) from the values which
motivate, assess and validate actions taken (“consequence expectations”) [Wallace,
1983]. This in turn promises the improved rationality in actions/interactions with re-
gards to (i) the adequacy in behaviour subject to the roles, (ii) the accuracy in time
and space, (iii) the mutuality in response and (iv) the trustworthiness of the actions
undertaken [Weber, 2009].
In conclusion, the institution is a socially constructed belief system where social
cognition takes place. The institution is on the one hand in charge of the construction
of social structure, consisting of normative contents through the processing a collective
of people in the interactions. On the other hand, it interprets the social reality with
normative patterns, so as to organise human behaviour in the social context. With the
nature of norms addressing appropriate actions subject to the situation, the institution
leads the enhancement of rationality in social behaviour of individuals by exerting norm
influences (which imply ‘common sense’) on individual cognitive reasoning.
4.2.3 Discussion
Although cognitive psychology has contributed to the understanding of human be-
haviour, it still has limitations in comprehending human behaviour in a social context.
As a resolution of this tension, this section presents a socio-cognitive theory, which is
in the pursuit of the incorporation of a cognitive as well as a social dimension in hu-
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Figure 4-1: DNA3 System Overview
context. The institution as a means for social cognition plays an important role in this
theory by the exertion of normative influences on individual cognitive reasoning.
In response, we propose the Distributed Norm-Aware Agent Architecutre (DNA3)
shown in Figure 4-1 in order to design and simulate virtual characters’ behaviour with
norms in the rest of this chapter. Recognising the importance of norms in human so-
cial intelligence, DNA3 includes institutional models on top of the Intelligent Virtual
Agent (IVA) which couples cognitive reasoning agents and virtual characters described
in Chatper 3. In doing so, virtual characters can show a better quality of norm-aware be-
haviour by means of socio-cognitive reasoning which considers social structure as well
as individual cognition, in particular in the situation that social activities are necessary.
In the next section (Section 4.3), we introduce the formal and computational model of
institutions as a preliminary to DNA3. Afterwards, the core of DNA3 is presented in
Section 4.4.
4.3 An Institutional Model in MAS
Institutional models – also known as normative frameworks – are a kind of external
source of knowledge for delivering norms to intelligent (virtual) agents in MAS re-
search. It is a set of rules for being able to govern the agent society. These rules can
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be seen as situation-specific norms resulting from reasoning about the current social
context, rather than just a hard-coded repertoire of reactions such as those in static ex-
pert systems. It describes not only correct and incorrect actions but also norms such
as obligations, while maintaining a record through its internal state, that evolves ac-
cording to events captured from the external world. Inside the institutional models, the
information about ‘when’ and ‘what’ is the correct (or incorrect) action to be achieved
by agents, evolves over time according to the given social context in the models. Once
these norms are issued, agents are able to carry out ‘rational’ decision making with
norms which can lead to a ‘right’ and ‘situation-specific’ behaviour created by situa-
tional awareness in social settings.
We adopt Cliffe’s institutional framework [Cliffe et al., 2007], which provides the
function of regulatory governance of agents through its capacity for social reasoning.
The regulation takes the form of permissions and obligations that an agent is free to
follow or ignore, but the latter may have social consequences, such as ostracism [Per-
reau de Pinninck et al., 2007], for example – although we do not explore this issue fur-
ther here. The framework provides a formal action language InstAL to specify norms
describing social interactions between agents and (or) environments in the context of
the institutions. Then the formal framework is translated to a computational frame-
work based on Answer Set Programming (ASP) [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991], which
enables the reasoning about the current social context described in the institution.
The actual modelling of the institutions is achieved by InstAL , an institutional ac-
tion language proposed by Cliffe et al. [Cliffe, 2007]. Underpinning the action language
is a formal mathematical model and an equivalent computational model implemented in
AnsProlog. We now briefly give overview of both models adapted from the citations
given in the following section.
4.3.1 Formal Model
InstAL ’s underlying principle is the interpretation of exogenous events in the context
of the institution, using [Searle, 1995]’s principle of conventional generation. The nor-
mative effects of these events are recorded in the institutional state.
Two types of events are defined in the model:
• external events (Eex) capture the events happening in the VE, and
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• institutional events (Einst) are the interpretation of external events in the institu-
tional context.
Following the “count as” principle introduced in [Searle, 1995], external events can
be interpreted into the corresponding institutional events. For example, an external
event “say hello” occurring in VE, counts as an institutional event “request chatting”.
Institutional events are divided into two groups: institutional actions (Eact), indicating
changes in the institutional states, and violations (Eviol), generated by performing non-
permitted actions or non-satisfaction of obligations.
The institutional state is represented by a set of facts, called fluents F . At any
given instant, their presence denotes the veracity of the fact and the absence otherwise.
Therefore, a state formula is a combination of positive or negative fluents: X = 2F∪¬F .
Different aspects of the normative state are denoted by subsets of F which may be
separated into domain fluents and normative fluents further as below:
• domain fluents (D) describe domain-specific properties,
• power (W) indicates some event is empowered and may so bring about institu-
tional change,
• permission (P) denotes an event can be performed without generating a violation,
and
• obligations (O) specify that an event must happen before the occurrence of dead-
line (e.g. a timeout), otherwise a violation is generated.
In practice, the normative fluents (e.g. P , O) represent the normative consequences
of particular behaviours which should be achieved by virtual agents at a certain so-
cial context. For example, the form of the normative information is represented as:
obl(act, deadline, violation) or perm(act), which means an agent X is obliged to
carry out action act, or an agent X is permitted to perform action act, respectively.
By observing a trace of exogenous events, the VE’s institutional states evolve ac-
cordingly. To this end, two transformer functions are provided:
• the generation relation (G), generates institutional events from the occurrence of
external/institutional events subject to conditions on the state, and
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I = 〈E ,F ,G, C,∆〉, where
1. F =W ∪P ∪O ∪D
2. E = Eex ∪ Einst with Einst = Eact ∪ Eviol
3. G : X × E → 2Einst
4. C : X × E → 2F × 2F where C(φ, e) = (C↑(φ, e), C↓(φ, e)) where
(i) C↑(φ, e) initiates fluents
(ii) C↓(φ, e) terminates fluents
(iii) with φ a condition on the state φ ⊆ 2F ∪ 2¬F and e ∈ E
5. ∆ ⊆ F
6. State Formula: X = 2F∪¬F
Figure 4-2: Formal specification of the institution
• the consequence relation (C), updates institutional states by adding or removing
fluents, subject to the occurrence of some event and other conditions.
Therefore, given an event trace and initial state ∆ of an institution, the correspond-
ing institutional model, i.e a sequences of corresponding states, can be generated.To
summarize, an institution is a tuple I := 〈E ,F ,G, C,∆〉 and the main features are
defined in Figure 4-2.
All these elements are specified in the institution by InstAL . The actual operation
of the reasoning about normative consequences, subject to an observed but incomplete
trace of Eex, is accomplished by answer set solver, just after the translation of formal
institution model to a corresponding computational model using ASP. In the reason-
ing process, answer set solver performs traversing all cases with descriptions and con-
straints derived from G and C, and find the most adequate answer in all answer sets
afterwards. More details are described in the following section.
4.3.2 Computational Model
The formal model of institutions described above can be translated to a corresponding
computational model using answer set programming.
ASP [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991] is a declarative programming paradigm under
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the answer set semantics. Instead of designing solution to a problem, ASP only requires
the description and constraints to the solution, and then finds the solutions. The basic
elements are atoms, that can be given a value, true or false. Atoms can also be negated
by negation as failure. The general form of an ASP rule is syntactically like that of
a Prolog term, comprising a head and and a body, such that the truth of the former is
implied by that of the constituents of the latter. Rules with no head express constraints,
indicating undesirable rules that solutions should not satisfy. Thus, an ASP program
is a conjunction of rules. Solutions are found by assigning values to atoms in order to
satisfy all the rules stated in the program in a minimal and consistent fashion. Each
such solution is an answer set.
The computational model of an institution comprises:
• base component, initiates/terminates fluents, generates violation events if neces-
sary,
• time component, defines time predicates as observed event and forms time se-
quence, and
• institution-specific component.
The main ASP atoms in this computational model are:
1. fluent(p) for a fluent p ∈ F of an institution,
2. event(e) for an event e ∈ E ,
3. evtype(e, obs) to denote an observed (exogenous) event e ∈ Eex,
4. evtype(e, act) to denote an institutional action e ∈ Eact,
5. evtype(e, viol) to denote a violation event e ∈ Eviol,
6. initiated(p, T) and terminated(p, T) denote a fluent p is initiated/terminated
at time T ,
7. occurred(e, T) to denote the occurred event e in the institution at time T , and
8. holdsat(p, i00) denotes that the fluent p is true in the institutional model at time
instant i00.
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p ∈ F ⇔fluent(p). (4.1)
e ∈ E ⇔event(e). (4.2)
e ∈ Eex ⇔evtype(e, obs). (4.3)
e ∈ Eact ⇔evtype(e, act). (4.4)
e ∈ Eviol ⇔evtype(e, viol). (4.5)
C↑(φ, e) = P ⇔∀p ∈ P · initiated(p, T)
← occurred(e, T),EX(φ, T ). (4.6)
C↓(φ, e) = P ⇔∀p ∈ P · terminated(p, T)
← occurred(e, T),EX(φ, T ). (4.7)
G(φ, e) = E ⇔g ∈ E,
occurred(g, T)←occurred(e, T),
holdsat(pow(e), T),EX(φ, T ). (4.8)
p ∈ ∆⇔holdsat(p, i00). (4.9)
Figure 4-3: Translation of institutional rules into AnsProlog
A formal model of an institution can be translated to an ASP program by the map-
ping from the formal model to ASP atoms according to Figure 4-3. For all exogenous,
institutional and violation events, lines 4.1 to 4.5 maps them into ASP atoms. Lines 4.6
to 4.9 show the framework-specific translation rules. As introduced in the previous
section, the set of state formula X denotes all possible states characterised by the com-
bination of positive (F) or negative fluents (¬F). For a given condition φ ∈ X , the
corresponding institution event g ∈ E is generated (occurred(g, T)) at time T sub-
ject to some conditions EX(φ, T ) when an event e occurs at time T (occurred(e, T))
according to the generation rule G(φ, e) (line 4.8). When an institutional event oc-
curs, some fluent p ∈ P might be initiated (initiated(p, T)) (line 4.6) or terminated
(terminated(p, T)) (line 4.7) at the same time T . The literal (not) holdsat(f, T) rep-
resents the fluent f holding positive (or negative) at time T . The initial states f of
institution at time i00 is encoded as holdsat(f, i00).
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4.4 Agent Deliberation with Institutions
As introduced in Section 4.2, socio-cognitive theory pursues the incorporation of so-
cial dimension and cognitive dimension in order to improve the rationality in human
decision making in the social context. Inspired by the theory, this thesis take into ac-
count the hybrid approach which combines social reasoning and individual cognitive
reasoning in the design and simulation of norm-aware virtual characters behaviour. In
the preceding section, we introduced the institutional model which take responsibility
of social reasoning as a computational model of social cognition in the socio-cognitive
theory. Now we would like to show the way how the social reasoning carried out by the
institutional models can be incorporated with individual virtual agents so as to guide
virtual characters behaviour with norms.
In this section, we introduce DNA3 which consists of such institutional models
supporting social reasoning, and N-Jason1, a norm aware (BDI-type) cognitive agents
supporting individual reasoning. To begin with, the architecture of this framework is
presented from an engineering perspective, explaining in detail how the coupling is ac-
complished between the institutional model and the Virtual Environment (VE) wherein
the Virtual Agents (VAs) (controlled by BDI agents) are situated. Subsequently, we
discuss from the operational perspective how the mental model of the framework is
implemented. To do so, we illustrate the internal mental state changes associated with
how an institution and norms affect the individual reasoning process.
4.4.1 Architecture
Existing examples of agent platforms working with VEs [Arcos et al., 2005, Savarimuthu
et al., 2008, Bogdanovych et al., 2008b] have quite a high degree of integration, tight
coupling, or bespoke software involved. Close integration is potentially beneficial
for performance, but potentially problematic when one of the software components
changes. Thus, we concluded that it was desirable to decouple agent platform and
VE to minimise the impact of change in one on the other, but close enough to deliver
acceptable performance and genuinely distributed execution. Furthermore, existing ar-
chitectural approaches would only get harder to maintain if we sought to integrate a
third component – the institution – into the system.
1See chapter 5 for more details
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We use a lightweight distributed framework, BSF, introduced in the previous chap-
ter (Chapter 3), originally conceived for distributed sensors, as a means to provide
communication and decoupling. It presents a simple and flexible programming envi-
ronment, using publish and subscribe streams, supported by XMPP server technology,
to connect multiple software components that can operate on one computer or over a
local or a wide area network. As mentioned in Chapter 3, we realise the system of cog-
nitive reasoning virtual characters by setting up a N-Jason platform for the cognitive
agents and the libOMV [OpenMetaverse Organization, 2012] interface to the Second
Life server as clients to an XMPP server. Subsequently, we can incorporate the institu-
tion component by connecting it using the same pub/sub mechanism.
The system overview of DNA3 is shown in Figure 4-4. The diagram is more general
than the system we describe here, in that it refers to a connection manager (libOMV, in
this case) and virtual environments (VEs)(Second Life, in this case). Different VEs can
be connected, as can device interfaces with the real world, such as Kinect, for gesture
recognition, both of which have been done. Thus, it is possible to support all four
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Figure 4-4: High Level Architecture of DNA3
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As shown in Figure 4-4, the DNA3 system is composed of three software compo-
nents as follows:
1. the normative framework, which formulates and delivers norms corresponding to
environmental events delivered by agents,
2. the virtual character, that resides in the VE and being capable of sensing and
acting in that environment, and
3. the N-Jason, (BDI-type) cognitive reasoning agent, which receives percepts from
the virtual character, and generating plans delivered to the virtual character.
The sensory data from the virtual character is usually raw, so it must be converted
into a symbolic representation to be used in the N-Jason agent (see ‘Interpreter’ in
Virtual Agent block, a left of Figure 4-4). Likewise, the action plans from N-Jason
agent are high level abstract behaviours that need to be decomposed in atomic virtual
character actions, similarly (see the same, ‘Interpreter’ in Virtual Agent block, a left of
Figure 4-4).
Percepts transferred from the virtual agent build up the belief set of the N-Jason
reasoning agent, along with normative consequences (permissions, obligations, prohi-
bitions) detached from the institution(s). The role of the institution(s) is in formulating
and communicating normative consequences corresponding to environmental events
delivered by N-Jason agents. As a part of belief set in the BDI reasoning agent, those
normative consequences also contribute to the agent’s decision-making process.
All decision making is performed by the N-Jason reasoning agent, each one of
which is directly mapped to a virtual character. When we refer to ‘Intelligent Virtual
Agent (IVA)’, we mean this pair of entities: the N-Jason reasoning agent and the virtual
character.
The next section describes the interaction between the N-Jason agent and the insti-
tution in more detail.
4.4.2 Mental model
The mental model of the distributed agent framework is shown in Figure 4-5. As might
be expected, this is somewhat different from a conventional agent platform, because
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Figure 4-5: Mental model of the distributed agent framework
changes of mental state not only depend upon percepts from the VAs, but also on the
normative information from the institution that are incorporated as percepts. In this sec-
tion, we describe how this mental model was implemented, combining the institution,
norms and the BDI agents. To begin with, definitions and formalizations are provided
for the key concepts and entities. With these in place, we discuss how the mental state
changes through interplay both between the institution and IVAs, and between the nor-
mative percepts (received from the institution) and mental states of IVAs.
Given an established VE, a group of IVAs co-exist and thus share a common en-
vironment, meaning they can each observe the same environmental changes, and can
interact with each other.
Within the virtual world, the actions of the VAs bring about observable changes in
the environment, which are perceived by the VAs and presented to the N-Jason agents
and the institution as events. Thus, the VA act as sensors and interpreter for both BDI
agent and institution and in consequence the agent and the institution are both aware of
the same events (see left hand side of Figure 4-5). We refer to these as external events
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because they occur external to the institution (see line 2 of Figure 4-2).
We use the concept of event to refer to the symbolic representation of some captured
data about the environments. The Recognising component in the VA is responsible for
turning whatever is observable in the VE into this symbolic representation. We assume
that the perception and recognition of all external events is carried out by VAs. Al-
though all these events are delivered to the N-Jason agent, only some of of them may
be meaningful to the agent, and those that are not are ignored. The same applies to
the institution: if there is no constitutive rule for an external event, then it is not of
relevance for the institution. It should be noted that an event that is not meaningful
in itself to the agent, but is to the institution, may consequently bring about an insti-
tutional change that is in turn relevant for the agent, because the event may cause the
institutional recognition of a situation that affects the normative position of the agent:
see the flow on the left hand side of Figure 4-5 from the institution to the agent. Thus,
the institution consumes events from the VE and provides a social interpretation of
them to the co-located IVAs, in terms of normative position information (permission,
obligation), which is incorporated into the agent’s mental model, broadly in line with
the ideas set out in [Alechina et al., 2012], and subsequently may be taken into account
by the agent’s decision-making process. In so doing, the agents may exhibit socially
aware responses to situations, which may be perceived by humans as more believable.
In the next section 4.4.2, we describe the details of such an interaction mechanism
between the institution and IVAs inspired by on-line reasoning mechanism [Balke et al.,
2011] in the institution. It is followed by the influence of social norms to the mental
state in N-Jason agents of intelligent virtual agents in section 4.4.2.
Institutions and IVAs
Unlike the on-line reasoning Balke et al. propose, the instantiation of the institution is
carried out by an external process called the Institution Manager, which provides the
interface between the institution and the VA (event feed from VE) and the BDI agent2.
The institution provides two services for the N-Jason agent:
2We decouple the institions and BDI-type cognitive agents using BSF whereas the institution and
the agents are tightly coupled in the Balke et al.’s model. Due to the tightly coupled property, Balke et
al.’s model is only able to instantiate the single institution. In contrast, the decoupling is the engineering
choice in order to be able to instantiate multiple institutions simultaneously by the use of instituion
manager.
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Figure 4-6: Sequence Diagram of Runtime Reasoning
• the interpreting of VE events and delivery of normative position updates, and
• a query mechanism, whereby the BDI agent can ask the institution for informa-
tion about the normative position.
The sequence of the runtime reasoning model are depicted in Figure 4-6, reflecting
the description above. Once the belief set in the N-Jason reasoning agent is updated by
percepts (denoted as Eex) collected by the virtual character, then Eex is delivered to the
institution and the normative state (P or O) is updated. When queries are made by the
N-Jason reasoning agent to the institution, it gives rise to a social reasoning process
and replies with new normative consequences(P orO) to the N-Jason reasoning agent.
The mental state of BDI agent is updated by this social normative information, denoted
as N (E ivain ).
Thus, the IVA is able to extend the information it has thanks to the social reasoning
capability provided by the institution. The notation N (E ivain ) denotes the social nor-
mative information returned from the institution associated with the co-located IVAs.
Once passed to the agent, the normative information can be incorporated in the belief
base of the BDI agent.
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Normative information and IVA Mental States
Normative information is communicated from the institution to the N-Jason agent and
typically becomes part of the belief base. In this mental model, normative information
(N (E ivain )) is complementary information for each agent rather than a separate part of
the mental state. This N (E ivain ) becomes a part of the belief base and perhaps a sub-
goal for the achievement of primary goal. If an institutionally generated obligation is
adopted as a final goal, the agent would in effect be regimented, thus the model can fall
back to fully regimented, if the agents have such behaviours. The actual form of the nor-
mative information is represented as: obl(act, deadline, priority) or perm(act),
which mean that an agent X is obliged to perform action act by deadline deadline with
a priority priority, or an agent X is permitted to perform action act, respectively. A N-
Jason agent will then take action act, if it satisfies a belief or a subgoal of its main goal.
If not, the obligation is ignored and a sanction may follow. More details of decision
making with norms in N-Jason are described in the next chapter (Chapter 5)
4.5 Illustrative Examples
We have set up two experimental scenarios in order to show how the system works.
In the first we consider a queuing situation and in the second a situation concerning
inter-personal distance.
We use Second Life as the VE in which all actions and interactions take place. IVAs
are modelled by the combination of the OpenMetaverse library [OpenMetaverse Or-
ganization, 2012], for the virtual characters and BDI agents implemented in N-Jason.
OpenMetaverse allows not only for the creation of VAs, but also the scripting of be-
haviours using combinations of various atomic actions. N-Jason provides a platform
for the creation and programming of norm-aware BDI agents using an extension of
Agentspeak. The institution is specified using InstAL, the Institutional Action Lan-
guage, which provides the social reasoning process.
4.5.1 Queuing
It is common in the society modelled in this scenario, that anyone who wishes to enter
somewhere, or get on something is obliged to wait their turn in a queue. Of course,
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Figure 4-7: Sequence Diagram of IVAs in Queue Scenario
people who arrive later join the end of the queue. If someone arrives who is disabled
or old, the social obligation is for those queuing to make a space for them at the front.
Here, we model and demonstrate a such situation with two human users and three IVAs
in a virtual world.
Initially, the VAs are dispersed, pursuing their own activities in the vicinity of the
boat. As soon as the conductor (a human user) announces that boarding is starting, the
VAs start to congregate at the gang plank and form a queue. When the disabled/old
agent appears, the disabled/old agent requests them to make space for it. A sequence
diagram for this scenario is provided in Figure 4-7.
In the normal course of events, IVAs take actions by individual reasoning, when be-
liefs are satisfied by its perceptions such as the case of EVT<Go(Destination)> (where
EVT< · · · > denotes an event). In the mean time, the delivery of percepts may cause
state update, or a query to the institution. Eventually however, the final decision on
which action to take is accomplished through the combination of internal knowledge
in BDI agents and normative information from the institution. Sometimes, such as in
the case of EVT<Detect(Disabled)>, the outcome of social reasoning affects the agent
behaviour directly. Nevertheless, it should be clear that plan selection is not purely
determined by normative requirements, but depends on internal computation in Jason.
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(a) Queuing (b) Detecting (c) Yielding
Figure 4-8: Queuing
Some frames extracted from the video are shown in Figure 4-8.
4.5.2 Inter-Personal Distance
Inter-Personal Distance(IPD), also known as proxemics, stands for the personal space
between oneself and others [Hayduk, 1983]. We noted earlier, in Section 1.1, an inter-
esting finding by Yee et al. that social interaction in VEs between avatars controlled
by humans, appear to be subject to the same IPD social norms as in the real world.
From this observational study, we may suggest that behaviours of VAs is likely to more
believable if they are able to replicate human behaviours governed by social norms.
Hence the motivation for the simulation of IPD in this second scenario.
To this end, we aim to show a simple IPD demonstration, in order to explore the ef-
fect of intimacy on IPD. The social norm in relation to intimacy and IPD is that: if peo-
ple get too close to a person with whom they are not sufficiently intimate, then people
typically either change their eye gaze or move to keep the proper level of IPD [Rosen-
feld et al., 1984]. We simulate this with one human user and two IVAs.
The brief scenario for this example is that a human user meets two IVAs. One of the
IVAs is friends with the human-controlled character, the other is not. Thus, when the
human character greets them, the expected behaviour of the one known to the human
is to react with greetings and maintain proximity. However, the other does not greet in
return and also changes its eye gaze to maintain a proper level of IPD.
Figure 4-9 shows a sequence diagram of the IVAs used in the example. When one
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Figure 4-9: Sequence Diagram of IVAs in IPD Scenario
virtual agent observes an external greeting message (‘Say Hello’), the greeting mes-
sage is interpreted as an event (EVT<Get(Greetings)>) which in turn delivered to the
N-Jason BDI agent. As soon as the percept of the N-Jason BDI agent is updated with
the event (EVT<Get(Greetings)>), the query to the institution (Q<Get(Greetings)>)
is made by the N-Jason BDI agent. Then the institution replies with a new normative
consequence (OBL<Keep(IPD)>) to the N-Jason BDI agent after it’s social reasoning
process. The mental state of the N-Jason BDI agent is updated by this obligation af-
terwards, which leads the virtual agent’s behaviour to comply with the obligation with
the plans, either Plans<Do(Greetings), Keep(IPD)> or Plan<Do(Change Gaze)> de-
pending on the IPD between the two virtual agents. Some frames extracted from the
video are shown in Figure 4-10.




In this chapter, what we mainly propose is a computational model, Distributed Norm-
Aware Agent Architecture (DNA3), in order to facilitate the socio-cognitive approach
in reasoning virtual character behaviour with (social) norms.
To begin with, we present an explanation of socio-cognitive theory on human choices
as a theoretical foundation of DNA3, through the investigation on literatures which ap-
pear in the domain of psychology and social scinece. In here, the brief introduction to
cognitive psychology is presented firstly. Then, criticisms on cognitive psychology is
discussed as a motivation on the advent of socio-cognitive perspective on human deci-
sion making. Afterwards, we introduce the socio-cognitive theory itself in conjuction
with the concept and mechanism of social cognition. In the end, the institution is inves-
tigated as a main element for social cognition process which produces norms, socially
constructed knowledge, representing the correct behaviour in social context.
In accordance with the theoretical foundation, the computational model of the insti-
tution is presented as a means to social reasoning in conjuction with cognitive reasoning
virtual characters. Then, this chapter introduces a DNA3, which is established by the
additional integration of institutions on top of coupling BDI-type cognitive agents and
virtual characters. Given (DNA3), we describe the informal explanation of the socio-
cognitive reasoning process based upon run-time reasoning mechanism, and identified
the mental model of N-Jason agent under the governance of the institution. Afterwards,
two illustrative examples are given, which serve to illustrate how the VA, controlled by
the N-Jason agent behaviours, is influenced by social reasoning in the institution.
When virtual characters are governed by the institution, their mental model is dif-
ferent from the conventional agents hence the decision making on norms and goals
is essential. Since norms have its own properties such as deadlines, priorities and
sanctions, the practical reasoning on norm compliance requires a careful considera-
tion which can not be achieved in the conventional BDI-type agents. In the following
chapter (Chapter 5), we introduce N-Jason and its internals, which is capable of run-




Norm Aware Decision Making in BDI
Agents
As introduced earlier (Chapter 4), normative systems (institutions in this case) offer
a means to govern agent behaviour in dynamic open environments. Under the gov-
ernance, agents themselves must be able to reason about compliance with state- or
event-based norms (or both) depending upon the formalism used.
This chapter describes how norm awareness enables a BDI agent to exhibit norm
compliant behaviour at run-time taking into account normative factors. To this end, we
propose N-Jason, a run-time norm compliant BDI agent framework supporting norm-
aware deliberation as well as run-time norm execution mechanism, through which new
unknown norms are recognised and bring about the triggering of plans. To be able to
process a norm such as an obligation, it is essential that the agent architecture is able to
deal with deadlines and priorities, and choose among the plans triggered by a particular
norm. Consequently, we extend the syntax and the scheduling algorithm of AgentS-
peak(RT) [Vikhorev et al., 2011] to operate in the context of Jason/AgentSpeak(L) and
provide ‘real-time agency’, which we explain through a detailed examination of the
operational semantics of a single reasoning cycle.
The chapter is organised as follows. We firstly start from the identification of the
main objective in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we show an institutional context where
N-Jason is running, specifically from the perspective of the semantics of norms. It
is followed by Section 5.3, where we present a run-time norm compliant BDI agent
framework including programming language and interpreter. After the operational se-
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mantics in Section 5.4, related work and the contribution of this work are contrasted in
Section 5.5. The summary and future work are discussed in Section 5.6.
5.1 Objective
In conventional development of BDI agents, norm compliance is typically achieved by
design. That is, by specifying plans that are triggered by detached norms, because the
agent programmer knows which norms the agent shall adopt, and then prioritising those
rules so that the supporting norms are chosen over those preferred by the agent’s mental
attitudes, in order to suppress conflicts between the normative and the agent’s existing
goals. This creates an undesirable dependence between the agent implementation and
the norm implementation, which creates two issues:
1. When an agent encounters new and unknown norms, which were not taken into
account at design time, there is typically no plan to deal with those norms in the
plan library at run-time. Hence, norm compliant behaviour cannot normally be
exhibited because the norms are unavoidably ignored. Yet worse, agents may
suffer a punishment from the enforcement of the normative system as a result of
a violation caused by their incapacity to process the normative event.
2. The hierarchical prioritisation of normative over ordinary plans deprives an agent
of its autonomy, since the norms in effect are treated as hard constraints, whose
violation is not possible.
We believe that such tensions can be resolved by the use of an extended model of
norm awareness. In the literature on BDI agents, norm awareness, which is a precursor
to norm compliance, is typically manifested in two places:
1. at the perception level, by taking new unknown norms into account as part of the
generic execution mechanism [Meneguzzi and Luck, 2009, van Riemsdijk et al.,
2013] and
2. at the deliberation level, by attempts to resolve the conflict between normative
factors and agents’ mental attitudes [Alechina et al., 2012, Dybalova et al., 2013].
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We propose to coalesce these approaches into one ‘sense–think–act’ reasoning cy-
cle informed by the concept of awareness, which Charlton [Charlton, 2000] describes
as the capacity “to select and integrate relevant inputs from a complex environment
to enable humans or animals to choose between a large repertoire of behavioural re-
sponses”. This definition reminds us that, in order to be norm aware, agents should
have knowledge (or understanding) about norms in respect of:
1. what (state) the norms are intended to reach or to achieve,
2. which action plans are appropriate to execute norms and
3. which behaviour agents should prefer between normative goals and the agent’s
own interests.
Thus, this chapter addresses the convergence of these approaches in the context of
the BDI agent architecture, in order to be able to ground the discussion of how the
extended model of norm awareness enables a BDI agent to exhibit norm compliant
behaviour at run-time.
To do so, we propose N-Jason, a run-time norm-compliant BDI agent framework
supporting a run-time norm execution mechanism, under which new and unknown
norms are recognised and enable the triggering of an appropriate plan (if present), in
conjunction with norm-aware deliberation [Alechina et al., 2012].
In order to be able to process a norm such as an obligation, the agent architec-
ture should be able to deal with deadlines and priorities, and choose among plans trig-
gered by a particular norm. Consequently, we extend the syntax and the scheduling
algorithm of AgentSpeak(RT) [Vikhorev et al., 2011] to operate in the context of Ja-
son/AgentSpeak(L) [Bordini et al., 2007] and provide ‘real-time agency’, which we
explain through a detailed examination of the operational semantics of a single reason-
ing cycle.
5.2 Semantics of Norms
In this section, we briefly address the syntax and semantics of norms resulting from the
institutional model introduced in Chapter 4. In addition, we sketch the concept of how
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this set of norms can take part in the practical reasoning process of Norm-Aware BDI
Agents.
Depending on the formalism of the normative system, norms can be categorised
as state- or event-based. State-based norms usually express higher level norms that
impose desirable or required states on the system (or an environment), often as a logical
combination of institutional facts, which should be brought about by the actions of
agents [Dignum, 2004]. In contrast, event-based norms generally represent relatively
lower level activities addressing possibly executable events (or actions) at the individual
agent level [De Vos et al., 2013]. As introduced earlier (Chapter 4), we use Cliffe’s
institutional model [Cliffe et al., 2007] for the purpose of providing detached event-
based norms, upon which we develop the run-time norm compliance model presented
here.
The institutional model is a set of rules describing consequences arising from ob-
servations for the purpose of reasoning about the current context, resulting in situation-
specific norms. As an example, if an agent X is obliged to carry out an action act by
deadline deadline otherwise the violation event violation is generated, the form of the
normative information is represented as:
obl(act, deadline, violation) (obligation)
Also if an agent X is permitted to perform an action act, then the representation is:
perm(act) (permission)
With regards to the norm compliance in BDI agents, van Riemsdijk et al. suggest
in [van Riemsdijk et al., 2013] that one feasible approach for run-time norm execution
is the use of “pre-existing capabilities” in the agent program when an agent encounters
new and unknown norms. This assumes that event-based norms can identify the asso-
ciated necessary actions, since event-based norms typically refer to relatively low-level
activities that address possibly executable events (or actions) at the individual agent
level [De Vos et al., 2013]. If appropriate information can be extracted from the de-
tached norm, such that it is recognisable to an agent, in this way an agent presumably
may execute unknown norms and so exhibit a form of norm compliance at run-time.
For example, the act term in an obligation represents a similar level of knowl-
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edge to plans or events in a BDI agent program. If an agent can retrieve and recognise
what action (or event) is required to be achieved, then it can trigger certain plans and
attempt to carry out such behaviour even though the norm is not handled explicitly in
the agent specification. With regard to the norm-aware reasoning, an agent may de-
duce a preference, if it is able to know the relative priorities, and critical impact or
the deadline of normative factors by extracting deadline and violation infor-
mation. This norm-aware reasoning may allow an agent to pursue its own preferences
between its own goals, norms and sanctions, by measuring feasibility, as proposed by
Alechina et al. [Alechina et al., 2012]. In this chapter, we only use obligations for such
purpose, in order to focus on the essential aspects of the agent’s internal reasoning pro-
cess. Additionally, we consider the handling of prohibitions for the compatibility with
other normative systems, however they are not explicit in the institution mechanism
employed here.
5.3 The N-Jason BDI Agent Framework
In this section we outline N-Jason, a norm aware BDI agent interpreter and its program-
ming language for run-time norm compliant agent behaviour. In principle, it extends
Jason/AgentSpeak(L) syntactically, semantically and in the reasoning process of the
interpreter. In practice, N-Jason is conceptually similar to AgentSpeak(RT) [Vikhorev
et al., 2011], which is capable of dealing with deadlines and priorities and schedul-
ing intentions with the aim of providing real-time agency. N-Jason is conceptually
a superset of AgentSpeak(RT), to which it adds normative concepts (i.e. obligations,
permissions, prohibitions, deadlines, priorities and durations) and norm aware deliber-
ation.
We firstly examine work to date with regards to the programming language aspect.
This is followed by an informal explanation of the N-Jason reasoning cycle. Subse-
quently, we show how the extended model of norm awareness in BDI agents is estab-
lished by the combination of the run-time norm execution mechanism and norm-aware
deliberation.
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5.3.1 The N-Jason Agent Programming Language
A N-Jason agent consists of four main components: beliefs, goals, events and a set
of plans. Beliefs and goals are identical to those in standard Jason, while events and
plans are extended. We now give a brief summary of the extended features of the basic
elements in the agent specification. We take advantage of Jason’s plan annotation
mechanism to provide deadline, duration and priority information, so that each feature
is simply a term, such as deadline(X), duration(Y) or priority(Z), where
the parameters are (positive) integer literals. The interpretation of these annotations and
examples are covered in the following.
Belief: A belief represents agent’s information (e.g. initial states of an agent, internal
knowledge established through the reasoning cycle) and its knowledge about the
environments wherein agents are situated (e.g. percepts observed by agents, mes-
sages containing the information about other agents and norms delivered from
normative frameworks). Typically, a belief is represented as a grounded atomic
formula. The collection of beliefs is referred to as a belief base, which contains
belief literals in the form of belief atoms and negations.
Goal: A goal is one of two basic types: an achievement goal or a test goal. The former
are usually specified as predicates prefixed by the ‘!’ operator. This specifies a
certain state of the environment that the agent wants to achieve, which is indicated
when the predicate associated with its achievement goal is true. The latter test
goal, for which the prefix is the ‘?’ operator, indicates that agents want to know
whether the associated predicate is a true belief.
Event: An event is the main component for triggering agent’s plans. In principle,
changes in agent’s mental attitudes (i.e. beliefs, goals and intentions) give rise
to events. There are two types of events: one is an addition event denoted by
‘+’, which means the addition of a belief or an achievement goal. The other is a
deletion event denoted by ‘–’, referring to a retraction of an element in the belief
base.
As in Jason, an addition event is categorised by a belief addition event denoted
by ‘+’ and a goal addition event jointly denoted by ‘+’ and ‘!’. All external
belief changes bring about belief addition events, so as to initiate the execution
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of corresponding plans. In contrast, the goal addition event results from both
internal and external changes in goals. In other words, explicit goals from the
users or other agents result in a goal addition event, but also a goal addition event
can be generated by internal operations affecting the agent’s mental attitude, such
as the execution of subgoals triggered in response to an external event.
Support for normative concepts is provided by an extension of the syntax for an
event by the addition of deadline and priority information. The deadline is a
real time value indicating a deadline by which an intention should be achieved.
It is expressed in a some adequate unit of real world time. When the deadline
is passed, it is no longer feasible to achieve an intention or to give a response
with a belief change. The priority is a positive integer value that expresses the
relative importance between the achievement of an intention and responding to
changes in a belief. A larger value reflects a higher priority. Both can optionally
be specified in the annotation (a list of terms in between square brackets “[” and
“]”) at the end of an event. For example the event:
Listing 5.1 : deadline and priority in an event
1 +!at(X, Y)[deadline(900), priority(10)]
specifies the goal adoption that an agent moves to the coordinate (X, Y), by the
deadline 900, with priority 10. By default, the deadline is taken as infinity and
the priority as zero. Note that the deadline and priority annotations do not play a
part in unification at plan selection stage.
Plan: A plan is a sequence of actions (and subgoals) which is a means to achieve a
(main) goal or a means to respond to changes in beliefs by agents. The plan
typically consists of a head and a body, but sometimes an optional plan label,
which defines an index, a name and other information, can be specified. The
head is composed of a triggering event, which specifies an event for which the
plan is to be used and a context specifying the condition which must be true for
the plan to be a candidate for execution. The body is a series of actions and
subgoals to achieve a main goal.
The plan is extended to support normative concepts. Given the three main ele-
ments (beliefs, goals and events), a duration is proposed in N-Jason, specifically
in order to enable assessment of the feasibility of the plan associated with the
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deadline (see Section 5.3.4). The duration is a non-negative integer value rep-
resenting a required time to execute the plan. In principle, the duration may be
determined by the summation of an execution time of each external action in
the plan body. For simplicity, we follow the assumption described in [Alechina
et al., 2012], that the estimated time for each external action is fixed and already
known. Like deadline and priority, a duration can be optionally specified in the
plan label in the form of an annotation (a list of terms in between square brackets
“[” and “]”). For example, the plan:
Listing 5.2 : duration in a plan
1 @plan[duration(50)]
2 +!at(X, Y) : req(ag)
3 <- move_toward(X, Y);
4 !ack(ag).
is triggered by the request from the agent ag to move to the coordinate (X, Y),
and then to send back an acknowledgement to ag. The required (or estimated)
execution time of the plan is 50.
5.3.2 The N-Jason Interpreter
The interpreter plays an important role in the operationalisation of agent programs.
The agent’s belief base, intentions and events are manipulated by the interpreter, and
practical reasoning consisting of deliberation and means-ends reasoning is performed
to achieve a goal or to respond to environmental changes.
As mentioned at the beginning of Section 5.3, we extend the Jason/AgentSpeak(L) [Bor-
dini et al., 2007] interpreter, by taking into consideration AgentSpeak(RT) [Vikhorev
et al., 2011], in order to propose N-Jason. Jason/AgentSpeak(L) – consisting of pro-
gramming language and its interpreter – is one of the popular/representative agent
platforms in the agent oriented programming community. Initially, programming plat-
forms for BDI agents have been proposed that emphasise either the formal basis (e.g.
2APL [Dastani, 2008], GOAL [Hindriks, 2008]), or industrial use (e.g. Jadex [Pokahr
et al., 2005], JACK [Winikoff, 2005]), although all are based upon theoretical foun-
dation of BDI agents and its programming language, AgentSpeak(L), as put forward
in [Rao and Georgeff, 1995, Rao, 1996]. Unlike the variants of AgentSpeak(L) noted
above, Jason/AgentSpeak(L) is a compromise between those two territories. In addi-
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tion, it provides further features which enable easier and more efficient programming
on top of simple, elegant and intuitive programming language [Bordini and Hu¨bner,
2010]. For this reason, we choose to extend Jason/AgentSpeak(L) to realise the N-
Jason interpreter.
However, as discussed in Section 5.1, Jason/AgentSpeak(L), as a conventional BDI
programming platform, is not capable of dealing either with properties of norms such
as deadline, priorities and sanctions or the execution of unknown norms in the agent
program. Thus, we take into account the addition of norm-aware deliberation [Alechina
et al., 2012] via the ‘real-time agency’ proposed in AgentSpeak(RT) [Vikhorev et al.,
2011] on top of Jason/AgentSpeak(L). Run-time norms execution is also proposed as
another extension to Jason/AgentSpeak(L) in order to support the operationalisation of
unknown norms which are not built into the agent program.
Given the extended features of the N-Jason, during a single reasoning cycle, run-
time norm compliance is accomplished by an extended model of norm awareness that
has three steps:
1. Event Reconsideration, to find out what the norm is intended to achieve or to
reach,
2. Option Reconsideration, to identify which plan is the most appropriate in re-
sponse to the norm,
3. Intention Scheduling, to confirm the decision about which behaviour agent would
prefer between goals, norms and sanctions.
The interpreter code of N-Jason is shown in Algorithm 2. B is the belief base, E is
the event base, G is a set of goals and I is a set of intentions of an agent. The function
create-tevent encodes a percept as a triggering event and returns it. The function add-
event updates the agent’s event base with an event which is a pair of a triggering event
and an intention. The function update-belief updates the agent’s belief base with a
percept p. The function type returns a type of p, either obligation or prohibition, if p
is a norm. The function edp constructs a triggering event using the terms in the event-
based norm, if the type of p is a norm (e.g. obligations). The functions EVENT- and
OPTION-RECONSIDERATION accomplish the run-time norm execution mechanism
described in Section 5.3.3. The main algorithm of the SCHEDULE function which
carries out norm-aware intention scheduling is shown in Section 5.3.4. The internal
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Algorithm 2 N-Jason Interpreter Reasoning Cycle
1: B :=B0 /* B0 are initial beliefs */
2: G :=G0 /* G0 are initial goals */
3: E :=E ∪G
4: P :=P ∪N /* P are percepts and N are norms */
5: for all p ∈ P and p /∈ B do
6: tep = create-tevent(p)
7: Rtep := {piθ | θ is a most general unifier (mgu) for tep and plan pi}
8: if Rtep 6= ∅ then
9: E :=add-event(E, tep)
10: else if Rtep = ∅ and type(p) = (obl | proh) then
11: E :=EVENT-RECONSIDERATION(E, p)
12: end if
13: B :=update-belief(B, p)
14: end for
15: for all 〈te, τ〉 ∈ E do
16: Ote := {piθ | θ is an applicable unifier for te and plan pi}
17: (piθθ′ : τ) := SO(Ote) where θ′ is a context unifier for te and plan pi
18: if (piθθ′ : τ) = nil then
19: (piθθ′ : τ) := OPTION-RECONSIDERATION(te)
20: end if
21: if (piθθ′ : τ) 6= nil and τ /∈ I then
22: I := I ∪ (piθθ′ : τ)
23: else if (piθθ′ : τ) 6= nil and τ ∈ I then
24: I := (I\τ) ∪ push ((piθθ′ : τ)σ, τ ) where σ is a mgu for (piθθ′ : τ) and τ
25: else if (piθθ′ : τ) = nil and τ ∈ I then
26: I := (I\τ)
27: end if
28: I :=SCHEDULE(I)




operation of the N-Jason interpreter is extended from [Vikhorev et al., 2011]. We use
the same notations as in [Vikhorev et al., 2011] for consistency and comparability.
We now give an informal explanation of one reasoning cycle in the interpreter.
At the start (lines 1–4), we assume that an agent perceives knowledge (P ) from its
environment and about its normative positions (N ) (e.g. obligations) from one or more
institutional frameworks. N is treated just like P , that is a form of percept at this stage,
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by the interpreter (line 4).
The belief base (B) and the event base (E) are updated by P in the belief update
process (belief-update-function (buf) more precisely) (see lines 6–13). This belief up-
date involves the creation/addition of events in response to each new percept. Once
a percept (p) is encoded as a triggering event (tep) by the function create-tevent, the
interpreter checks whether tep has a set of relevant plans Rtep1 in the plan library Π. If
Rtep is retrieved, then E is updated with the event, a pair of tep and its intention, by
the function add-event. If no relevant plan is retrieved, tep is ignored but B is updated
in any case with p by the function update-belief.The same approach is taken for norms
when the norms and its relevant plans are already specified in the agent program. Oth-
erwise, the event reconsideration process (line 11) starts to find out what the norms are
intended to achieve, as the first step in run-time norm execution.
Next, the interpreter starts the reasoning process in order to determine an applicable
plan2 in the selected set of applicable plans (Ote). The selection function SO chooses
a single option from Ote as a result of the unification of event and context. If SO
retrieves nothing (denoted by nil), then the interpreter follows exactly the same path as
described above. The option reconsideration process (line 19) tries to find out which
action plans are appropriate to execute unknown norms, as the second step in run-time
norm execution. See lines 17–20.
If one single applicable plan is successfully retrieved by SO, then the means-ends
reasoning adds the applicable plan (pi) as an intended means (IM ) on top of an intention
(I). If te of pi is an internal event then pi added in the existing I , otherwise a new I
is created with pi to be added in there (line 21–27). This is followed by the intention
scheduling process which returns a preference maximal set of intentions in deadline
order (line 28). Afterwards, one intention, selected by the intention selection function
SI , is finally executed (line 30). The details of the remainder are exactly the same as
in [Bordini et al., 2007] or [Vikhorev et al., 2011].
1A relevant plan for a particular event is a plan whose triggering event matches the particular event.
There can be many relevant plans for each triggering event in general [Bordini et al., 2007].
2An applicable plan is a candidate plan for execution, which has a context that evaluates to true given
the agent’s current beliefs [Bordini et al., 2007].
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5.3.3 Run-Time Norm Execution
In Section 5.3.2, we explained that run-time norm execution is realised by two steps:
(i) event reconsideration and (ii) option reconsideration. Prior to defining those re-
consideration processes, we firstly define a property of the executability of norms at
run-time. We say that a norm such as obl(evt, deadline, violation), is
executable at run-time iff:
1. p ∈ P and type(p) = (obligation | prohibition), where p is a percept, formed
from a list of terms such as term(“,” term)∗, in a set of newly observed percepts
P at run-time;
2. tep /∈ E, where tep is a triggering event generated from the percept p, and E is
an event base, which is a set of events {(te, τ), (te′, τ ′), . . .}, where an event is a
pair of a triggering event and an intention (te, τ);
3. edp(p) 6= nil and {(teedp(p), τedp(p))} ∩ E 6= ∅, where edp(p) is a function ex-
tracting the obliged event together with its deadline and priority from p, teedp(p)
is a triggering event of the edp(p), an event term in the norm, and τedp(p) is an
intention of teedp(p) and
4. Rteedp(p) 6= ∅, where Rteedp(p) is a set of relevant plans.
The executability determines the necessity for further reconsideration for the new
and unknown norms. If those norms are judged executable at the perception stage, the
event-reconsideration process starts for the addition of such norms to the event base
as triggering events. Similarly, the executability also enables option-reconsideration in
order to execute an applicable plan in relation to the triggering events derived from the
norms.
Event Reconsideration aims to verify that a norm perceived at run-time is exe-
cutable, even though no corresponding plan exists in the agent program. If an event
extracted from a detached norm has a relevance to a certain set of plans, it thus has
potential to trigger specific ones, and it is then concluded that the norm is executable.
If the norm is proven to be executable, the interpreter adds the norm to the event base
E as an achievement goal addition event. The procedure for event reconsideration is as
follows (see Algorithm 3):
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Algorithm 3 Event Reconsideration
Require: P :=P ∪N
Require: tep = create-tevent(p)
1: if p ∈ P and type(p) = obligation then
2: teedp(p) = create-tevent(edp(p))
3: Rteedp(p) := {piθ | θ is a mgu for teedp(p) and plan pi}
4: if Rteedp(p) 6= ∅ then
5: E :=add-event(E, tep)
6: end if
7: else if p ∈ P and type(p) = prohibition then
8: Ξ :=add-prohibition(Ξ, edp(p))
9: end if
1. Extract the terms representing an obliged event, a deadline and its priority3 from
the obligation by the function edp, whose practical implementation may vary,
depending on norm representations in various systems (line 2),
2. Construct a new triggering event (an achievement goal addition event in this case)
from the combination of extracted terms (line 2),
3. Query the existence of a set of relevant plans with such a constructed triggering
event (line 3),
4. Add such triggering event toE, if relevant plans are successfully retrieved (line 5)
and
5. If the norm is a prohibition, then the extracted event is added into the prohibition
base (Ξ) (line 7 - 8) and will be revisited at the norm deliberation stage 4.
For example, suppose there is a detached obligation obl(at(X, Y), 1030,
10). If relevant plans are not found in the agent program (plan library of an agent, to be
precise) in response to the obligation, the function edp firstly extracts the event (at(X,
Y)), deadline (1030) and priority (10) from the obligation. Next, the interpreter
constructs a new triggering event (an achievement goal addition event as described
3In principle, the last term is an event which arises when a violation occurs. This value normally
indicates the criticality of such a violation. Higher values represents a higher priority.
4N-Jason supports prohibitions as described above, and is therefore compatible with normative sys-
tems supporting prohibitions, but we note that the institutional model described in Section 5.2 does not
have an explicit representation of prohibition, but only the absence of permission.
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above) such as +!at(X,Y)[deadline(1030), priority(10)] using the ex-
tracted information. Subsequently, the interpreter queries the existence of relevant plans
to SR once again with a new triggering event, +!at(X,Y)[deadline(1030),
priority(10)]. If the retrieval of relevant plans is successful, then the original
event, +!obl(at(X, Y), 1030, 10), is added to E.
One exceptional aspect in event-reconsideration is the addition of a deontic event
tep (which is a detached norm) instead of a normal event teedp(p) (which is a newly con-
structed triggering event) into the event base E. In so doing, we intend to distinguish
norm-triggered intentions from ordinary intentions that normal events trigger, so as to
facilitate norm-aware deliberation (see Section 5.3.4) in N-Jason. In principle, Jason
creates different intentions in response to different triggering events. Given this char-
acteristic, both a deontic and a normal event create a deontic and a normal intention
in N-Jason, respectively. The intended means included in both intentions are identical
since a deontic and a normal event trigger exactly the same plan in an agent program.
However, the properties (e.g. deadline and priority) of each intention are different. The
normal intention follows the original deadline and priority specified in the plan. In con-
trast, the deontic intention has different deadline and priority, which are inherited from
those in the detached norm. As a result, these intentions are the main source of norm-
aware deliberation. An agent is able to deliberate on norms and agent’s private goals
through the evaluation of the relative importance and urgency using norm-triggered (i.e.
deontic) intentions and ordinary event-triggered (i.e. normal) intentions.
Suppose a plan whose label is example, is specified in an agent program:
Listing 5.3 : An Example Plan with duration, deadline and priority
1 @example[duration(50)]
2 +!at(X, Y)[deadline(1000), priority(5)]
3 <- move_toward(X, Y);
4 !ack(ag).
Assuming that a normal event triggering example is added to event base E. Then it
creates a normal intention using a pair of normal event and its associated plan plan -
example, whose deadline and priority are 1000 and 5, respectively. Later, a detached
obligation obl(at(X, Y), 1030, 10) is received. Following Algorithm 3, the
deontic event +!obl(at(X, Y), 1030, 10) is added to E, since a relevant plan
example is found. Consequently a deontic intention is created using a pair of a de-
ontic event and its associated plan example. Its deadline and priority are 1030 and
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Algorithm 4 Option Reconsideration
Require: 〈tep, τ〉 ∈ E where tep is an event and τ is an intention
Ensure: piθθ′ where θ′ is a context unifier for teedp(p) and plan pi
1: if type(p) = obligation then
2: teedp(p) = create-tevent(edp(p))
3: Rteedp(p) := {piθ | θ is a mgu for teedp(p) and plan pi}
4: if Rteedp(p) 6= ∅ then
5: Oteedp(p) := {piθ | θ is an applicable unifier for teedp(p) and plan pi}
6: piθθ′ := SO(Oteedp(p)) where θ
′ is a context unifier for teedp(p) and plan pi
7: end if
8: end if
10, respectively, which are different from those in the normal intention. Obviously,
we have two intentions whose properties are different, although the intended means
are absolutely same. Hence, N-Jason is able to carry out norm-aware deliberation on
norms and the agent’s own goals using those intentions. If N-Jason simply adds a nor-
mal event instead of a deontic event when an obligation is detached, then norm-aware
deliberation may not be feasible since there must be only one normal intention.
Option-Reconsideration is a central element in the practical reasoning process whereas
the event reconsideration happens at the perception stage. The main objective of option
reconsideration is the determination of an applicable plan corresponding to the new and
unknown norm – whose executability is already verified – and is thus added to E as an
achievement goal addition event. If the applicable plan is chosen, then it will probably
be used to enact a norm-compliant behaviour, unless it is infeasible as judged by inten-
tion scheduling (described in Section 5.3.4). The procedure is shown in Algorithm 4.
Like Event-Reconsideration, tep is generated by a new and unknown norm that does
not have any relevant plans Rtep at this moment. Thus at the beginning of the option
reconsideration, the interpreter carries out the same process for event reconsideration:
1. Extract the event term edp(p) of the norm in order to retrieve relevant plans
Rteedp(p) (as before), if the type of p is a norm (i.e. an obligation) (line 1 - 2),
2. Retrieve the relevant plans corresponding to the teedp(p) by the unification of an
atomic-formula in a triggering event and each plan in an agent (line 3),
3. Determine a set of applicable plans with the constructed triggering event (line 5)
and
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4. Select a single applicable plan as an intended means to which to commit, through
the extended unification of a triggering event, a plan and a context (line 6).
5.3.4 Norm Awareness in Deliberation
Norm awareness in the deliberation process is achieved by the scheduling of intentions
with deadlines and priorities. We extend the algorithm proposed in [Vikhorev et al.,
2011] with the consideration of prohibitions in order to establish a conflict-free pref-
erence maximal set of intentions. In effect, this is like [Alechina et al., 2012] which
proposes a scheduling algorithm that brings about a preference maximal set of inten-
tions, but that depends upon (N-)2APL’s parallel execution of plans, whereas here the
scheduling algorithm for (N-)Jason has to take account of the single-threaded plan ex-
ecution model in Jason.
The scheduling algorithm is introduced in Algorithm 5. A set of candidate inten-
tions IC = {τ, τ ′, . . . }, which is sorted in descending order of a priority, is inserted
into a scheduling process. If each intention is feasible, i.e. a plan on top of the inten-
tion can be executed before the deadline and is not prohibited by a set of prohibition
Ξ = {ξ, ξ′, . . . }, then the intention is added to the preference maximal set (Γ) whose
criteria are defined as follows:
1. An intention is feasible iff the execution of the intention is completed before its
deadline, that is, for τ ,
ne(τ) + et(τ)− ex(τ) ≤ dl(τ)
where τ denotes an intention, ne(τ) is the time at which τ will next execute,
et(τ) is the time required to execute τ , denoted in the plan label, ex(τ) is the
elapsed time to execute τ to this point, and dl(τ) is the deadline for τ specified
in the plan [Alechina et al., 2012].
2. The intention should not be prohibited, that is, for τ
• τ /∈ Ξ or
• τ ∈ Ξ, then ∀ξ ∈ Ξ, τ = ξ and priority(τ) > max{priority(ξ),∀ξ ∈ Ξ}
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Algorithm 5 Scheduling of Intentions
1: Γ := ∅,Ξ′ := ∅
2: for all τ ∈ I in descending order of priority do
3: if {τ} ∪ Γ is feasible then
4: if τ /∈ Ξ then
5: Γ := {τ} ∪ Γ
6: else
7: for all ξ ∈ Ξ do
8: Ξ′ := {τθ | θ is a mgu for ξ and intention τ}
9: end for
10: if priority(τ) > max{priority(ξ),∀ξ ∈ Ξ′} then





16: sort Γ in order of increasing deadline
17: return Γ
where τ is an intention, ξ is a prohibited event in the prohibition base Ξ and
priority is a priority retrieval function.
Scheduling in N-Jason is also pre-emptive in that the adoption of a new inten-
tion τ may prevent scheduled intentions with lower priority than τ (including currently
executing intentions) being added to the new schedule just as in N-2APL and AgentS-
peak(RT). Intentions that cannot meet their deadline are dropped.
5.3.5 Implementation
We have implemented N-Jason on top of the existing code base for Jason version
1.3.6. The latest prototype5 of N-Jason implements the core language extensions (i.e.
syntax, semantics) described in Section 5.3.1 and the extensions (e.g. run-time norm
execution, norm-aware deliberation) described in Section 5.3.3 and Section 5.3.4. In
addition, we implement a norm adoption mechanism in N-Jason, so that an agent under
the governance of institutional frameworks is able to receive situationally appropriate
norms and subsequently add them as percepts for processing by the reasoning cycle.


































































Figure 5-1: Extended Features of N-Jason on Jason/AgentSpeak(L)
Figure 5-1 shows the extended features6 and how they fit into the Jason interpreter.
The language extensions, run-time norm execution and norm-aware deliberation are
implemented as part of the reasoning cycle of the Jason interpreter. The norm adoption
mechanism is implemented as an extension of the AgArch class.
In brief, one reasoning cycle of Jason is modelled as a transition system over
states. The configuration of a Jason agent [Bordini et al., 2007], contains the
current state, denoted s, where s ∈ {ProcMsg, SelEv, RelPl, ApplPl, Ad-
dIM, SelInt, ExecInt, ClrInt}. Each state has a corresponding procedure –
applyProcMsg(), applySelEv(), applyRelPl(), applySelAppl(),
applyFindOp(), applyAddIM(), applyProcAct(), applySelInt(),
applyExecInt() – which are internal to the reasoningCycle() method in
the transition system. To this transition system, we add the states RcvNorm and
6Grey boxes with numbers 2, 4, 10, 12 in Figure 5-1 are new features. For more explanation about
other white boxes see Chapter 4 of [Bordini et al., 2007].
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schInt and customise the procedures reasoningCycle(), applyRelPl(),
applyFindOp(), applySelInt(). The complete states are detailed in Sec-
tion 5.4.1.
We now sketch some details of the implementation. To begin with, we extend the
Jason agent reasoning architecture class (AgArch) by subclassing in order to facilitate
the norm adoption mechanism (2checkNorms). Run-time norm execution is achieved
by Event- and Option-Reconsideration as described in Algorithms 3 and 4 above. The
former, 4EV TRECON in Figure 5-1, is implemented by customising the native be-
lief update function (buf()) which is a subroutine of reasoningCycle() to im-
plement Algorithm 3. For the latter, 10OPTRECON in Figure 5-1, we customise
the native option selection function (applyFindOp()) to implement Algorithm 4.
Norm-aware deliberation, 12IntentionScheduling in Figure 5-1, is accomplished by
an intention scheduler with deadlines and priorities implemented in a newly created
IntentionScheduler class. The scheduling (schedule()) method in this class
is inserted just before the intention selection function (selectIntention()) which
is a part of the applySelInt() procedure.
Apart from the above changes to the interpreter, the language syntax extensions are
implemented by the customisation of the annotation processing routine (setLabel()
and setTEvent()) in the Plan class.
5.3.6 Example
As an example, we consider robots serving beer in a pub, whose main role is to get an
order and to deliver a beer to the customer. We assume the existence of some institutions
delivering desirable social norms, subject to the observations of participants, and that
all agents are governed by such systems. A part of the agent program is shown below:
Listing 5.4 : A Part of a N-Jason Example Program
1 @P1[duration(5)]
2 +!at(X, Y) : not at(X, Y)








10 // A request from customer seated at (X, Y).
11 // The deadline is D and the priority is P.
12 +request(X, Y)[deadline(D), priority(P)]
13 <- !order(X, Y)[deadline(D), priority(P)].
At time 100, the robot receives the following events:
E1: +!request(2, 3)[deadline(130), priority(20)]
A request from customer seated at (2, 3).
The deadline is 130 and the customer is important so the priority is 20.
E2: +!request(1, 1)[deadline(115), priority(10)]
A request from customer seated at (1, 1).
The deadline is 115 and the the priority is 10.
E3: +!request(3, 3)[deadline(130), priority(10)]
A request from customer seated at (3, 3).
The deadline is 130 and the the priority is 10.
These three events trigger the plan P2, and give rise to three possible intentions τ1
(P2 triggered by (2, 3)), τ2 (P2 triggered by (1, 1)) and τ3 (P2 triggered by (3, 3)). τ2 is
not feasible, thus it is dropped, whereas τ1 and τ3 are feasible, so scheduled in deadline
order: τ1 is scheduled first between 100 and 110 since it has an earlier deadline followed
by τ3 between 110 and 120. Now the agent starts the execution of τ1.
Now consider an announcement of a fire alarm by one of the normative frameworks.
It broadcasts an obligation containing the coordinates of an exit to all participants so
they may escape from the building. Suppose the norm is obl(at(0, 0), 115,
100). Although the obligation is not stated in the agent’s program, it is executable
since the agent has a pre-existing moving ability !at(X, Y), which is enough to
satisfy the obligation. With the event- and option-reconsideration, the event :
E4: +!at(0, 0)[deadline(115), priority(100)] is generated from the
obligation, thus adopting the plan P1, bringing about an intention τ4 (P1 triggered
by (0, 0)). During the execution of τ1, τ3 and τ4 are inserted into a new schedule
in deadline order: since the priority of τ4 is greater than τ3 and τ4 has a more
urgent deadline, the agent starts to execute τ4, triggered by the obligation, before
the execution of τ3.
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Notwithstanding, that this example is extremely simple, it provides a useful in-
principle illustration of norm-aware deliberation – as performed by intention schedul-
ing – as well as the run-time norm execution mechanism in N-Jason.
5.4 Operational Semantics
In this section, we present a theoretical foundation for the N-Jason programming lan-
guage with semantics based upon an extension of the operational semantics for Ja-
son/AgentSpeak(L). Given the formal semantics of Jason we extend the transition
rules which transform one extended configuration into another. To begin with, we
show a configuration of individual N-Jason agents which is almost unchanged except
for norm configuration. In the following section, we describe the transition rules that
give rise to a configuration change at each state in a single reasoning cycle. For con-
sistency and comparability, we follow exactly the same notations as those in published
Jason descriptions excepting the normative aspects.
5.4.1 N-Jason Configuration
The configuration of N-Jason is a tuple 〈ag, C,N, T, s〉 where:
• ag is an agent program consisting of a set of beliefs bs and a set of plans ps, as
defined by the EBNF in [Bordini et al., 2007].
• An agent’s circumstance C is a tuple 〈I, E,A〉, where I is a set of intention
{i, i′, . . .}, E is a set of events {(te, i), (te′, i′), . . .}, in which event is a pair of a
triggering event and an intention (te, i) andA is a set of actions an agent performs
in the external environment.
• N is a tuple 〈Γ,Ξ〉 denoting normative consequences delivered from normative
systems, where Γ is a set of obligations {γ, γ′, . . .} and Ξ is a set of prohibition
{ξ, ξ′, . . .}.
• T is a tuple 〈R,Ap, ι, ε, ρ 〉 defining a trace of provisional information required
for subsequent steps within a single reasoning cycle, where R is the set of rel-
evant plans, Ap the sets of applicable plans, and ι, ε and ρ record an intention,
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event, and applicable plan (respectively) at a specific moment under considera-
tion within the execution of a single reasoning cycle.
• The current state swithin an agent’s reasoning cycle is denoted by s ∈ {RcvNorm,
ProcMsg, SelEv, RelPl, ApplPl, AddIM, SchInt, SelInt, ExecInt, ClrInt}.
5.4.2 Transition Rules
The execution of the N-Jason program leads the modification of the initial configura-
tion of an agent via transition rules given below. We do not repeat the communication
semantics, since these are unaffected by the changes in relation to norms.
In general, the transition would normally start from the state ProcMsg, but we
propose a preceding step RcvNorm, as described in Section 5.2 because this provides
the hook for the consideration of the norm as part of the reasoning cycle. Thus, note that
the initial configuration of this model is 〈ag, C,N, T,RcvNorm〉, where ag is specified
by the agent program and other all components are empty, and the reasoning cycle starts
from RcvNorm with the transition rules given below.
Receiving detached norms: As described in Section 5.2, institutional frameworks
may distribute norms via broadcasting when a norm is activated by the fulfilment of
institutional states triggered by external events in the environment. As soon as the
event-based norms are received, the norms effectively act like an ordinary event thus
triggering the transition of the agent’s mental state. Rule RcvNorm (see Figure 5-2)
updates the agent belief base and an event base component CE associated with adding
new norms, specifically in the case of obligations in an obligation base NΓ. Otherwise,
only a prohibition is added into the prohibition base and there are no updates to other
components.
Relevant plans: (see Figure 5-3) If the transition of states (RcvNorm 7→ SelEv) is
successful after RcvNorm and the state SelEv selects one event from the component
E of which event is either 〈te, i〉 or 〈γ, i〉, rule Rel1 starts to assign the set of relevant
plans to component TR in the state RelPl. Rule Rel2 indicates the reconsideration
situation where a new triggering event extracted from the obligation is assigned to the
component CE , where Evt(γ) is a function constructing a triggering event by the re-
trieval of information from γ. Rule Rel3 assigns a set of relevant plans to TR in respect
of the reconsidered event. Rule Rel4 and Rel5 cope with the situation where no rel-
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N 6= {}
〈ag, C,N, T,RcvNorm〉 → 〈ag′, C,N ′, T,SelEv〉 (RcvNorm)
where: ag′bs = agbs ∪ {γ}
N ′Γ = NΓ ∪ {γ} ∨N ′Ξ = NΞ ∪ {ξ}
Figure 5-2: Transition Rule for Receiving a Norm
Tε = 〈te, i〉 RelPlans(agps, te) 6= {}
〈ag, C,N, T,RelPl〉 → 〈ag, C,N, T ′,ApplPl〉 (Rel1)
where: T ′R = RelPlans(agps, te)
Tε = 〈γ, i〉 RelPlans(agps, γ) = {}
〈ag, C,N, T,RelPl〉 → 〈ag, C ′, N, T,RelPl〉 (Rel2)
where: C ′E = {〈Evt(γ), i〉}
Tε = 〈Evt(γ), i〉RelPlans(agps,Evt(γ)) 6= {}
〈ag, C,N, T,RelPl〉 → 〈ag, C,N, T ′,ApplPl〉 (Rel3)
where: T ′R = RelPlans(agps,Evt(γ))
RelPlans(agps, te) = {}
〈ag, C,N, T,RelPl〉 → 〈ag, C,N, T,SelEv〉 (Rel4)
RelPlans(agps,Evt(γ)) = {}
〈ag, C,N, T,RelPl〉 → 〈ag, C,N, T,SelEv〉 (Rel5)
Figure 5-3: Transition Rules for Relevant Plans
Tρ = {}
〈ag, C,N, T,SchInt〉 → 〈ag, C ′, N, T,SelInt〉 (SchInt)
where: C ′I = SCHEDULE(CI)
Figure 5-4: Transition Rule for Scheduling Intentions
evant plan is retrieved. In those cases, events (both ordinary event and reconsidered
event) are simply ignored and the state returns to SelEv.
Since transition rules between (AppPl 7→ AddIM) are almost same as those in Ja-
son we give a brief description of each rule at each state from here. If T ′R is successfully
assigned then it is followed by: (i)AppPlwhich assigns a set of applicable plans to TAP
by retrieving those relevant plans whose contexts are believed to be true, (ii) SelAppl
which assigns a particular intended means selected by an option selection function SO
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to Tρ, and (iii) AddIM which adds a selected intended means to CI which is an existing
intention or a newly created one. If transitions fail between (AppPl 7→ AddIM), then
the state SelInt becomes the next step. For more information, see [Bordini et al., 2007].
Scheduling of intentions: Rule SchInt (see Figure 5-4) updates the component C ′I by
the function SCHEDULE(CI). Note that the scheduling function, SCHEDULE(CI),
sorts intentions in order of priority and deadline so as to determine the preference max-
imal set of intentions discussed in Section 5.3.4.
After this step, the transition system follows the same rules as presented in [Bordini
et al., 2007] in order to execute an intended means in an particular intention selected by
SI in between SelInt, ExecInt and ClrInt.
5.5 Related Works
There has been much research over a number of years on the matter of norm compliance
through the combination of normative frameworks and classical (BDI-type) cognitive
agents [Boissier et al., 2013, Hubner et al., 2007]. However, research on compliance
of norms at the individual agent level has received less attention. As discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1, this problem can be decomposed into two perspectives: to facilitate a generic
norm execution mechanism at run-time, and to focus on the process of rational decision
making between norms and existing goals.
Alechina et al. [Alechina et al., 2012] introduce N-2APL, a norm-aware BDI agent
architecture and its programming language. It is able to carry out norm-aware delibera-
tion, which aims to permit agents to resolve the conflicts between an agent’s own goals,
normative goals and sanctions. This is accomplished by a deadline- and priority-based
intention scheduling algorithm, which weighs the feasibility for all intentions that may
bring about conflicts. The (potential) sanctions may affect agent decision making, but
violations are possible in this approach. Given N-2APL, Dybalova et al. [Dybalova
et al., 2013] demonstrate norm-compliant agents in location-based gaming environ-
ments in conjunction with the organisational framework, 2OPL [Dastani et al., 2009].
There, once organisations have broadcast state-based norms to all participants, the indi-
vidual agents achieve a state of the environment described in the norms using a design-
based approach. N-Jason is also able to support norm-aware deliberation in conjunc-
tion with an institutional model, which is similar to the combination of N-2APL and
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2OPL, but extends the concept of norm awareness to the whole reasoning cycle. As a
result, it supports agents in being design-based norm compliant, but can additionally
deliver run-time compliance through norm execution.
Meneguzzi et al. [Meneguzzi and Luck, 2009] focuses on norm awareness at the
perception level, by extending the AgentSpeak(L) BDI architecture with a run-time
plan modification technique. It enables agents to behave appropriately in response
to newly accepted norms at run-time. However, it assumes that the norms are non-
conflicting, so it does not consider scheduling of plans with regards to their deadlines
or possible sanctions in accordance with existing goals in agents. Whereas [Meneguzzi
and Luck, 2009] takes a rather practical perspective, van Riemsdijk et al. [van Riems-
dijk et al., 2013] introduce a formal framework for generic norm execution, which
allows agents to be norm compliant by triggering or preventing actions in new and un-
known norms at design time. However the agent in [van Riemsdijk et al., 2013] works
at the level of individual actions (its decision mechanism chooses actions rather than
plans) and the norms are specified in terms of actions, making in effect a norm-reactive
agent, and it is unclear how the decision mechanism can combine actions to achieve
goals and thereby the objective of a norm-deliberative agent. In N-Jason, run-time
norm execution is in practice accomplished at the level of plans to achieve goals, and
norms indicate a sort of event that triggers plans. Moreover, in N-Jason run-time norm
compliance is achieved on top of the norm aware decision making and in conjunction
with the execution mechanism.
Notwithstanding the benefits of N-Jason, there are some issues to highlight in re-
spect of the mechanism for run-time norms. The norm compliance strategy is hard-
coded in the semantics of the language, leaving only a capacity for configuration via
the plan annotations, whereas the strategy is programmable through agent plans (i.e.
supporting the design of strategy by an agent programmer) in JaCaMo [Boissier et al.,
2013] and N-2APL [Alechina et al., 2012]. Thus, the proposal presented here pro-
vides a pre-packaged approach to normative reasoning, since it deprives the agent of
the scope to change plans dynamically or mis-behave intentionally, based on rules the
agent programmer designs. However, the mechanism put forward here does enable
legacy agents, which have no compliance rule or strategy in their specification, to be-
come norm-aware automatically. Thus, those agents’ behaviour can be coordinated
through the governance of normative frameworks without further engineering effort.
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Another issue lies in the simple mechanism for the operationalisation of norms in
run-time norm execution. The approach described here means the ontology and syntax
of norms that can be executed are limited to those present in the plan library of an agent.
In consequence, some detached norms, that may correspond semantically to one of an
agent’s plans, but which are ontologically different from the plan, will be ignored or
violated. To this end, it would be worth to generalise the execution mechanism with the
analysis of semantics of norms, following [van Riemsdijk et al., 2013], in conjunction
with plan synthesis.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a design for a norm-aware BDI agent, N-Jason,
that enables the exhibition of norm compliance at run-time. Basically N-Jason offers
a generic norm execution mechanism on top of norm-aware deliberation to contribute
to the exploitation of run-time norm compliance. Run-time norm execution specifi-
cally focuses on the operationalisation of new and unknown (event-based) norms not
stated in the agent program at run-time. By judging the executability of them, N-Jason
agents executes those norms following an extended model of norm awareness consist-
ing of: (i) event reconsideration, to find out what the norm is intended to achieve or
to reach, and (ii) option reconsideration, to identify which plan is the most appropri-
ate in response to the norm. The selection of norm compliant behaviour is achieved
in the norm-aware deliberation process by intention scheduling with deadlines, priori-
ties and prohibitions which confirms the decision about which behaviour agent would
prefer between goals, norms and sanctions. It brings about a preference maximal set
of intentions in order to realise the norm compliance. N-Jason is implemented in Ja-
son/AgentSpeak(L) and extends its syntax and semantics to create N-Jason.
We believe that run-time norm compliance model is beneficial for the enhancement
of both a norm compliance capability and agent autonomy from the agent’s perspective.
However, we note that the behaviour triggered by run-time norm execution may look




Through the previous chapters (Chapter 3, 4 and 5), we introduce DNA3 (which consists
of normative framework, norm-aware N-Jason agent and virtual characters) and its
internal mechanism grounded on socio-cognitive theory in order to design and simulate
virtual character behaviour with norms. In this chapter, we present three case studies to
show the adequacy of DNA3 in engineering norm-aware behaviour of virtual characters.
The use of polite agents is a new approach in order to improve the navigation expe-
rience for player characters (PCs) in crowded virtual worlds [Allen et al., 2012]. This
chapter aims to demonstrate the politeness of virtual characters using DNA3, subject to
a theory of politeness composed of conventional and interpersonal politeness.
According to status-power theory by Kemper [Kemper, 2011], the choice of social
behaviour is strongly influenced by the social status as well as the social force that
the current social context imposes. In this sense, the form of polite behaviour could
vary depending on the social situations, i.e. whenever the situation is changed, then the
social norms and its associated polite behaviour should be also changed to show the
appropriateness of politeness in that new situation. Given this hypothesis, we present
three types of polite behaviour in relation to three different situations.
We firstly present the polite behaviour on the individual level, avoiding the distur-
bance of others in navigation, inspired by Allen et al. [Allen et al., 2012]. Afterwards,
we extend this polite behaviour in navigation when individuals are formed into a group
(which gives rise to the change of social status). Taking into account the human ter-
ritoriality model [Scheflen and Ashcraft, 1976] as a way to propose group formation
subject to social relationship, we first show here the formation of groups subject to so-
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cial norms which the model proposes, then the polite behaviour (avoiding disturbance
in this case) between those groups is described. In addition, the evacuation model is
illustrated when the situation is rapidly changed from ordinary group level navigation
to the emergency situation.
Through these case studies, we aim to show how the most appropriate (polite) be-
haviour can be determined by incorporating social and cognitive reasoning so as to
ensure the adequacy of DNA3 for modelling norm-aware virtual characters in all cir-
cumstances with regards to (i) the capability in reasoning about social norms subject
to changes of social situations and (ii) the rationality in decision making on norms and
agent’s individual goals.
6.1 Intro: Politeness in Virtual Characters’ Behaviour
6.1.1 Motivation
Navigation in virtual environments (VEs) is an essential task for virtual humans, but it
remains challenging for several reasons. A significant contributing factor is that VEs
are getting more sophisticated, dynamic, and crowded, due to the outstanding advances
in recent years resulting in changes in form, scope and purpose [Messinger et al., 2009].
In addition, the awkwardness of many user input devices severely impacts on ease of
navigation of player characters (PCs).
These circumstances lead to a poor interaction experience for users, with both satis-
faction and believability likely to be decreased [Merritt et al., 2011] in consequence. In
this context, the use of politeness in virtual agents is proposed as an approach for a res-
olution of such tensions. Allen et al. [Allen et al., 2012] put forward the idea that polite
behaviours of non-player characters (NPCs) may promise a more pleasant navigation
experience for PCs in virtual worlds. Allen uses a predictive model to understand a
PC’s intention, which allows virtual humans to behave politely (collision avoidance in
this case) and so improves the interaction in dense crowds.
Presumably, politeness looks like an aspect of social intelligence since such polite
behaviours are brought about by prediction, accompanied by recognition of other’s
behaviour, in social relationships. This view is supported by the literature on the theory
of politeness. A fairly recent and popular theory of politeness is presented in [Arndt
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and Janney, 1985]. Traditionally, the notion of politeness has been discussed in the
context of linguistic theory [Brown and Levinson, 1987], but Arndt et al. extends
the discussion in terms of verbal and non-verbal communication. They decompose
politeness into conventional politeness and interpersonal politeness. The former refers
to compliance with social conventions (or etiquette) that maintains order in society. The
latter, interpersonal politeness, refers to the considerations of others and their feelings in
social interactions. This implies that more comprehensive awareness in social situations
(beyond conversational situations) ought to be required to be polite in some personal
situations. Accordingly, it is clear that politeness seems to be a part of, or closely related
to social intelligence, which enhances the adequacy of human behaviour to society or
its members in public and (or) private social situations.
The use of norms, normative frameworks and norm-aware virtual characters is one
potentially effective approach to satisfy the above theory. In effect, normative frame-
works provide a repository of knowledge of social conventions, particularly about cor-
rect behaviours, by capturing human social structures [Boella et al., 2006]. In addition,
such a framework may also infer expected behaviours, subject to specific situations,
by means of logic-based reasoning processes. It seeks to identify the causality be-
tween observations in the external world and potentially correct behaviours that are
only meaningful within given social situations [Cliffe, 2007]. This can be viewed as
a sort of prediction about rational decisions corresponding to the specific interpersonal
context.
Hence, it seems clear that modelling behaviour, subject to the theory of politeness,
is feasible with assistance from normative frameworks. Virtual humans may be able
to behave adequately under the governance of social rules – conventional politeness,
but may also take actions as a result of recognizing situation-specific actions from ob-
serving the activities of others associated with personal interactions – interpersonal
politeness.
In this context, this chapter aims to demonstrate the enhancement of politeness us-
ing norm-aware virtual agents which is engineered by DNA3, as the combination of
normative frameworks, norm-aware BDI agents and virtual characters. Beyond the
individual world view of virtual agents, this mechanism allows the analysis of social
situations in which each virtual agent is situated, and thus leads them to ‘rational’ deci-
sion making in line with ‘common sense’ with assistance from social norms and social
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reasoning: the former, social norms, may enlighten virtual agents to be capable of being
conventionally polite in a society, whilst the latter may promise a better understanding
of current social situations, so that it becomes a source of prediction about ‘when’ and
‘what’ to do in order to be interpersonally polite as perceived by other participants.
The main contribution of this chapter is a mechanism to cope with politeness in
general rather than in a small specific aspect of daily activities. In reality, humans are
likely to be engaged in many complicated social interactions so various kinds of polite
activities are required corresponding to those situations. Likewise, virtual agents are
also situated in similar circumstances due to major advances in virtual worlds, thus
they need a higher level of autonomy to deal with a wider range of situations in which
to be more polite.
With this aim in mind, the main focus of this chapter is to: (i) utilise DNA3,
a high level agent architecture combined with normative frameworks which capable
of modelling, reasoning and deliberation about polite behaviours in social situations,
and N-Jason which is able to deliberation on polite behaviour and agents own goals,
(ii) demonstrate the interpretation of high level behaviour into sequence of physical
atomic actions formed in animations in VEs, and (iii) show the evaluation of this ap-
proach.
6.1.2 Scenario
As mentioned in Section 6.1.1, Allen et al. [Allen et al., 2012] describe pioneering
work on politeness in interactions between PCs and virtual characters. On the basis
of an asymmetric relationship, virtual characters predict the next few movements of
PCs using a Hidden Markov Model (HMM), and react politely such as changing veloc-
ity and path around PCs to avoid collisions. The result with regards to the number of
collisions and completion time of navigation is remarkable, so the ease in navigation
is achieved despite using low precision user input devices. However, offline learning
is always required with training data representing spatial information and its related
reactive behaviours in this system. This aspect gives rise to the issue on the lack of
flexibility subject to changes in situations. When the envrionment where virtual char-
acters reside is changed, the spatial information and associated behaviour are no longer
valid.
In comparison to the work by Allen et al. [Allen et al., 2012], DNA3 has more
120
generality, making it applicable to circumstances without training data due to the na-
ture of logic-based reasoning. In addition, we use autonomous and deliberative agents
so richer behaviours may be presented with the combination of social reasoning and
individual reasoning at any time, in any place. Thus, we show a simple illustrative
example of how the concept of such politeness as proposed in [Allen et al., 2012] is
achieved by DNA3 in Section 6.2. We here present a model, avoiding disturbing PC
navigation [Allen et al., 2012], that is triggered when PCs are detected by virtual agents.
Then, we extend this individual level of politeness to the group behaviour level. In
effect, polite behaviour in between groups of virtual characters requires more careful
consideration due to social dynamics between members. In the previous scenario, po-
liteness in navigation of individuals, the social relationship is relatively simple: there
is only an asymmetry relationship between human player characters (PCs) and vir-
tual characters (non-player characters, NPCs) so the polite behaviour is obvious, either
avoiding disturbing PC navigation or not. However, social relationships in/between
groups (composed of multiple members) and its underpinning implications are more
complicated. Depending on social relationships amongst them, which potentially could
bring about new social situations, the expression of politeness can be vary. According
to the Social Importance Dynamics (SID) model [Mascarenhas et al., 2013], which
is strongly based upon the status-power theory [Kemper, 2011], “inter-personal Rela-
tion”, “group membership and roles” and “task interdependence” play a crucial role in
the choice of behaviour of individual members within a group in practice. This im-
plies that polite behaviour in groups could be affected by social situations embedding
social status (e.g. interpersonal relationship, membership) as well as social power (e.g.
roles or task representing responsibilities). It also reminds us that changes of situations,
which give rise to the subsequent changes in social status and power, have impact on
the determination of polite behaviour in that new situation.
As an example, let us assume a number of virtual characters are waiting for the
guided tour in a museum. When there is a notice that the tour is starting from a tour
guide, one of the polite behaviours of tourists is to become a member of the guided
group. In this case, the tourists are likely to approach to the guide and keep a relatively
close distance although they are not intimate enough to have a close inter-personal
distance with each other. Afterwards, to follow the guide within a certain radius could
be the other polite behaviour during the guided tour. If a collision between two groups
is foreseen during the guided tour, usually the leader (e.g. a guide) of the group is
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aware of avoiding disturbance of the other group as a polite behaviour. The guide
group members are unlikely to give the same attention to the behaviour as they would
when navigating as individuals. Instead, they just simply comply as the guide shows
the way without being concerned about the collision1.
Suddenly, there is a fire alarm in the museum. Several kinds of polite behaviour
may be feasible as social norms to assist others: some guides may be able to point out
the location of exits. Others may try to help group members to escape easily such as
yielding a space, keeping order in crowds or coordinating people. Another possible
behaviour just ignores everything suggested and follows its own goal (e.g. to escape as
soon as possible without consideration of others). Depending on roles and relationship2,
these behaviour may be appropriate to rescue as social norms subject to the role in the
group indicates3.
As seen in the above example, the polite behaviour between groups depends on not
only the social situation itself but also changes of social situations. In the rest part of the
chapter, we would like to take into account this property in the case studies. To this end,
Section 6.3 demonstrates the politeness in group behaviour described in the guided tour
scenario in the previous paragraph. At the beginning, it is presented as the impact of
social norms and their governance on the formation of groups subject to the human ter-
ritoriality model [Scheflen and Ashcraft, 1976, Pedica and Ho¨gni Vilhje´lmsson, 2010].
Then, we apply the same polite behaviour in navigation (the avoidance of disturbance
of others presented in Section 6.2) on the group level. Afterwards, the change of po-
liteness in group depending on the situation is shown in Section 6.4 with the example
of an evacuation scenario in the emergency described above. In the end, after a short
discussion on pros/cons and limitations of the experiments in Section 6.5, a summary
is presented in Section 6.6.
The above two demonstrations are achieved by the process of: (i) specifying the po-
lite behaviour as a form of social norms in the institutional model, (ii) social reasoning
technique for the generation of social norms representing polite behaviour, (iii) delib-
eration on such norms, individual goals and sanctions in N-Jason agent, and (iv) reali-
sation of the polite behaviour by atomic physical actions inside the virtual character.
1We call this a guided tour scenario.
2For example, one of the leader’s roles might be to make sure the members’ safety within a leader-
member relationship
3We call this an evacuation scenario.
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Note that in each case study section, we firstly describe the high level modelling and
reasoning on politeness by the combination of insitution and N-Jason. Then, we illus-
trate the practical implementation of polite behaviour in terms of actions and animations
in VEs. It is followed by the results, which comprise experiment and evaluation, at the
end of each section.
6.1.3 Objective
In Chapter 2 (particularly in Section 2.4), it is argued that the major drawbacks of state-
of-the-art in norm-aware behaviour of virtual characters are in general:
1. A lack of capability in reasoning about norms subject to the changes of situa-
tions. Reminding the case that social norms are pre-defined in a single virtual
characters mind. These norms are usually too domain specific thus no longer
correct/adequate when the situation is changed.
2. A lack of norm autonomy in the deliberation of agents. In other words, virtual
characters either cannot violate norms due to deterministic rules at design time or
cannot conduct deliberation on norms, goals and sanctions with the consideration
of both social and individual contextual knowledge.
In consequence, the main objective of this chapter is to verify the adequacy of DNA3
in the design and simulation of norm-awareness for virtual characters. In particular, we
have in mind to show the characteristics of DNA3 with regards to
1. Flexibility in specifying and reasoning about norms themselves subject to changes
of social situations (in response to the former drawback) and
2. Rationality, by means of norm-aware reasoning, to pursue deliberation over norms
and agent’s individual goals (in relation to the latter drawback).
Given the first case study with a scenario on politeness in navigation of individu-
als, we would like to address the advantage of the incorporation of social reasoning
technique in the exhibition of polite behaviour, which is one of the benefits of a socio-
cognitive perspective on decision making. Due to the nature of institutions, we may
123
expect individual virtual characters to have improved understanding of the social di-
mension, which in turn results in a better level of flexibility in social norms and associ-
ated behaviour.
With the second case study in the guided tour scenario, we aim to consider both
flexibility and rationality. In this scenario, we can see a couple of situaion changes.
One is ‘gathering’ as a group which affects the interpersonal distance of individuals in
relation to social relationship between a guide and members. The other is ‘navigation’
between groups, which can be governed by the institution of the previous scenario.
We show how these situations are managed by the additional flexibility in DNA3. In
addition, the choice of individual behaviour either driven by social norms or driven by
agent’s own goals is investigated. For example, assuming a norm for being polite in
navigation is detached when a virtual character is a member of the guided tour group.
Then the character should select a plan to be polite as an individual or as a member. By
measuring the priority and deadline of each goal (e.g. deontic goal, ordinary goal), the
rational choice can be made by norm-aware reasoning in N-Jason.
The last case study with an evacuation scenario is an experiment covering both
characteristics as well. Due to the fire alarm, it is obvious that there is a rapid change
in the situation, which requires a different type of polite behaviour subject to the new
environmental context. So this aspect can contribute to support the improved flexibil-
ity of DNA3. However, the other emphasis of this case study lies in the latter: the
enhancement in rationality. The fire alarm needs an immediate change of behaviour,
whose priority is very high and deadline is very urgent. We show how norm-aware de-
liberation is able to deal with these properties in the determination of virtual character
behaviour by the scheduling of intentions.
6.2 Politeness in Individual Navigation
In this section, we show a simple illustrative example of how the concept of politeness
proposed in [Allen et al., 2012] is achieved by DNA3, the combination of institutinal
model, N-Jason, and virtual characters. To do so, we present a collision avoidance
model, which is triggered when PCs are detected by virtual agents.
This is a modelling of the theory of politeness composed of: (i) a formulation
of a social norm representing a obligation, ‘Avoid Collision’, and its related decision
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making in high level agent architecture, for conventional politeness (described in Sec-
tion 6.2.1), and (ii) a resolution of collision and a prediction of the future situation
by the recognition of others’ activities, which represents interpersonal politeness (il-
lustrated in Section 6.2.2). Afterwards, the evaluation of this case study including
experimental settings and its results is shown in Section 6.2.3.
6.2.1 High Level Modelling
Specifying Polite Behaviour in Navigation
As introduced in Chapter 4, we employ the declarative action language InstAL in-
troduced in Section 4.3.1 to construct the formal model of institution which specifies
the social norms in the collision avoidance scenario. The ‘Institution Specification’
in ‘Normative Framework’ seen on the right of Figure 4-4 refers to this constructed
institution.
We define three domain fluents denoting the friendship between a virtual character
and a PC friends(Ag, P), and two kinds of InterPersonal Distance (IPD) asso-
ciating them: lowIPD(Ag, P) and highIPD(Ag, P) subject to the closeness of
the friendship. When an intimate character is moving towards a virtual agent, then
lowIPD(Ag, P) should be initiated to maintain a lower personal distance between
them, otherwise highIPD(Ag, P) is initiated (see Listing 6.1)
Listing 6.1 : Domain Fluents
1 lowIPD(Ag, P) when friends(Ag, P);
2 highIPD(Ag, P) when not lowIPD(Ag, P);
As seen in Listing 6.2, an exogenous event is defined to indicate the physical event
that a PC is detected, which then generates the corresponding institutional event:
Listing 6.2 : Events and Generation Rule
1 exogenous event detected(P);
2 inst event intDetected(P);
3 arrived(P) generates intArrived(P);
A set of consequence rules are also provided (see Listing 6.3) to specify the norms
that should be initiated subject to the condition of the IPD: (i) when a high IPD is
required, the agent is obliged and permitted to avoid collision with the player; (ii) when
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a low IPD is required, the agent is obliged and permitted to greet the player.
Listing 6.3 : Consequence Rules
1 intArrived(P) initiates
2 perm(avoidCollision(Ag, P)),
3 obl(avoidCollision(Ag, P), deadline, violpoliteness(Ag))




8 obl(greet(Ag, P), deadline, violpoliteness(Ag))
9 if lowIPD(Agt, P);
Reasoning about Polite Behaviour using ASP
Once polite behaviours are specified using InstAL , it can be then translated automat-
ically into the a computational model in ASP, which sets the stage for the normative
reasoning performed by the Answer Set Solver, Clingo. What follows is a fragment of
ASP code for the initiation of the obligation norms translated from the InstAL formal
model (see Listing 6.4).














The process of realising social reasoning consists of: (i) translation of specifi-
cations from InstAL into ASP code, (ii) generation of all possible answer sets using
observed events, the rules of the specification, and the constraints on answer set gener-
ation, and (iii) querying the resulting answer sets for behavioural actions for the agents.
Such a series of processes takes place in the ‘Social Reasoning(ASP)’ component of
the ‘Normative Framework’ seen in Figure 4-4.
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The query should result in the identification of ‘correct’ (somehow polite) behaviour
as a form of social norms. A fragment of an answer set representing social norms is
shown in Listing 6.5. It shows the normative consequences of a query following the
observation of an external event that a player is detected:












Provided with the friendship information that jason2 is a friend of the player
p1, whilst jason1 is not, the normative consequences generated for agent jason1
and jason2 are shown as above. The agent jason1 is obliged to perform
action avoidCollision before the deadline, otherwise, a violation event
violpoliteness is produced. For jason2, the obligation is to greet the player.
Decision Making with Norms in N-Jason Agents
As mentioned in Chapter 4, such normative consequences may become a part of belief
or trigger sub-goals or goals presented as follows. At the same time, the N-Jason BDI
agent (seen in the middle of Figure 4-4) then carries out the decision making, and sends
a sequence of action plans to the virtual character to perform motor actions.
Listing 6.6 : An Example of N-Jason Agent Program
1 % Norms as (Sub-)Goals
2 @plan_avoid_collision[duration(30)]
3 +!avoidCollision(NPC, PC)





9 +!greet(NPC, PC) : lowIPD & ˜highIPD





14 +!greeting : ˜lowIPD & highIPD
15 <- greeting(bow).
16
17 % Norms as a Belief
18 @plan_be_polite[duration(30)]
19 +obl(ACT, D, P) : ACT = avoidCollision & ˜lowIPD & highIPD
20 <- +!avoidCollision(_,_)[deadline(D), priority(P)].
Listing 6.6 is a fragment of N-Jason agent program for polite behaviour in indi-
vidual navigation. Due to the run-time norm execution mechanism in N-Jason (de-
scribed in Section 5.3.3), plans such as @plan avoid collision and @plan -
greeting can be triggered when relevant obligations are adopted in agent mind.
These plans inherit the deadline and priority that obligations have in its representation.
Then N-Jason starts the norm-aware deliberation on (norm triggered) deontic goals
and ordinary goals through intention scheduling with deadlines and priorities (shown
in Section 5.3.4). In the following section, we introduce the actual realisation of those
external actions.
6.2.2 Low Level Modelling
Prediction of Potential Collisions
The simple approach for the prediction of potential collisions is inspired by the social
force model [Helbing and Molnar, 1995]. Both characters are modelled as cylinders,
which are rp in radius for PCs, and rv for NPCs, respectively. Physical collisions occur
when the distance between PCs and NPCs is less than rp + rv. Likewise, the scanning
range is modelled as a cylinder, with a radius of Rs in order to verify the proximity
between PC and NPC.
Once PC comes inside the scanning range Rs, then the NPC investigates and pre-
dicts using the following information: (i) vectors representing the direction of char-
acters, determine whether collisions will occur or not (see Figure 6-1), and (ii) the
intimacy determined by the inter-personal distance (IPD) [Hayduk, 1983], which al-
lows a NPC to approach closer to a PC. The velocity is not considered since all agents












Figure 6-1: Prediction of Potential Collisions
Resolution of Physical Collisions
Once collision avoidance is decided upon, subject to the IPD between PC and NPC, the
new position of a NPC is then updated by the same model proposed in [Allen et al.,
2012] inspired by the Reciprocal Velocity Obstacle (RVO) algorithm [van den Berg
et al., 2008].
RVO in principle takes into account a set of non-colliding velocities for NPC to
follow, in order to avoid collisions amongst virtual characters. Based upon this, NPC
attempts to reach its new location by setting a desirable velocity whenever the potential
collision is predicted between PC and NPC. Given the current location of NPC at lv and
PC at lp, the preferred velocity vp for NPC to follow is simply
vp =
lp − lv
‖lp − lv‖ (6.1)
With the preferred velocity vp, the new location lv ′ that avoids collision at lv, the
current position of NPC, is therefore determined by
lv
′ = lv + vp((rp + rv)− ‖lp − lv‖) (6.2)
where vp is a preferred velocity for NPC, lp and lv are the current location of PC and
NPC, respectively, and rp and rv are the radii of PC and NPC, respectively. Equation 6.2
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Figure 6-2: Road Scenario
implies that NPC is able to avoid the collision with PC by moving to the new location
lv
′ from the current location lv at a preferred velocity vp when PC is moving towards
the NPC’s location lv at a velocity vp.
6.2.3 Evaluation
Experiments
We conduct a brief experiment chosen from [Allen et al., 2012] to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of using polite behaviours for navigation in VEs. Two simple navigation
scenarios are designed: navigation on the open road and in a doorway, seen in Fig-
ure 6-2 and 6-3, respectively. The main task of PCs is to reach the destination by
passing through the group of avatars, which are moving in the opposite direction to the
players.We assume that there may be moderate space between avatars which ensures
players can walk between them without much effort.
In accordance with the scenario, the institutional model introduced in Section 6.2.1
is in charge of social reasoning in this experiment. The individual norm-aware cognitive
reasoning is carried out by the agent program shown in Section 6.2.1.
The experiments are carried out in the Second Life [Linden Labs, 2014] virtual
world. Players directly log in to the main server using its client program. These PCs
are manipulated by an ordinary keyboard as usual for most human users. The virtual
agents are created by libOMV [OpenMetaverse Organization, 2012], and are controlled
by BDI reasoning agents. 10 virtual agents are used for a formation of a group in both
scenarios. Each scenario is played out for 40 trials, split equally into 20 for polite
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Figure 6-3: Doorway Scenario
agents and 20 for otherwise.
The collision detection is achieved programmatically by (i) capturing collision no-
tifications from the Second Life server, and (ii) measuring distance at the same time,
between PCs and virtual agents. Both are perceived by virtual agents internally. Note
that we only take account of collisions between PCs and virtual agents in these experi-
ments: PC-PC and NPC-NPC collisions are not considered.
Results












Table 6.1: Statistics of collisions
These results suggest that polite agents provide quicker and easier navigation in
crowded VEs. In both scenarios, we can say that passing through a group of po-
lite agents is smoother and collision-free compared to that within a group of impolite
agents.
Figure 6-4 and 6-5 also demonstrate the effectiveness of the politeness of virtual
agents using social reasoning. In the first scenario, a high density group of agents
provides a enough space for the PC to be able to pass through with little or no change
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Figure 6-4: Polite Behaviour on the Road
of direction. Similarly, the player is rarely observed being obstructed by polite virtual
characters despite the doorway being somewhat narrow and that many agents are still
moving around in that space4.
It may be appropriate to emphasise that all the virtual agents participating in this
experiment are fully autonomous. There is no pre-training process or learning process
involved, so each run will see different individual action sequences: the agents are not
automata that do the same thing each time hence the necessity for multiple runs. In our
model, agent autonomy is developed on the basis of temporal reasoning with sequence
of event occurrences, which provides a degree of flexibility making it applicable for a
range of circumstances. In addition, thanks to the use of autonomous and norm-aware
4The video clip is available via http://people.bath.ac.uk/jl495/video/
politeness.wmv
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Figure 6-5: Polite Behaviour in Doorway
N-Jason agents, more rich behaviours may be presented with the combination of social






Figure 6-6: The Concept Human Territories and Organisation
6.3 Politeness in Group Navigation
As noted in Section 6.1.2, this section presents the second case study based upon the
guided tour scenario. In principle, the main purpose of this section is to exhibit polite-
ness between groups in the same way as it is shown between individuals (in particular
between PCs and NPCs) in Section 6.2. To this end, we begin with the illustration
of social dynamics between indviduals inside the group subject to Human Territoriality
model [Scheflen and Ashcraft, 1976] (see Figure 6-6) introduced in Section 2.2.1. Then
we describe polite behaviour between groups (i.e. avoiding disturbance of other group)
whose underlying concept is described in Section 6.2.
The structure of this section is exactly the same as that of previous section. At the
beginning (Section 6.3.1), we describe the high level model specifying social norms
with respect to both the human territoriality model and politeness between groups, and
its associated decision making in DNA3. Afterwards, we present in Section 6.3.2 the
low level modelling, which realises inter-group politeness driven by collision avoid-
ance, as well as the Human Territoriality model [Scheflen and Ashcraft, 1976] in group
formation. This is followed by the evaluation including experiment settings and results
in Section 6.3.3.
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6.3.1 High Level Modelling
Specifying Politeness in Group Formation
Same as the previous scenario in Section 6.2, we use InstAL shown in Section 4.3.1 to
construct the institution coordinating the behaviour on the group level. As discussed in
Section 6.2.1, this constructed institution is an ‘Institution Specification’ of the ‘Norma-
tive Framework’ seen on the right of Figure 4-4. In here, we show a fragment of InstAL
code for the initiation of social norms (representing correct behaviour during the for-
mation of a group) in response to exogenous events, generation rules and consequece
rules.
We define exogenous events in order to indicate the physical events shown in List-
ing 6.7: (i) see(Agent, Agent) indicates the external events that a tour guide
is seen by a NPC. (ii) requestToJoin(Agent, Agent) represents that the NPC
sends a request to be a member of the tour guide’s group. (iii) agreeToJoin(Agent,
Agent) refers to the physical events that the tour guide agrees to the request. (iv) Then,
join(Agent, Agent) can be detected as soon as the NPC joins as a member of
the tour guide’s group (physically, this means the NPC is now located in the member
territory of the tour guide). (v) follow indicates the physical events that a tour guide
is now moving. (vi) When the NPC has left the group, escapeGroup(Agent,
Agent) is detected. Whenever exogenous events are detected, those events generate
the corresponding institutional events.
Listing 6.7 : Exogenous Events and Generation Rules
1 exogenous event see(Agent, Agent);
2 see(Ag, AgLeader) generates
3 intSee(Ag, AgLeader);
4
5 exogenous event requestToJoin(Agent, Agent);
6 requestToJoin(Ag, AgLeader) generates
7 intRequestToJoin(Ag, AgLeader);
8
9 exogenous event agreeToJoin(Agent, Agent);
10 agreeToJoin(Ag, AgLeader) generates
11 intAgreeToJoin(Ag, AgLeader);
12
13 exogenous event join(Agent, Agent);




17 exogenous event follow(Agent, Agent);
18 follow(Ag, AgLeader) generates
19 intFollow(Ag, AgLeader);
20
21 exogenous event escapeGroup(Agent, Agent);
22 escapeGroup(Ag, AgLeader) generates
23 intEscapeGroup(Ag, AgLeader);
A set of consequence rules are also provided to specify the norms that should be
initiated subject to the current state as well as condition (see Listing 6.8). For example,
when a NPC (denoted as Ag) finds a tour guide whose role is leader, the NPC is per-
mitted to send a request to join, which in turn initiates the permission and obligation
with DEADLINE and PRIORITY 5 to join the group of the tour guide (denoted
as AgLeader) (line 1–18). As soon as the NPC joins the group, the role is changed to
member (line 20–22). When the NPC has joined in the group, it is obliged to follow a
tour guide within a given time ( DEADLINE ) and priority ( PRIORITY ).
Listing 6.8 : Consequence Rules
1 % if an agent sees a leader,
2 % then it’s permitted to request join




7 if roleOf(AgLeader, leader);
8





14 intAgreeToJoin(Ag, AgLeader) initiates
15 perm(join(Ag, AgLeader)),




20 % update the role of the agent Ag to be group member
21 intJoin(Ag, AgLeader) initiates
22 roleOf(Ag, member);
23
24 % agent Ag has to follow the leader
5For ease of reading, we use symbols representing a deadline and a priority instead of assigning real
numbers.
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25 % before the _DEADLINE_
26 intJoin(Ag, AgLeader) initiates
27 obl(follow(Ag, AgLeader), _DEADLINE_, _PRIORITY_);
28










39 % terminates the role of agent Ag
40 % once it leaves the group
41 intEscapeGroup(Ag, AgLeader) terminates
42 roleOf(Ag, member);;
Reasoning about Polite Behaviour using ASP
Same as the individual politeness model shown in Section 6.2.1, once polite behaviours
in the group are specified using InstAL , it can be then translated automatically into
the a computational model in ASP, which sets the stage for the normative reasoning
performed by the Answer Set Solver, Clingo. What follows is a fragment of ASP code
for the initiation of the obligation norms translated from the InstAL formal model (see
Listing 6.9.







The process of social reasoning in here is exactly same as the process shown in
Section 6.3.1. Again, this social reasoning process takes place in the ‘Social Reason-
ing(ASP)’ component of the ‘Normative Framework’ in Figure 4-4. A fragment of an
answer set representing social norms is shown in Listing 6.10. It shows the normative
consequences of a query following the observation of an external event that a NPC is
detected:
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Listing 6.10 : Answer Set representing Social Norms
1 % Event Traces
2 observed(see(jason2, jason1), group, 0).
3 observed(requestToJoin(jason2, jason1), group, 1).
4 observed(agreeToJoin(jason2, jason1), group, 2).
5 observed(join(jason2, jason1), group, 3).
6







Given the physical events updating status on the formation of the guided tour group
between jason2, a NPC that wishes to be a member, and jason1, a tour guide, the
normative consequences generated for virtual character jason1 and jason2 are as
shown above. The agent jason2 is obliged to perform action follow before the
DEADLINE with PRIORITY , otherwise a violation occurs.
Decision Making with Norms in N-Jason
In this scenario, two types of N-Jason agents (seen at the middle of Figure 4-4) are
used: the one is a leader agent acting as a tour guide. The other is a member agent acting
as a member of guided tour. Basically, as shown in the first scenario in Section 6.2.1,
normative consequences adopted by a N-Jason agent could trigger sub-goals or goals
by run-time norm execution mechanism. Otherwise, the adopted norms may become a
part of belief in the agent mind. Then, norm-aware deliberation begins to choose a plan
to execute, taking into account deadlines and priorities.
Listing 6.11 is a fragment of a leader agent specification. When a certain NPC joins
as a member of the leader agent’s group, the leader agent updates a number of members
and their names in its belief base (see @plan members join). Afterwards, the
leader agent updates its territory mode and inter-personal distance with pubcli under
the condition that the leader agent has the member(s). Otherwise, the territorial mode
and its inter-personal distance become social (see @plan update territory -
social). The duration of each plan is fixed as 30, and priority and deadline are set
with the default values of infinity and zero, respectively.
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Listing 6.11 : A Fragment of a Leader Agent Program
1 @plan_members_join[duration(30)]
2 +join(NAME) : not too_much(member) &
3 my_member(NAME) & not has_member(NAME)
4 <- .date(YY, MM, DD); .time(HH, NN, SS);
5 +add(YY, MM, DD, HH, NN, SS, member, NAME);




10 +!update_territory_mode : territory(T) &
11 .count(add(YY, MM, DD, HH, NN, SS, member, NAME), CNT) &





17 +!update_territory_mode : territory(T) &
18 .count(add(YY, MM, DD, HH, NN, SS, member, NAME), CNT) &
19 CNT < 1
20 <- +territory(social);
21 update_ipd(social).
The leader agent in this scenario is governed by the institutinal model for polite be-
haviour in navigation of individuals shown in Section 6.2.1. When the leader (NPC in
this case) detects the other leader (PC), then the plan for avoiding collisions is selected
and thus executed with its own territory mode (either public or social) exactly the same
as the agent in Section 6.2.1.
Listing 6.12 is a fragment of a member agent program. When the obli-
gation obl(follow( , ), DEADLINE , PRIORITY ) is adopted, a plan
@plan join group is triggered by the run-time norm execution mechanism in
N-Jason in order to join a guided tour. Since the member agent is now a member of
the leader, inter-personal distance between agent itself and a leader is zero which im-
plies the member agent does not have to be governed by the institutional model for
polite behaviour in navigation described in Section 6.2.1. Due to the characteristics of
the run-time norm execution mechanism, deadline and priority of the plan @plan -
join group 1 are same as those of the adopted obligation as explained in Sec-
tion 5.3.36.
6See Event-Reconsideration in Section 5.3.3 for more details
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Listing 6.12 : A fragment of a Member Agent Program
1 @plan_join_group[duration(30)]










12 +!escape_group(ROLE, NAME)[priority(5), deadline(60)]
13 : ROLE = guide & has_seen(guide)





6.3.2 Low Level Modelling
Formation of Groups
As noted in Section 6.2.2, all virtual characters are modelled as cylinders inspired by
social force model [Helbing and Molnar, 1995]. In the previous section, each character
has a radius depending on the role, either PC or NPC. We in here extend this cylinderical
model: each character has a radius depending on the role (either member or leader) and
its associated territory mode. In this experiment, the radius of the leader character is
either rpub denoting public territory when be with members or rsoc representing social
territory otherwise. In case of the group member agents, the radius is rper denoting
personal territory with a leader or rsco as an individual. Figure 6-7 renders the idea on
group formation based upon the concept of human territory seen in Figure 6-6. This
formation is a means for the prediction of physical collision between groups in the
following section.
Prediction of Potential Collisions between Groups
Given the formation shown in Figure 6-7, physical collision can be detected when the
distance between groups is less than 2(rsoc+rper). The scanning range is also modelled
as a cylinder with a radius of rpub. We assume the scanning radius rpub is always greater

























Figure 6-8: Prediction of Potential Collisions between Groups
The criterion for the prediction of collision detection shown in the right side of
Figure 6-8 is exactly same as described in Section 6.2.2. Whenever the one group G
comes inside the public territory of the other group G′, then G′ predicts the potential
collision using vectors representing the direction of G, determines whether collisions
will occur or not (see Figure 6-8). The velocity is not considered.
Resolution of Collisions between Groups
As introduced in Section 6.2.2, we use the same model poposed in [Allen et al., 2012],
inspired by the Reciprocal Velocity Obstacle (RVO) algorithm [van den Berg et al.,
2008], in this scenario when collision avoidance is decided (see Section 6.2.2 for more
details).
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Given the current location of the NPC tour guide (i.e. leader) at lv and a PC tour
guide at lp, the preferred velocity vp for the NPC tour guide to follow is simply
vp =
lp − lv
‖lp − lv‖ (6.3)
Then, the new location lv ′ is determined by
lv
′ = lv + vp(2(rsoc + rper)− ‖lp − lv‖) (6.4)
where vp is a preferred velocity for NPC, lp and lv are the current location of PC and
NPC tour guide, respectively, and rsoc and rper are the radii of social territory and
personal territory, respectively (see Figure 6-6). Equation 6.4 represents a guided tour
group led by a NPC guide, so that it is able to avoid the collision with the other guided
tour group led by a PC guide by moving to the new location lv ′ from the current location
lv at a preferred velocity vp, when the PC’s guided tour group is moving towards the
NPC’s location lv at a velocity vp.
6.3.3 Evaluation
Experiments
We conduct the same experiment chosen from [Allen et al., 2012] as we did in Sec-
tion 6.2.3. In here, only one scenario of group navigation is considered: navigation in
a museum seen in Figure 6-9. The main task of one group G led by the tour guide (i.e.
leader, PC) is to reach the destination by passing through the other group G′, which are
moving in the opposite direction to the players.
In accordance with the scenario, two institutional models are involved in social
reasoning in this experiment: the one is the model of ‘Polite Behaviour in Navigation’
introduced in Section 6.2.1, and the other is ‘Politeness in Group Formation’ model
shown in 6.3.1. The individual norm-aware cognitive reasoning is carried out by two
agents, a leader and a member, as described in Section 6.3.1.
The experimental settings are almost same as those in Section 6.2.3. One different
factor is that 8 virtual agents are used for a formation of a group in this scenario. After
an experiment on group formation, the experiment on politeness in group navigation is
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Figure 6-9: Museum Scenario
played out for 40 trials, split equally into 20 for polite groups and 20 for otherwise. The
collision detection is achieved programmatically by (i) capturing collision notifications
from the Second Life server, and (ii) measuring distance at the same time, between
groups. Both are perceived by virtual agents internally. The same as the previous
setting, we only measure collisions between PCs and virtual agents and PC-PC and
NPC-NPC collisions are not considered.
Results
Figure 6-10: Polite Behaviour – Group Formation
Figure 6-10 shows how individuals are gathering in order to form a group around a
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tour guide (i.e. a leader). The male virtual character in a black t-shirt is a leader, and
rest of them are members joining the guided tour7.
The statistics for collisions are shown in Table 6.2, where µ and σ are the mean
and standard deviation, respectively. The impression from this result is almost same
as that in Section 6.2.3. This result with Figure 6-11 confirms that politeness in group
behaviour also presents quicker and easier navigation experiences in VEs than with an






Table 6.2: Statistics of collisions Between Groups
In this case study, same as the previous scenario, all the intelligent virtual agents are
fully autonomous. There is no pre-training or learning undertaken, neither on the new
environment (e.g. museum) nor on which plans to execute. The same applies to the
institutional models. Both of them (agents and insitutions) are actually developed on
the basis of logic-based reasoning with sequence of event occurences, which promises
a degree of flexibility being applicable for a range of circumstances. For example, the
institutional model governing the politeness in navigation successfully carries out the
social reasoning thus regulates intelligent virtual agents behaviour regardless of envi-
ronmeatal/situational changes in this experiment. Likewise, a norm-aware behaviour of
virtual characters (avoiding disturbance of others in this case) is presented well under
the same circumstances. Not only is the situation changed from individuals to groups
navigation but also the environment changed from road, doorway to museum, the re-
sult, the pattern of statistics of collision avoidance is the same. These examples can
be seen as an evidence that the logic-based approach to design both social and cogni-
tive reasoning is able to improve the flexibility in presenting a degree of norm-aware
behaviour of virtual characters at any time in any place.
7The video clip is available via http://people.bath.ac.uk/jl495/video/group.wmv
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6.4 Politeness in Emergency Situation
This section presents the third case study, an evacuation scenario under the emergency
situation as described in Section 6.1.2. When there is a fire alarm during a guided tour
in the museum, virtual characters exhibit a different type of polite behaviour depending
on their roles. Moreover they should act rationally with respect to urgency as well as
importance, as polite behaviour requires. Given this case study, we expect to show both
flexibility in social norms and rationality in decision making of DNA3 as discussed in
Section 6.1.3.
This section is organised as follows: In Section 6.4.1, the institutional model of
the evacuation scenario and its associated agent programs are described. Then the low
level modelling, an implementation side, is illustrated in Section 6.4.2. In the end, the
evaluation including experimental settings and results is presented in Section 6.4.3.
6.4.1 High Level Modelling
Specifying Politeness under Emergency Situation
The institutional model in this section is relatively simpler than those in the previous
sections (Section 6.2.1 and 6.3.1). Listing 6.13 shows a fragment of InstAL code of the
Politeness under Emergency Situation institution, which is ‘Institution Specification’
in the ‘Normative Framework’ on the right of Figure 4-4. Here, we firstly define the
exogenous event detectEmergency(Agent) to indicate the physical event (fire
alarm in this scenario) detected by a virtual character Agent. This exogenous event
generates the corresponding institutional event instOblEscape(Agent) which in
turn brings about the obligation obl(exit building(Agent), 1000, 100)
whose deadline and priority are 1000 and 100, respectively.
Listing 6.13 : Events and Generation/Consequence Rule
1 % Agent detects the occurrence of emergency (e.g. fire alarm)
2 exogenous event detectEmergency(Agent);
3 inst event instOblEscape(Agent);
4
5 % Generation Rule
6 detectEmergency(Agent) generates instOblEscape(Agent);
7




11 obl(exit_building(Agent), 1000, 100);
Reasoning about Polite Behaviour using ASP
Like the previous case studies, once polite behaviour is specified using InstAL , it can
be then translated automatically into the a computational model in ASP, which sets
the stage for the normative reasoning performed by the Answer Set Solver, Clingo,
taking place in the ‘Social Reasoning(ASP)’ component of the ‘Normative Framework’
in Figure 4-4. Listing 6.14 is a fragment of ASP code for the initiation of the obligation
norms translated from the InstAL formal model.






A fragment of an answer set representing social norms is shown in Listing 6.15. It
shows the normative consequences of a query following the observation of an external
event that the fire alarm is detected:
Listing 6.15 : Answer Set representing Social Norms











Given the physical event, namely the detection of the fire alarm, the normative
consequences generated for the agent jason are shown as above. The agent jason is now
obliged to perform action exit building before the 1000 with 100, otherwise a
violation occurs.
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Decision Making with Norms in N-Jason
In this scenario, two types of N-Jason agents (seen at the middle of Figure 4-4) are
used, a leader and a member, same as those in Section 6.2.1.
Listing 6.16 is a fragment of a leader agent in this scenario. When an obligation
is detached, it triggers the goal with same deadline and priority the obligation imposes
under run-time norm execution in N-Jason. In response, an agent whose role is a tour
guide (i.e. leader) has two choices. The one is direct engagement in the rescue of
members as seen in the plan @plan escape building 1. When its member(s)
are still left under its control, then the leader shouts out the escape message in order
to inform to all mebers in the museum. If all members escape safely, then the leader
agent itself now escapes the building. When there is no obligation detached but the
leader agent perceives the fire alarm, the goal +!exit building is triggered with
deadline (50) and priority (20).
Listing 6.16 : A fragment of a Leader Agent Program in Evacuation
1 +fire_alarm : true














Unlike the leader agent, the first option for members is to escape the building as
soon as possible (see Listing 6.17). If there is still a leader with the group members,
then the members may be able to follow the leader.







6.4.2 Low Level Modelling
As seen in Figure 6-12, there are three types of behaviour in the evacuation scenario.
The most common behaviour (in particular for member agents) we can expect is to exit
as soon as possible as shown on the right of Figure 6-12. The behaviour shown in both
left and middle of Figure 6-12 is a polite behaviour of leader agents. They communicate
to their group members to escape the building by shouting and waving hands.
6.4.3 Evaluation
Experiments
Continuing from the previous group navigation settings in Section 6.3.3, we conduct
the experiment with a scenario of a evacuation model. During the guided tour, when
the alarm is detected by one of virtual characters, the experiment starts.
In accordance with the scenario, two institutional models are involved in social
reasoning in this experiment: the one is the model of ‘Polite Behaviour in Navigation’
introduced in Section 6.2.1 in order to coordinate the group navigation, and the other
is ‘Politeness under Emergency Situation’ model shown in 6.4.1 for the evacuation
scenario. The individual norm-aware cognitive reasoning is carried out by two agents,
a leader and a member, as described in Section 6.3.1.
The experiment is conducted in the same place shown in Figure 6-9 with the same
experimental settings described in Section 6.3.3. Here, we measure the response time of
the virtual character when the obligation is detached. To see the enhancement of ratio-
nality in decision making of DNA3more accurately, we conduct the experiements with
three configuration: (i) with N-Jason and the obligation which has the highest priority,
(ii) with N-Jason and the obligation which has the lowest priority, and (iii) without
N-Jason i.e. use a conventional Jason which is not capable of norm-aware reasoning.
The response time is a elapsed time between the time the obligation is adopted in
the agent mind and the time the corresponding plan is executed8. The detection of time
8More precisely, we measure the time when the obligation is added as a goal triggering event in
the event base (in addEvent()) and the time when the intention selected by intention scheduling is
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stamp and calculation of elapsed time are achieved programmatically.
Results
The overall statistics for response time (in millisecond) are shown in Table 6.3, where
µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation, respectively9.
Museum
Agent Type µ σ
Response Time (ms)
N-Jason (highest priority) 1.56 0.04
N-Jason (lowest priority) 10.37 0.55
Conventional Jason 5.07 0.21
Table 6.3: Statistics of Response Time
Also Figure 6-13 demonstrates the result that how the evacuation is performed in
the museum. When there is a fire alarm during a guided tour in the museum, every
virtual character stops the current behaviour immediately. One group starts to escape
the museum (the right side of the first image) but the other group (the left side of the first
image). Once one of leaders starts and keep shouting, then the members of the leader
are escaping the museum (the second and third image). In the end, every member
successfully escapes the museum and waits for another notice (the fourth image). 10.
The result in Table 6.3 shows that the highest priority of a plan enables the most
expeditious response. In constrast, the lowest priority causes the tardiest response.
Compared to the case of using a conventional Jason which is not able to norm-aware
deliberation, it is obvious that a degree of priority in norms and goals definitely affects
the rational choice of behaviour. Assuming that a virtual character has a very important
goal to achieve, and norms which the situaion requires participants to comply are less
important to the virtual character. Then, it can be seen rational that the virtual character
choose its individual goal instead of norms, and vice versa.
Given this result and its implication, the rationality in decision making on norms
and goals can be improved by norm-aware deliberation in N-Jason. In addition, this
excuted (in reasoningCycle()) just after the practical reasoning in N-Jason
9Usually, three intentions are observed in the intention scheduling. The one is +!exit -
building(AG) triggered by the obligation, and the other two is an intention triggered by the position
update events from the virtual character (every 25ms) which is not seen in Listing 6.16.
10The video clip is available via http://people.bath.ac.uk/jl495/video/group_
escape.wmv
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norm-aware reasoning capability is able to contribute to the enhancement of norm-
autonomy. According to the definition on autonomy by Castelfranchi [Castelfranchi,
1995], it could be an ability of an agent which can abandon something to do despite it is
capable of doing that. Likewise, norm-autonomy is an ability to give up the compliance
of the norm although an agent can comply the norm. N-Jason is able to do that by
measuring the importance and imminence of goals and norms. In consequence, the
compliance of norms can be abandoned thus violation is possible by norm-autonomy
of N-Jason although it is capable of complying the norms.
6.5 Limitation
Notwithstanding the positive results above of the collision avoidance model for individ-
uals and groups, and evacuation model that are achieved by the incorporation of social
as well as norm-aware cognitive reasoning, there are some issues to discuss regarding
the matter of taking measurements from experiments in Second Life (SL).
The unusual definition of collision in SL weakens the reliability of the statistics of
collision detection. In the SL server, collisions are only detected when one avatar’s
position is changed by being pushed by another. Only in this case is the collision
actually detected and communicated to the client side. So, some cases which do not
satisfy those condition may not be counted as collisions, even though they may be
clearly observed by human eyes.
The client-server architecture is another factor interfering with the immediate de-
tection of collisions. In the SL system, the metrics (such as position, orientation and
velocity etc) of avatars come from the server to update client-local information, which
might be used for monitoring the movement of others. However, packet loss, trans-
mission delay and status up-date failure can all contribute to inaccuracy in movement
detection. As a result, again, not all collisions may be counted.
Lastly, if an avatar keeps moving all the time, sometimes this avatar can not detect
any event or the movement of other. This is serious because not all collisions can be
reported, even if everything is witnessed.
For more precise and accurate measurement, it seems that manual counting of col-
lisions using recorded video sequences [Allen et al., 2012] is the only reliable method.
An alternative solution is to change to a different VE.
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6.6 Summary
As we suggested at the outset, polite behaviour in virtual agents is promising for the ef-
ficiency and naturalism in navigation in dynamic virtual environments. To support this,
we propose DNA3 combined with normative frameworks which is capable of mod-
elling, reasoning and decision making about polite behaviour under social situations
in conjuction with N-Jason which is able to provide norm-aware individual reasoning.
Using this architecture, three case studies are explored. Firstly, avoiding disturbance
of others’ navigation [Allen et al., 2012], between PCs and virtual agents subject to
inter-personal distance, is demonstrated as a simple example in a real-world 3D vir-
tual environment. Then, the same navigation model between groups subject to Human
Territoriality model [Scheflen and Ashcraft, 1976] is demonstrated in the same place.
In both two studies, PCs are able to pass through a group of virtual agents, and navi-
gate around them with relative ease. Afterwards, the evacuation model is presented at
the end. Here, NPCs are able to show different types of polite behaviour depending
on the different settings (e.g. roles) in the situations within rational response time the
situations require.
Compared to the literature we cite, the framework developed as DNA3 has more
generality and flexibility to be applied for all circumstances without pre-defined envi-
ronmental data and its associated sets of behaviour. This is because it depends upon
rule-based, temporal reasoning with a sequence of event occurrences, rather than a
spatial reasoning systems which needs suitable training data. Also all forms of polite
behaviours can be created subject to the theory of politeness thanks to the main func-
tionalities in normative frameworks. In addition, we use norm autonomous and delib-
erative agents, by means of which more rational behaviours may be presented through
the combination of social reasoning and individual reasoning at any time and in any
place.
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Figure 6-11: Polite Behaviour – Groups Navigation in the Museum
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Figure 6-12: Polite Behaviour – Types of Evacuation




We now would like to recall Bandura’s argument [Bandura, 2001].
“People do not live their life only in individual autonomy.”
In reality, people cannot always pursue what they really want to do: sometimes
they give up their own desire depending on the social context. With the consideration
of social factors in the context, individuals instead gladly comply with “the way things
are” or “the way things should be” [Stein, 1993, Stein, 1997] when the behaviour is
socially more worthy during their social activities. This implies that the determination
of human behaviour is an outcome of the interplay between individual knowledge and
social structures as proposed in socio-cognitive theory on human choices [Stein, 1993,
Bandura, 2001, Akgu¨n et al., 2003].
In this respect, it is not surprising that social intelligence substantially plays an
important role in human choices. Norms have a potential to contribute to advances
in this social intellience. As investigated in Section 4.2, the norms are socially con-
structed knowledge [Stein, 1993, Stein, 1997], which are established as a “common
sense” through the social cognition process of actions and interactions of members in
the society [Akgu¨n et al., 2003]. This nature, socially constructed beliefs representing
common sense, promises that norms not only offer a guidance about appropriate be-
haviour in the social situation, but also provide a sense of social expectations acting as
an interpretation window of interactions in that situation. Thus, these characteristics of
norms provide a good inspiration in the better comprehension of human behaviour, in
particular, when the causality between what individuals really want to do and what they
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can actually do is not explicilty seen in the social situation.
The domain of virtual characters research has accordingly given much attention to
take take into account the benefits of norms in the design and simulation of virtual
characters behaviour. However, as addressed in Chapters 1, 2 and 6, it has been chal-
lenging in the exhibition of naturalism in social behaviour of virtual characters due to:
(i) a lack of capability in reasoning about norms subject to changes of situations, and
(ii) a lack of norm-autonomy in individual reasoning. Within this context, the main
objective in this thesis is to take advantage of such characteristics of norms in virtual
agents’ behaviour, possibly through the hybrid approach incorporating social structures
(i.e. “common sense”) and individual knowledge (i.e. “private sense”) inspired by
socio-cognitive theory [Stein, 1993, Bandura, 2001, Akgu¨n et al., 2003].
Now we present the overall contributions and reflections in detail in Section 7.1. It
is then followed by future work in Section 7.2.
7.1 Contribution
As discussed in Section 1.3, the primary contribution of this thesis is:
“The provision of Distributed Norm-Aware Agent Architecture (DNA3) via
the combination of social reasoning and cognitive reasong in order to en-
gineer norm-aware behaviour in virtual characters”.
In theory, DNA3 pursues the faciliation of socio-cognitive perspective on the prac-
tical reasoning process of virtual characters by the combination of social (norms) rea-
soning on the social level and norm-aware cognitive reasoning on the individual level.
In practice, DNA3 is a programming framework for the purpose of engineering norm-
aware virtual characters, which is established by the integration of: (i) the Institution,
also called a normative framework as a means to specifying and reasoning about norms,
(ii) N-Jason, a (BDI-type) cognitive agent carrying out the norm-aware practical rea-
soning and (iii) a virtual character in charge of perception and realisation of actions in
virtual environments.
In Section 1.2, we defined that the challenges leading to research questions which
have to be resolved in the design and simulation of norm-aware virtual characters. We
show that how these research challenges are solved through DNA3 in the following.
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1. The use of institutions in charge of social reasoning is a contribution of this the-
sis in response to Question 11 and 22 described in Chapter 1. Conceptually, the
institution can be seen as a means of social cognition which constructs the exter-
nal repositories of normative knowledge. The institution is in effect composed
of a set of rules of which aim is the governance of individual agents in MAS.
These rules describe consequences in response to knowledge or observations for
reasoning about the current context. As a result, the institution brings about a set
of situation-specific norms which can be a guidance representing appropriate/i-
nappropriate behaviour in the form of obligations, permissions and prohibitions.
Chapter 4 shows how this social reasoning is performed by the institutional model
incorporating with individual virtual characters. Firstly, in order to construct
the institutional model, we employ the declarative action language InstAL intro-
duced in Section 4.3.1 which specifies the social norms. Then, the InstAL model
can be translated automatically into the a computational model in ASP setting the
stage for the normative reasoning performed by the Answer Set Solver, Clingo.
Given this computational model, the social reasoning is accomplished through
the generation of all possible answer sets using a sequence of event occurrences
observed by multiple virtual agents. As a result, the institution brings about a new
set of situationally appropriate behaviour depending upon the social context vir-
tual characters encounter. Afterwards, the detachment of such a new set of norms
(more precisely normative consequences of specific actions) to virtual characters
takes place via run-time reasoning mechanism proposed in Section 4.4.
2. In consequence, such detached norms are adopted in virtual characters mind,
which in turn involved in the practical reasoning process of individual agents.
The other contribution of this thesis is the provision of N-Jason, a norm-aware
(BDI-type) cognitive agents proposed in Chapter 5 in response to Question 33.
The major role of N-Jason is to perform practical reasoning to select a plan to
execute through the norm-aware deliberation on norms and individual goals. In
principle, N-Jason offers a generic norm execution mechanism on top of norm-
aware deliberation in order to contribute to run-time norm compliance. Thus, it
1“How to reason about norms subject to dynamic changes of situations in which virtual characters
are involved”
2How to share the new set of norms (constructed by collectives) with virtual characters at run-time
3How to ensure norm-aware decision making in virtual characters’ behaviour
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is capable of the operationalisation of new and unknown norms not specified in
the agent program at run-time by judging the executability of those norms. In
the meantime, the selection of agent behaviour is achieved in the norm-aware
reasoning process by intention scheduling with priorities and deadlines. This
enables the evaluation of the relative importance and imminence between feasible
plans triggered by both detached norms and goals, so that confirms the decision
about which behaviour the agent would prefer.
3. Another contribution is the proposal of a middleware, the Bath-Sensor-Framework
(BSF) introduced in Chapter 3 in response to Question 2 and 4. In the domain of
intelligent virtual chatacters research, only a few virtual environments allow AI
programming for their participants. This is mainly caused by heterogeneity such
as differences in programming languages to develop the softwares and platforms
(or OS) to run softwares as discussed in Section 3.1 and 3.4. The BSF enables
the integration of these heterogeneous softwares as a middleware and its associ-
ated engineering methodology. With the pub/sub based communication on the
basis of the standard network protocol (XMPP), BSF facilitates the integration
of N-Jason, virtual characters in the VE and the institution by supporting mul-
tiple programming languagues and physically distributed locations of softwares
as a middleware shown in Chapter 3. In addition, the BSF provides communica-
tion channels in order to support the run-time sharing mechanism for observation
and social information between N-Jason, virtual characters and the institution
with the concept of a (topic-based) node as seen in Chapter 4 (particularly in
Section 4.4).
4. Taking advantage of DNA3 described above, three case studies, of which the main
concept is politeness in virtual characters’ behaviour, are conducted in Chap-
ter 6. According to theory of politeness, polite behaviour should consider both
conventional and interpersonal context in order to express appropriate politeness
depending on the social situations participants encounter. In this sense, DNA3
is able to demonstrate politeness properly by understanding the situations which
brings about situational-specific norms (driven by the institution) as well as con-
sidering the individual context and social context in agents mind (driven by norm-
aware reasoning by N-Jason). In here, polite behaviour of virtual characters
is demonstrated, which can be differently presented according to the situations.
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Firstly, avoiding disturbance of others’ navigation [Allen et al., 2012], between
PCs and virtual agents subject to inter-personal distance, is presented. Then, the
same navigation model between groups is presented in a different place. After-
wards, the evacuation model is demonstrated. With the analysis of both statistics
on the number of collisions in the first two experiments and statistics on the re-
sponse time, we can conclude that the use of DNA3 contributes to advances not
only in flexibility of reasoning about norms subject to changes of situations, but
also rationality in decision making on norms and goals.
7.2 Future Works
Possible extensions to the work proposed in this thesis are manifold. We describe
these future works in the context of the long-term goal, a provision of a social-aware
intelligent (virtual) agent.
Facilitation of Multiple Institution
We firstly discuss the facilitation of multiple institions. The use of only a single in-
sitution can be rather limited to specifying and reasoning about norms in the rich en-
vironments. In effect, the society where agents and humans are situated is not simple
enough to be described by a single institution. Thus, the computational framework of
the multiple institutions (MI) model is now considered to deal with richer situations in
for virtual characters.
Actually, in Chapter 6, we use a preliminary form of MI shown in Figure 7-1.
MI consists of two packages: the one is Institution Manager (InstManager afterwards)
and the other is Web based Institution Service. InstManager is a gateway to use the
MI connected by BSF between InstManager and a group of agents. The main role
of InstManager is: (i) subcribe external events, (ii) update instances of institution in
InstFactory (IF) and (iii) publish new normative states according to external events.
Figure 7-2 shows the sequence of above operations in detail.
The concept of multiple institution enables various sets of institutional specifica-
tions which are reasoning about various kinds of norms such as social rules, cultural
rules or laws. Perhaps, this rich set of institutions may be able to contribute to provide
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Figure 7-1: A Preliminary Concept of Multiple Institutions
Figure 7-2: A Sequence Diagram of Social Reasoning in Multiple Institutions
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more realistic social-awareness in virtual characters’ behaviour by deeper and better un-
derstanding of situations. However, in this setting, conflicts between institutions should
be considered. For this, the resolution of conflicts on the basis of inductive learning or
conflict avoidance algorithms can resolve the tension here, as discussed clearly in [Li
et al., 2013, Li, 2014].
Towards Social-Aware Cognitive Agents
Although N-Jason provides a level of rationality in deliberation on norms and individ-
ual goals, the more consideration is required to improve the norm-awareness.
First, norm-aware reasoning with deadlines and priorities requires a revision capa-
bility. Actually, this approach, norm-aware deliberation by intention scheduling with
deadlines and priorities has a limitation due to pre-designed values (e.g. deadline, pri-
ority) in the agent programs. For more flexibility and robustness, these values should
be re-assigned on the basis of adaptation to environments similar to the concept of dy-
namic assignment of a preference into plans proposed in [Padgham and Singh, 2013].
Depending on the agent types (e.g. BOID model [Broersen et al., 2002]) or the context
of environments (e.g. social meetings, formal meetings or crisis), the values describ-
ing the internal characteristics of norms/goals should be re-evaluated in response to the
adaptation process such as re-inforcement learning [Beheshti* et al., 2015]. The long
term goal is to take into account reputations, emotions norms and individual goals with
the identification of dynamics amongst them in a practical reasoning framework [Hoelz
and Ralha, 2014] as human brains studies on social awareness which are investigated
in sociology, psychology and economics.
To support the re-evaluation of values requires the detection of norms violation on
the N-Jason interpreter level. For example, the priority of a certain norm should be
increased when the norm violation happened in the agent mind, if the type of agent is
social according to the BOID model [Broersen et al., 2002]. This type of violation,
leading to the failure in execution of deontic plan that norms trigger, has an impact on
the agent mental states. Under the normative settings, this violation can also occur in the
process of norm adoption taking place in the belief update stage, and action selection
process at the intention selection stage. Given the plan failure detection mechanism
in BDI agents such as [Bordini and Hu¨bner, 2010], we can formalise the violation
representing the failure in execution of norms or when the normative goals are dropped
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during scheduling, thus ensuring the more accurate changes in social awareness in agent
mental states.
Another future works in which we are interested is the evaluation of the norm-aware
agents. Like the analysis of semantics and properties shown in [Bordini and Hu¨bner,
2010], [Alechina et al., 2012] and [Harland et al., 2014], operational semantics of norm
aware agents can be fully formalised. In addition, the probabilistic modelling of norm-
aware agent behaviour could be considered as it appears in [Winikoff and Cranefield,
2014, Vikhorev et al., 2011]. In conjunction with these theoretical evaluations, the
experimental settings allow to measure the metrics such as response time of the agent
subject to the adjusted values in norms and goals, or a number of plans in response
to norms executed by the compliance mechanism as [Bordini et al., 2002] or [Waters
et al., 2014] have done the comparative experimental evaluation of the agent reasoning
capability.
Towards better Politeness in Virtual Characters
Given the combination of social-aware cognitive agents described in 7.2 and multiple
institutions 7.2, we hope future research on politeness in virtual characters will enable
more delicate polite behaviours through the extended social/cultural model, but also
that politeness becomes usual amongst virtual characters, beyond the asymmetric re-
lationship in players and virtual agents. We also hope these polite virtual characters
will be able to interact human4 which perhaps could be a contribution to the training
purpose of serious games.
Politeness is inherently a qualitative judgement on behaviour, which would sug-
gest the need for quite challenging – from a science and psychology perspective, as
well as cost, time and repeatability – human-based studies. Consequently, we seek a
lighter weight quantitative mechanism as a proxy for the qualitative study, for which
factors such as number of changes of direction and the angular change involved in
passing through the crowd might be suitable indicators of the quality of the avoidance
mechanism. From an architectural perspective, multiple institutional models and re-
lated decision making mechanisms in BDI agents will be shown to provide a similar
circumstance with real human society.
4The video clip is accessible via http://cs.bath.ac.uk/˜jl495/kinect.wmv
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Towards a Better Performance Evaluation of BSF
As we discussed in Chapter 3, the evaluation of performace for BSF is not simple. Plans
for future work include a careful evaluation of performance issues, such as (i) the no-
tion of component subscription profiles, (ii) monitoring of communication in live sys-
tems, so that out-of-profile situations can be detected, (iii) development of mitigations,
such as throttling, replication and aggregation, (iv) experimentation with data handling
policies, such as discarding and (finite) buffering, amongst others and (v) exploring the
feasibility of applying corrective actions during execution, as well, of course, as the
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